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ABSTRACT
In Canada profound diversification of multiple moral, political and normative commitments of a
multiplicity of communities is unstoppable. Its historically liberalized, modernized and
secularized law dominates principles of procedural justice in expressing the monistic liberal
theory of rights now entrenched as individual rights within its charter. For religious believers,
basing legal and political life on moral behavior acquired through generations of norms is
integral to both security of state, and integrity of multiple communities. Tension exists between
religious rights, demands of different visions of the good life, secular politics and the slow
reshaping of liberal constitutional law in recognizing religious pluralism in the context of
freedom of religion guarantees. The greatest challenge in liberal freedom of religion
jurisprudence is to balance equality and difference and attain judicial consistency. If conflicting
normative systems are not able to combine their respective power and co-exist, the potential of
conflicts to escalate is serious.
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INTRODUCTION - The Limits of Modern, Secular Liberal Legalism:
Restraining Different Ethics in the Context of Equal Religious
Citizenship
“In a plural world, law is an ongoing process of articulation, adaptation, re-articulation, absorption,
resistance, deployment, and on and on. It is a process that never ends …; study the multiplicity and
engage in the conversation rather than impose a top-down framework that cannot help but distort the
astonishing variety on the ground.” 1

A. Overview: The monistic claims of modern, liberal, and secular values
Today, the modern Western democratic state broadly engages in the rule of, and
the organization of, social life by a set of fundamental liberal rules and principles as set
out in its constitution. The notion of the rule of liberal constitutional law—the normative
political philosophy of all modern Western states—describes a purposive and an effective
legal system that: respects individual identity; is generally obeyed and breaches of which
are enforceable by the state; limits government powers; and is itself independent of the
other branches of government and powerful private interests.2 Western secular law is part
of this liberal modernity. This systematic liberal political philosophy that is dominated
by an individualistic, secularist, universalistic and rationalistic framework is a product of
Western European legal tradition and culture that was voluntarily adopted by Western
countries as legal modernity.3 Constitutional law now consists of statute law and
precedent (stare decisis) and in the West, it is part of the democratic system.
However, the current age is of a multiplicity of modernities, the next avatar of
Paul Schiff Berman, “A Pluralist Approach to International Law” (2007) 32 Yale J Int L 301 at
328 [hereafter Berman, “A Pluralist Approach”].
2
The Constitutional Law Group, Canadian Constitutional Law (3rd). (Toronto: Edmond
Montgomery Publications Limited, 2003) at 2 [hereafter CCL]; Wagner, Peter. A Sociology of
Modernity: Liberty and Discipline (London & New York: Routledge, 1994) at xi [hereinafter
Wagner, A Sociology of Modernity].
3
Wagner, ibid. The European ideology of classical liberalism grew out of struggles for liberation
from Stuart Kings in England. It was due to revolutions in Europe, the Glorious Revolution in
1688 in England and the Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789 that power shifted to
parliament with public and political authority finally resting in the people as democratic rights.
1
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this liberal modernity. There is therefore a co-existence within Western plural societies
of a multiplicity of meaning systems leading to multiple truth claims.4 In the West now,
there are spaces of forced coexistence of an “astonishing variety” of primary sources,
including of moral standards.5 The dominant and firmly rooted Western liberal secular
legal system is now required to lend order to plural normative lives in their midst.
In Canada, in 1982, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) was
enacted as a basic feature of the Canadian constitution.6 Although, since 1982, these
values have been reassessed and even restructured with complex politics and
philosophies about multiculturalism, disagreements on major social transformations are
highly divergent. In globalization, although epistemic theories about personal freedom
remain central in providing organization and focus of problems, explanations and
interpretations,7 the formation of modernity generally is not a uniform process of

Roger Ballard, “Common Law and Common Sense: Juries, Justice and the Challenge of Ethnic
Plurality” in Prakash Shah ed, Law and Ethnic Plurality: Socio-Legal Perspectives (Leiden,
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) at 23 [hereafter Ballard, “Common Law”]. For
relevant works on pluralism and the law, see Meena Bhamra, “On Cultural Diversity: The
Importance of Normative Foundations for Legal Responses” in Prakash Shah ed, Law and Ethnic
Plurality: Socio-Legal Perspectives (London: Glass House Press, 2005) at 24; John Griffiths,
“What is Legal Pluralism?” (1986) 24 J Legal Plur Unoff Law 1 at 38 [hereafter Griffiths, “What
is Legal Pluralism?”]; Prakash Shah, Legal Pluralism in Conflict (London: Glasshouse Press,
2005) at ix [hereafter, Shah “Legal Pluralism in Conflict”].
5
Berman, “A Pluralist Approach” supra note 1. For further development of pluralism in a
societal context, see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority
Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) [hereinafter Kymlicka “Multicultural Citizenship”];
Timothy Macklem “Faith as a Secular Value” (2000) 45 McGill LJ 1; Charles Taylor, Modern
Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004) at 5 [hereafter Taylor, Modern Social
Imaginaries]; Paul Schiff Berman, “Global Legal Pluralism” (2006-2007) 80 S Cal L Rev 1155
[hereinafter Berman, “Global”].
6
CCL, Supra note 2. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 [Charter].
7
Werner Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa
2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 3.
4
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secularization.8 I hope to show that the interactive space—the sociocultural space—is
currently a terrain of contestation precisely because the space for normative difference
does not seem to exist. Because a sociocultural space without meaningful values and
norms is a space of conflict—divisions in terms of rights and obligations, and the creation
of hierarchies, in the current globalized age, how egalitarian are the claims of liberal
values? How can this modern liberal secular state encourage religious diversity,
pluralism and the common good? And in Canada, as an offshoot of the Western liberal
secular modernity—although its liberal democratic philosophy is admirable—how
effective is the interactive space in this modern liberal secular and democratic society for
both a plurality of religions and liberal law to co-exist in the governance of a multiplicity
of lifeworlds and where legal resolution is free from arbitrary interference?9
Does Canada’s constitution sufficiently prohibit the state from favouring any one
religious community, and does it protect religious freedom for all? In the context of
normative pluralism and the dominance of the universalized agency of the liberal
individual, are religious individuals forced to choose between the tenets of their faith and
full participation in society?
For at least the last two hundred years, the central aspects of Western liberal
modernity have been the ongoing global normative concepts that continue to drive the
evolution of reason defined as instrumental rationality. Master theories about liberal
institutional and cultural progress from pre-modernity to modernity were based on the
works of Marx, Tonnes, Durkheim, Simmel, Parsons and others.10 These theorists

8

Wittrock, Björn. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global
Condition.” (2000) 129:1 Daedalus 31 at 32 [hereinafter Wittrock, “Modernity”].
9

The concept of secularism will be defined in Chapter II.
See Wagner, supra note 3, also generally, supra note 4.

10
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focused on economic growth, specialization, rationalization, individualization and so on
as crucial to the processes of liberal modernization.11 Liberalization was coupled with
the process of secularization, a process that separated religion from law and for Knights,
as part of freeing the Christian religion from legal and political rule, Christianity was
separated from the territorial state.12 These secularized socio-political claims functioned
as a form of morality and eventually became law that was equipped to interpret the
positions of the secular liberal judiciary.13 The instrumental rationale of liberal
modernity, as structured within its political systems and egalitarian ideals, supposedly
ensures that the rule of secular liberal law would not be domineering and public
regulation would not constrain the liberties of individuals.14
The singularly determining centre of society—the rule of constitutional law,
based on the modern Western secular form of liberty—may not be capable of shaping the
entirety of social relations. There is “reciprocal influence” that exists within human
sociabilities, human hierarchies and human relations.15 The sociological dynamics of
group relations, of power or not, continue to be shaped by socio-political collectivities by,
for, and of, group processes. Humans are ultra-socialites, no matter what their
surroundings. Humans are consistently engaged in highly coordinated relationships of all
kinds, be they face to face or not. The tasks humans are involved in are related to
survival, the provision of resources, and reproduction. And for these endeavours, the
11

Ibid., also see Wagner, supra note 3 at x to xi.
Samantha Knights, Freedom of Religion, Minorities, and the Law. (London & New York:
Oxford University Press, 2007) at 1.36.
13
Warwick Tie, Legal Pluralism: Towards a Multicultural Conception of Law (England: Ashgate
Publishing Company, 1999) at 102.
14
Ibid. also Supra notes 4 & 5.
15 Dacher Keltner, Gerben A. Van Kleef, Serena Chen, and Michael W. Kraus. “A Reciprocal
Influence Model of Social Power: Emerging Principles and Lines of Inquiry” (2008) 40 Advances
in Experimental Social Psychology at 155.
12
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human is basically constantly involved in navigating through myriad relationships of
anthropological groups.
Many questions arise: Is there such a thing as a coherent sense of self? A
coherent sense of self would point to an ability of the self to identify and govern
themselves as completely aligned with a particular ethos, theory, concept, philosophy,
norm, or theology, that is so balanced, so lucid, so comprehensible, so logical, so
complete that it is possible to both, on the one hand be explained to others as truth, and
simultaneously, be understood by all as totally justified. In effect, can humanity—in the
form of a community, nation, or world—be cohesive such that it is unified, consistent,
organized, and solidly interconnected with interrelations that logically complete each
other? Generally, it is known that ideas of coherence or so called rationality: of self, of
community, of nation or of world, are a fallacy.
Although constitutional values respect the equality and human dignity of
individuals, interpretation, or institutional responses—the final arbiter being the high
courts—include a variety of secular visions of social justice based on liberal strategies.
Forms of secularized liberal legalism have constitutional recognition and democratic
legitimacy in modern states. The aim of these strategies is to create stable and lasting
political identities linked to concepts of social good and political rights or positive rights
such as the right to vote and participate in politics, freedom of thought, conscience and of
association, freedom of movement, and free choice of occupation and the protection of
the rule of law.16 As part of this political ideology relating to personal freedom, the
established liberal legalism with rational values further stresses human dignity and
16

CCL, supra note 2. Also see generally supra note 4 & 5. The 18th century positivist approach
attemps to strip all subjective considerations from the scientist for objective value free
investigations.

5

autonomy: liberty, relating to limited government; equality of right, relating to obeying
similar laws enforced by the state; and critical thought, relating to the consent of the
governed.17 However, whether the multiplicities of modernities are committed to the
existing liberal or non-liberal norms, they all have numerous open interpretations of the
good life.
A powerful theme for all faith-based cultures globally is that the role of the ethical
imagination in legal expressions of the civil is fed by religious and cultural narratives as
sources of the self. What therefore are the capacities of the already conflicted liberal
logic and norms? Can liberal law be redefined to make it more hospitable to diversity
without compromising its commitment to universal liberal principles? Again, as Berger
insists, modernity does not interfere with religious beliefs but secularization and the
pluralizing modernities make the task of uncovering religious truths more difficult.18
And Parekh laments that the logic of liberalism tends to view human beings as
completely constituted by their culture where culture is a superstructure interacting with
an unchanging and identical human nature.19
I also hope to show that the classification of different categories of class,
citizenship, religious believer, consumer and producer can be constrained by liberal legal
doctrines as dominated by this individualistic, secularist, universalistic and rationalistic
framework. Communities have always survived in worlds where cultural mediums give
rise to the law—jurisgenesis—and where intelligible normative behaviour and stronger

17

Bhiku Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (New
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006) at 338 [hereafter Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism]. Also,
see generally Supra notes 4 & 5.
18
Linda Woodhead, Paul Heelas, and David Martin. Peter Berger and the Study of Religion
(London & New York: Routeledge, 2001) at 3 [hereinafter Woodhead et al, “Peter Berger”].
19
Parekh, supra note 17 Rethinking Multiculturalism.

6

bonds are in context.20 Narratives, prescriptive or adjudicatory, are normative
commitments—the law. Robert Cover will tell us in Chapter 5, that there is a constant
construction of law through various norm-generating communities.21 And Falk-Moore
will tell us in the same Chapter that heterogeneities are self-regulated.22 The
sociocultural space is consistently normatively full. Also, multiple modernities are not
openly critical of Western modernity “as a metanarrative but as a vehicle of Western
domination.”23
In particular, in a survey of jurisprudence on freedom of religion in Canada, I
found that freedom of the individual was a paramount value as guaranteed in s. 2 (a) of
the Charter—which states that as part of the fundamental freedoms, “everyone has the
freedom of conscience and religion.” The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), in the Big
M. case—a part of the case study herein on freedom of religion jurisprudence in
Canada—in effect confirmed, per Dickson J., that the individual is the central bearer of
rights.24 Could this be is a problematic form of liberalism that the Western secular and
normative philosophy embodies?
In terms of freedom of religion, for recent theorists such as Charles Taylor,
Robert Cover, Griffiths, Tie, Menski, and many others, despite the fact that liberal law
Robert Cover, “The Supreme Court 1982 Term – Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” (1983) 97
Harv L Rev 4 at 11 [hereafter Cover, “The Supreme Court 1982”].
21
Ibid. Cover “The Supreme Court” at 48.
22
Sally Falk Moore, “Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an
Appropriate Subject of Study” (1973) 7:4 Law & Soc’y Rev 719 [hereinafter Moore, “Law and
Social Change”] at 722.
23 Lee, R.L.M. “Reinventing Modernity: Reflexive Modernization vs Liquid Modernity vs
Multiple Modernities.” (2006) 9 Euro Jnl Soc Theor (3) 355-368 at 350 [hereinafter Lee
Reinventing”].
24
In Big M., infra note 272, per Dickson, J. … “an emphasis on individual conscience and
individual judgment also lies at the heart of our democratic political tradition. The ability of each
citizen to make free and informed decisions is the absolute prerequisite for the legitimacy,
acceptability, and efficacy of our system of self-government” at para 122.
20
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purports to have the ability to account for religion amongst many other norms, including
non-liberal norms, the standardization, uniformity and even the secularization thesis of
liberal modernity are all to be now considered as received differently in different contexts
around the globe.25 The ambit of the protection of the law has to consider the historical,
sociological, political and the religious contexts.26
In this age of intense plurality, Ryder confirms that multiplicities of citizens seek
equal rights, including “equal religious citizenship”, under the rule of the established
modern Western secular law.27 Globally, cries for civil toleration of all other religions
remain consistently alive in a variety of modern democratic political documents—from
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution28 to the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights issued by the United Nations.29 I would argue that
currently, because the globe is in an epoch of voluminous interconnections due to the
impacts of globalization, and although Western liberal secularized democracies are being
emulated around the globe, in the West now, there are a large number of possible
varieties in cultural patterns, religious beliefs, and commitments to both liberal and nonliberal norms—all aiming at “institutional specificity.30”
The ideology of legal pluralism is therefore central to my thesis; liberal freedom
25

See Supra notes 4 & 5, 7 also infra notes 17, 20, 22, 23, 31, and 38.
Knights, supra note 12 at viii.
27
Bruce Ryder, “The Canadian Conception of Equal Religious Citizenship” in Richard Moon ed,
Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) [hereinafter Ryder, “The
Canadian Conception”] at 87.
28
Congress shall make no law respecting religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…. U.S.
Const. amend. I.
29
Article 18 of the United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “Everyone
has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change
his religion or belief, and freedom alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”
30
Wittrock, “Modernity” supra note 8 at 32.
26
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of religion jurisprudence is only one legal technology; there are other instruments that
protect basic human rights and happiness.31 Although, liberal legalism both supports and
limits pluralism, and there are provisions for toleration of others, the current Canadian
national identity is based on majoritarian political views, in turn, based solely on Western
forms of liberty, and further based on presuppositions connected to the concepts of
secularism related to the protection of the Christian faith only.
However, demands for recognition go beyond toleration; recognition has to
include legitimacy of and social respect for difference. Shah sums up: “liberalism as a
practical attitude, rather than as a focus of sophisticated philosophical debate, has
become deeply impoverished…socially ignorant and ethically barren.”32 As a
consequence, liberalism, and its broad legal approach with its many merits, has gradually
been challenged by the multiplicity of the modern to reexamine its, liberal legalism’s,
very fundamentals. Liberal legalism, as the main force of liberal modernity, may be a
force that is unable right now to accommodate modernism’s incarnation/avatar; the
multiplicity of the modern.
In that judges have a political function in creating, applying and interpreting the
law by specialized political and legal techniques, Shapiro denotes this as “a myth of
speciality” and that law is not an independent area of substantive knowledge.33 If every
constitutional question has to be considered in traditional legal analysis terms, and if the
rule of constitutional law is not an all-encompassing philosophy, based as it on
historically and politically universalized and secularized principles, how do Canadian
Peter C Sack, “Legal Pluralism: Introductory Comments” in Peter Sack & E.J. Minchin eds,
Legal Pluralism: Proceedings of the Canberra Law Workshop VII. (Australia: Australian
National University, 1986) at 14.
32
Shah, “Legal Pluralism in Conflict”, supra note 4 in foreword by Cotterrell, R. at ix.
33
Martin Shapiro, “Political Jurisprudence.” (1963) 52 Ky LJ 294 at 295.
31

9

courts distinguish religion from non-religion? Is state law equipped to transcend
difference in freedom of religion cases? Is the state normatively prone to validate
equality more than equity? And in terms of national identity, do religions have a role in
society?
In consideration of all my questions and given that liberal law presides over the
management of society, I needed to understand the following in the Canadian context:
the concepts of the primacy of legal rights attached to the autonomous liberal individual;
the concept of secularism and the application of the process of secularization in
jurisprudence; and the prospects for the cumulative plurality of law, and in particular, the
rights of the increasing diversity of religious adherents in the West given the current
globalization and rapid immigration that continues to occur.
In recognizing that the modern liberal consciousness is a social construction, I
also needed to understand the appeal of this liberal modernity and its effects on
individuals, institutions and societies. However, in that the shifting condition of
modernity is now a multiplicity of modernities in their current empirical and real
situations, how does the prevailing legal system—constitutional law—identify and
negotiate social and cultural differences? The aim is to examine the possibilities for
peaceful coexistence of state law—understanding that its liberalized and secularized
constitution has to limit the full extent of religious freedoms—with the norms and
customs of the multiplicity of modernities in Canada.
1.

The political power of constitutional authority as legitimated by the
processes of modernization, liberalization and secularization
It was during the 17th century Whig tradition of liberty under law as part of the

10

process of liberal modernization that the word “liberal” was coined.34 It comes from the
Latin, “liber”, meaning “free.”35 The conception of freedoms of the citizen stems from
this root of classical liberalism of Christian Europe as part of classical modernization.36
Liberal modernization has been a progressive process from traditional monarchy to legal
authority and legitimacy of people living together under the same laws or rules of
conduct; a democracy requires the rule of law. The ideology of liberalism is therefore
central to the onset of legal authority as human emancipation and as understood in a
modernizing and predominantly Christian Western Europe.
When classical jurists began to reflect scientifically on the European doctrine of
liberalization, they presupposed a certain internal coherence within the rule of liberal law
that was separate from religious authority.37 In this shift towards rationality and secular
approaches to the liberalization of the individual, Western liberals began to believe that
society would achieve material and political progress if science would focus on, and
critically examine, ‘man’ and society to yield a general knowledge about the natural
principles of law, morality, myths, superstitions, religious dogma, other traditions and
customs.38 However, the process of secularization does not succeed in completely
relegating religion to the confines of the “private” sphere and there are many

34

Hugh Trevor-Roper, Lord Macaulay: The History of England (London, England: Penguin
Books, 1986).
35
Ibid.
36
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combinations of ‘the secular.’39 Although the emergence of Western thoughts about law
initially emphasized natural law, these thoughts later included Latin Christianization.40
Natural law, or inherent law, lies at the intersection of theology (concerned with the
transcendental), and philosophy (concerned with notions of the world and the
temporal).41 Although in liberal secular modernity, interpretation of belief is left to the
believer, Christianity was seen by 18th and 19th century philosophers as akin to
liberalism’s secular surrogate. Liberalism’s moral and social role is tied to the centuries
old Christian faith.42 Liberalization is therefore steeped in the image of Christianity by
way of: language, categories, thought, self-understanding, and life.43
Currently, secular institutions organize life “in this world” as opposed to reference
to the religious or the transcendent.44 Freedom of religion is two pronged: to free public
life from religion and to open a space for continuous dialogue among religious traditions
and between the religious and the secular. For a “self-sufficient social [and modern]
morality without transcendent reference” reason is independent of Godly Revelation so
that this former ‘morality’ is supposedly devoid of other inconsequential non-contributing
elements.45 However, Taylor insists that both these dimensions of life are indespensible
in society.46 Again, as Taylor points out, even if good religions and good public remain
the exclusive perview of the autonomous individual, the confusion arises in that it is now
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a separation of religion and state and no longer the Christian church and state as the
scientific rational definition of secularism and as identified with modernity.47 What is a
fair and harmonious mode of coexistence between religious communities without, as
evolved, Western connotations of the secular?
For Taylor, secularism is not about state and religion, it is about the democratic
state and diversity and the goal is to protect people in belonging and to practice freely
their outlook thus treating people equally whatever their option.48 In that modern
democracies have to be secular, plurality necessarily requires neutrality making
secularism a complex requirement of balancing social goods. For human rights, equality,
the rule of law, and democracy, state neutrality in effect protects any basic position,
religious or not. Yet, religion continues to be pitted against secularity.49
However, Christianity remains at the heart of Western thought in general and in
law in particular. And although normatively, the question of whether religion should be
confined to the private sphere is heavily contested in public forums, the current form of
modernization, secular and liberal, carries with it the assumption that secular liberal
ideology contains truths for the regulation of the good life.50 However, despite the fact
that modern constitutional law is ever-changing, redirected and regulated towards
positive ends and equality of opportunity within society, religions such as Islam continue
to face tremendous pressures to be removed completely from the public sphere,
particularly within Western contexts. The most important facet of Western liberal secular
modernity is that in a democracy, sovereignty resides in the will of the people; the
47
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numerical majority of an organized group can make decisions binding on the whole
society.51 Coupled as part of modernity with this democratic ethos, the Eurocentric
processes of secularization and liberalization were mostly unalterable within Western
states as were they in their “empires.” These assumptions about the processes of
liberalization and secularization still extend globally with points of interconnections in
the now intercultural capitals of Europe, United States and Canada.52 Uninterrupted, the
above assumptions, empowered as they are by politics, continue to be essentialized and
reproduced within modernizing constitutions.
Again, not only are centralization and universalization of human rights, both
international and domestic, having stemmed from particular universalistic explanations
for events based on presuppositions of theorists from classical liberalism, they are also
based on various Christian conceptions of liberty. And generally, respect for equality,
human dignity, and other good moral values are part of natural law. However, social
arrangements, including those that are meaningful and that seek to identify with different
terms and conditions of citizenship, are susceptible to conscious human engineering by
the instrument of the rule of liberal legislated law.53
As will be seen in the discussion of case law on freedom of religion, there are
limitations in values that are in effect admitted; constitutional arrangements can be
authoritatively justified as reasonable by the commitment of judges to the democratically
instituted constitution.54 In a democracy, the boundaries between the private and the
public are variable according to the political will of the citizens, the authority of the judge
51
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is limited by democratic choice. And juridical outcomes may result from a flawed
understanding of the meaning of secular. In that it is now a secular, liberal democratic
constitution that legitimates political authority in an environment of legal and religious
pluralism, specific sociopolitical questions are translated into legal issues left to the
discretion of judges who are bound by the limited set of general ideas aimed at protecting
individuals from state control.55 As the historical processes of secularization become
firmly installed, the identification of religion as akin to an irrational force, tends to
become stronger. The shared sense of public and political reason is predisposed to public
controversy. What is apparent is that urbanization and fast paced global movements are
profoundly secularizing forces that erode traditional bases of legitimation.56 Although
the processes of liberalization and secularization are fluid, they are also fragile and
contested. How can these processes be both, fortified yet, less controversial?
Canada, for instance, is now composed of cultures, groups, associations and
institutions that are culturally and ethnically diverse. Currently, the state also has many
groups of religious believers that are seeking recognition in concrete sociopolitical and
sociolegal arrangements. Canada is a liberal democratic state and since the enactment of
the Charter within its constitution in 1982, equitable justice and substantive equality are
supposedly furthered.57 The rule-based conception of liberal constitutional law,
particularly in the post-Charter era, has the power to determine how the law is imagined,
and there is a “concrete impact of legal arrangements on the distribution of power and
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rewards among the various elements in…society.”58 As a basic element of the Canadian
Constitution, the Charter has even given legal and political powers to its courts thus
affording them a certain equal partnership to the legislature in ordering society.59
Although the Charter was a product of, and a part of, the responses to the increasing
plurality within Canadian society, in the liberal interpretation of constitutional values
related to equality rights, there is tension between the Charter and the current nature of
Canadian pluralism. Case law that will be discussed in Chapter III will show
interpretations that unjustly fail to recognize the economic and social rights of minorities.
The greatest challenge for liberal modernity and legalism is to balance equality and
difference. To what extent can questions of identity, including that based on religious
adherence, be effectively addressed within its liberal democratic and legal frame?
It is understood that in the accommodation of religious freedoms of minorities,
the reach of religion encompasses theological, philosophical, anthropological,
sociological, psychological and other possible dimensions. Religion is very difficult to
define as it entails these aspects of social, cultural and normative human behavior that
goes beyond liberal politics. It is therefore not only difficult to limit, it cannot be
interpreted accurately from any one point of view. Further, the rule of liberal secular
constitutional law tends to consider other forms of modernization as subject to its
political and legal accommodation.60 Are religious values subordinated or is this a
reflection of a desire to not elevate some religious beliefs at the expense of others? Does
accommodation address pre-existing disadvantage, inequality and inclusiveness of other
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forms of institutions?61 Is the Western human rights tradition aimed at the
accommodation of pluralism, including religious pluralism?
2.

The interaction of liberal political and legal tradition of the
autonomous individual, and the morals of a multiplicity of modernities
Liberal modernity, liberal legal doctrines and practices, based on the autonomous

individual, are now required to interlink with other aspects of dynamic life.62 The
reproduction, complexity and dynamics of liberal modernity presently are represented by
the relentless magnification, hybridization, traditionalisation, homogenization, and
pluralizations of knowledge of global cultures and religions.63 These interrelated and
simultaneous processes form the very essence of globalization and suggest a model of
liberal modernity in its multiplicity. Lee too confirms that the concept of a multiplicity of
modernities is that of cultural diversity that disputes the universality based on the
Western experience.64 I maintain that the current age, globally, is of a multiplicity of
modernities, the next avatar of modernity. But the space of forced coexistence of a
variety of moral standards in the West—particularly of the dominant and firmly rooted
liberal secular legal system in ordering plural normative lives—is now a terrain of
contestation because liberal legalism both supports and limits pluralism.
However, a reconstruction of modernity—now a multiplicity of normative
communities—is urgently needed; there is a need to understand different perceptions as
part of the dynamics of social change in more empirically realistic and metaphysically
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open terms.65 The political concept of liberty, as attached to the liberal culture of
secularization, has penetrated legal theory, and this “law” generally has become state law.
Because current majoritarian political views on liberty are based on presuppositions that
are no longer neutral, it will be argued that classification of different categories of class,
citizenship, religious believer, consumer and producer can be constrained by liberal legal
doctrines. Given that Western law is characterized and governed by the rule of
constitutional law as fundamental to Western liberal modernization and secularization,
how well can it accommodate the multifaceted social and religious base of believers who
are most unlikely to treat their religious convictions as purely private or personal matters?
For example, in Islam, just as in Christianity, the role of the ethical imagination in legal
expressions of the civil is fed by religious and cultural narratives as sources of the self;
this is a vital theme for all faith-based cultures globally. Again, the fact that the
modernity of Islam is already diverse within itself compounds the complexity in coming
to grips with plural modern Islamic ethnicities in countries such as Canada.
Historically, religious believers have had the power to resist legally ordered
strategies that coerced and conflicted with their essential moral codes. The liberal
political tradition based on liberal modernity and secular law may be in danger, not from
hostile extraneous forces so much as from its own naïve emphasis on individualism and
from its own tendency to naturalize and thus universalize solutions that are noticeably
uninformed. The legal concept of equality between individuals tends to obscure more
substantive questions of difference: the plurality of religious beliefs and practices, ethnic
identifications and historical patterns of collective experience. Contemporary liberal law
dominates liberal social theory; seems to have proclaimed its superiority over other
65
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cultures and religions so that only Western liberal ideals are recognized in the public and
political sphere; and has curtailed the power of certain transcendent religions to morally
order the lives of believers and thus of society at large in the public and political sphere.66
The dominant rights-based regime, coupled with the common law consisting of
“rules springing from the social standard of justice, or from the habits and customs from
which that standard has itself been derived” may not be representative of a growing
multiplicity of changing and overlapping normativities.67 The constitution is in effect the
ultimate word in all facets of social life, particularly as interpreted by judges on specific
issues. In that human rights and basic freedoms are deemed to be guaranteed by the rule
of liberal constitutional law, this ideology also assumes that social diversity is
represented by the liberal legislature. In Canada, if disagreeing normative systems are
not able to combine their respective power and co-exist, serious social and political
conflicts will escalate.
In the 21st Century, is the secular liberal justice, based on its own historical
fundamentals and law, therefore the legitimate authority to recognize differences? Is
there a model of liberal legalism that can allow a co-existence of a plurality of norms,
including diverse religious orders, within liberal democracies? What are the possibilities
of peaceful co-existence of religious normativity and authoritative normativity in Canada,
in the 21st century and beyond? How can the legal constructs of myriad cultures
legitimately be distinguished from the locus of the popular, dominant and certified legal
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order that imposes its own limitations and that are not able to admit change at the
required speed? How do individual groups legally express their distinctive worldviews,
such as religious beliefs, that lend them a sense of well-being and belonging within a
larger evolving political association and a wider field of legal regulation? In Canadian
terms, in an age of globalization, is there a legal space wherein models of liberalism itself
can allow a co-existence of a plurality of religious norms in the country?
B. Research objective
This LL.M. thesis will attempt to explore the movements of modernization and
secularization that define individuated freedoms in liberal constitutional democracies.
Individual freedoms are paramount in liberal constitutions and secularity is central to
modern liberal democracies. It is important to understand that due to the impacts of
globalization, growing pluralism exposes the limits of liberal modern secular
constitutions; in particular the existence of normative pluralism shows that secularity is
one among many worldviews and that liberalization—an ideology that is to be admired—
should not be ignored in an age of a multiplicity of modernities. The complexity of the
tension between religious rights and secular politics is akin to a tug of war between the
principles of legitimation and the principles of justice wherein the principles of religion
are subjected to intense manipulation. There is a difference between fact-finding and
evaluation; the separation of fact and value with an emphatic commitment to empirical
inquiry may not be objective.
Trubek points out that social science is a multidimensional activity in which
considerations of a general and metaphysical nature are as important as specific empirical
findings and in which all levels, from the most basic presuppositions about social life, to
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the minutest empirical findings, have their independent yet related places.68 Also,
political jurisprudence cannot be a complete philosophical system at any given time
because jurisprudence expands with political science as judicial and legal facets are
integrated into political life. Judicial realism is a growing socio-political science. A
secure space for normative difference is missing.
The aim of this thesis is to further explore the extent to which normative
pluralism, emerging from specific religious beliefs, is accommodated by Canadian courts
pursuant to the guarantee of religious freedom in the Charter under s. 2(a). Other
Charter guarantees also protect religion from state discrimination, however, problems
arise frequently when state legislation fails to consider the perspectives of religious
claimants and often sets limits that produce conflicts with individual beliefs as will be
illustrated in case law in Chapter III.
I maintain that the focus has to be not on an obligation to respect complex and
historic public policy, or on the levels of decision-making processes, but on the changes
in the social and ethical values that are being contested within a shared social space. For
Shah, there is a contest in defining the concepts of equality and tolerance in liberty.69
Again, can liberal law be redefined to make it more hospitable to diversity without
compromising its commitment to universal liberal principles?
Plurality, including a variety of moral and religious orders will not disappear in
Canada; neither will the interaction between myriad normative orders and their many
institutions of origin. Since Canadian constitutionalism recognizes and fulfils the desire
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of the individual as the highest good—a political ideology of liberal modernity—not all
liberal values that underlie social and economic human rights are associated with human
dignity. The constitution may be inadequate in acknowledging difference. Difference is
supposed to result only from rational choices pursued by individuals, voluntary acts. But
liberal law inevitably denies the relevance of some distinctiveness making governance
through rules questionable.70
C. Methodology and the structure of the thesis
Although the focus of this LL.M. thesis is on fundamental democratic rights and
just law in the face of diverse norms and legal pluralism in contemporary Canadian
society, it is specifically centered on the possibilities of a peaceful co-existence between
the rule of liberal law and the norms of plural religions in post-Charter Canada. To
understand current history on the management and accommodation of religious diversity
in constitutional law and practice in Canada, an examination of recent freedom of religion
jurisprudence in the post-Charter era will reveal the responses and the built-in limitations
of liberal law to the claims for equality of differing and competing norms of a
multiplicity of modern citizens—multiple modernities. This examination concerning
freedom of religion as guaranteed in the Charter will serve as a study highlighting the
tension between the slow development of legal outcomes that are supposed to be guided
by values essential to a free and democratic society that respect different beliefs and
practices of diverse peoples, and the needs of the rapidly increasing number of religious
persons living as minorities in Canada. This thesis hopes to demonstrate the significance
and the durability of the different forms of normative ordering in contemporary Canadian
Roger Cotterell, “Foreword” in Shah Prakash ed, Legal Pluralism in Conflict: Coping with
Cultural Diversity in Law (London: Glasshouse Press, 2005) at ix.
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society. It will also argue that a problem of escalating and violent conflicts related to
fundamental democratic rights and just law in the face of diverse knowledge and diverse
religions may be imminent in Canada.
The ideology of legal pluralism is necessarily valuable in Canada; it supports the
concept that there are different ways of being for which different adjudicative bodies can
be organized. Again, the ideology of legal pluralism is therefore central to this thesis
because freedom of religion jurisprudence is only one legal technology, there are other
instruments that protect basic human rights and happiness.71 And demands for
recognition go beyond toleration; recognition has to include legitimacy of and social
respect for difference.
D. Chapter breakdown
This thesis will consist of six chapters inclusive of the introduction and the
conclusion. The Introduction is an overview of the thesis concerning arguments on the
limits of liberal legalism and the restraints on equal religious citizenship. It also provides
the general framework of the thesis. Chapter I will elaborate on this clash of liberal
legalism and religious diversity. The chapter will highlight the conflict between the
historical theoretical presuppositions within modernity and liberal legalism, and the
current plural sociolegal perspectives that now represent the citizen in Canada. The aim
is to point out, philosophically, the possible mistakes in the presuppositions about liberal
law and to demonstrate the urgency of addressing conflicts. Chapter II will elaborate on
and explain the misconceptions of the concept of secularism and the aggressive form of
secularism that is now dominant within liberal law, and of the relationship between
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politics and secularity. Chapter III is a review of freedom of religion jurisprudence in the
post-Charter era with a view to illustrating the impasse caused by the failure of courts to
definitively resolve religious values of multiple modernities within the liberal rights
perspective based on individual liberty. In particular it will serve to show that legal
relationships are complex wherein courts are having “difficulty distinguishing between
treating people as equals and changing them into different people.”72 Chapter IV will
explore the possibilities of coexistence of liberal law and religious pluralism amongst the
multiplicity of the modern in Canada in the 21st century and beyond. The final chapter
will conclude the thesis.
E. Literature review
1. The possibility of reinterpretation of liberalism at the intersection of
secularism, freedom of religion guarantees and religious identity
Although, classical liberalism was initiated to smooth out conflicts between
Christian religious groups and politics, many inadvertently believe that it has in effect
displaced religion altogether.73 Laws—by collective agency—may be passed for
supposedly “neutral” secular reasons.74 However, as the diversity of immigrant
populations increases, instrumentalized state responses that have the effect of limiting
freedom of religion, including of different Christian faiths, are challenged as they tend to
be coercive, as will be reflected in freedom of religion jurisprudence.75 Freedom to
choose normativity is in effect imposed by the abstract and codified classification of the
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liberal identity regardless of myriad social interactions of the same identity.76 In that
civic authority and political power are established and legitimated by constitutional law,
different religious claims are seen as complex and demanding autonomy. 77 In a system
of well-entrenched individual rights, group rights tend to be subordinated; inherited
culture becomes subjected to Western legal culture and in particular, courts are
constrained by this Western tradition. However, state intervention is not only about
regulating and managing intercommunal conflict; it is also about moral obligations.
Political justice does not consider moral arguments that can be shared. A theological
critique of the dominance of secularity is missing. Yet, plurality is a by-product of
modernity itself.
In Canada, at the intersection of liberal law, plural religious beliefs, citizenship
and religious identity, because state responses are based on the modern liberal definition
of secularism that is further based on freedom of individual conscience and a structured
form of freedom of religion, the purpose of freedom of religion as guaranteed under s.
2(a) of its Charter is not to maintain a particular religion but instead to protect and
continue a culture of liberalization and secularization.78 Any future arrangements for
social diversity to exist must be open to different group rights so that deep democracy is
reflected within the Canadian population. Interconnectedness breeds dynamism and
dynamism necessarily feeds off of interconnectedness. It may be time to reinterpret
liberalism in the context of the multiplicity of the modern and the evolving legal norms,
for the optimum development of the multifaceted individual in Canada. Or, as Parekh
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states generally, what we need is a liberal theory of multiculturalism.79
2. The role of law in a globalizing world of interacting normativities
As stated, globalization highlights the challenges of inter-normativity reflecting
differentiated forms of law. The globe has now been communicating intensely in
significant ways. As the structures and dynamics of globalization continue to evolve, the
closely knit worldwide society of migrants and immigrants also continue to maintain their
connections to their places of origin; they particularly continue to observe the tenets of
their religions, which many consider to be the final authority for human conduct. Each
event, relationship or individual has distinct features and reflects a desire for self-rule, the
oldest political good in the world. However, multicultural groups also seek to participate
in existing institutions of dominant societies, but in ways that recognize and affirm, rather
than exclude, assimilate and denigrate their culturally diverse ways of thinking, speaking
and acting.80 But “a treatment can be differential without being preferential.”81
For Arthurs, globalization necessarily changes social values at its foundation so
that the role of law changes.82 The law also identifies and negotiates differences.83
However, if laws differ, for Trubek, rationalization of the law and the creation of general
rules will not be able to emphasize decision of specific cases that take “account of
political, ethical and other affective dimensions of conflict.”84 For Trubek (falling back
on Weber’s arguments), formal law maybe unavoidable and its bureaucracy can create
for itself “an iron cage”…“a shell of bondage which [powerless people] will perhaps be
79
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forced to inhabit some day.”85 And Berman states that any adjudication of conflict will
lead to “jurispathic activity” (meaning law that “kills” all alternative interpretation of
norms by offering only one normative worldview).86 For Berman, the multifold
interactions between different governance structures that further generate norms are “a
space for the ‘jurisgenerative’ interplay of multiple normative communities and
commitments.”87 This is a social need. For Berman, to manage hybridity, attention has
to be paid to a pluralist framework to be able to comprehensively conceptualize a world
of hybrid legal spaces—a wide variety of transnational and international regulatory
problems can be conceptualized in managing hybridity.88
The primary purpose of equality rights is to protect the individual human interest
in belonging, simultaneously, to several communities. And for Cotterell, legal theory
needs to be conceptualized with the content of social relations of community and the
combinations of networks within which they exist.89 For the relation of law and culture
and for the interpretation of interests, intentions and causations, different abstract types of
communities should be distinguished—the institutionalized and the noninstitutionalized.90 And to that extent, if human rights are being reconceptualized in the
context of legal pluralism globally, do important jurisgenerative changes in Canada need
to be framed from an alternative plural perspective? Again, the post-Charter era is also
an era of intense global communications and migration that represent a “tremendous body
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of rules that envelop any social field.”91 Generally, “normative conflict among multiple,
overlapping legal systems is unavoidable and might even sometimes be desirable, both as
a source of alternative ideas and as a site for discourse among multiple community
affiliations.”92
In Canada, accommodation of religious practices is reluctantly offered to
individual adherents as and when they require exemption. It will be seen that the sharp
balance between competing rights of individuals and groups in the context of freedom of
religion is a constant theme in case law. The impasse that is caused by the inability of
courts to resolve specific struggles involving accommodation of religious values are
explained as a plurality of contests over recognition politics and the limits of recognition
centering on the liberal rights perspective based on individual liberty and secularism.93
For legal pluralists, intercultural normativity includes the inner dynamics and value
systems of the ethnic minorities as crucial in analysing the character of legal
reconstruction for improved social conditions.
F. The Focus of this thesis
Although freedom and equality are central to liberal law, neutrality cannot be
absolute. In the multiplying base of moralities, perhaps a new conception of a political
moral order in society would require that state law allow the believer to live according to
her/his own specific convictions, both, those perceived as rational and those perceived as
“irrational.”94 Different norm systems of multiple other modern identities are
interplaying with each other with complex results. In that guaranteed rights remain
91
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limited and abstract, the legitimacy and existence of specific religions depends not only
upon state laws that are at the discretion of judges focused on individual autonomy, but
also where individuals, as members of their cultural communities, engage with plural
norm systems (their own consciences, and a variety of other plural community
conventions).
This thesis focuses on the consistent failure of the rule of liberal legalism in postCharter Canada to evolve at a pace that enables it to recognize and accommodate the
ongoing plurality of normative material and systems, including religious diversity or
different ways of ordering of life of its rapidly-expanding diasporic populations. If
conflicting normative systems are not able to combine their respective power and coexist, the potential of conflict to escalate is serious. Finally: no single position has
successfully exhausted truth.
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CHAPTER I - The Clash of Modern Liberal Legalism and Religious
Diversity: Historical Presuppositions and Current Plural Perspectives
What are the possibilities for conflicting norms to coexist in a shared space of
power to order moral conduct? This chapter is a theory-based literature review of the
politics of recognition of the plural sociolegal perspectives, that is, the different norms
and conventions, including religious beliefs and tenets, of intercultural communities in
modern Western secular liberal states. Generally, legal prescriptions are located in
discourses of history.95 A brief outlay of the history of modernization, liberalization,
secularization and globalization will help in understanding the following terms that
appear within the literature: “classical modernity”, “liberal modernity”, “multiple
modernities”, “the rule of liberal legalism”, “secularity and modernity”, “modernity and
globalization.” This same history will serve to outline the philosophical presuppositions
of the current liberal modern law. As part of the processes of modernization and
liberalization, at least in the last two hundred years, religion was removed from political
rule; church and state were separated for the purposes of freedom of religion.
In outlining the presuppositions of liberal secular modernity and liberal law in the
context of the politics of recognition generally, this chapter will highlight the dominance
of Western liberal secular modernity and its rule of liberal constitutional law in highly
diverse societies such as in Canada; the rule of law is a collectively accepted centralized
structure of political and legal authority. The fact that the rule of constitutional law is
based on Western liberal classical roots and experience contributes to its comparative
homogeneity in a world of multiple normativities. For example, although Islam is
determined by an ongoing interplay of multiple cultural, linguistic and religious
95
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expressions going back 1428 years—based on conquests upon vast geographical spans
acquired at different historical times—today in the West, Islam, as a civilization, is
politically homogenized causing the Muslim identity to be feared in the West. Is the
Western liberal and secular state law therefore inadequate in the protection of the norms
of a multiplicity of citizens in its current history as impacted by globalization and
migrational encumberances?
Since at least the beginning of the 20th century, with accelerating global
interconnections everywhere, differently manifest laws are being constantly negotiated in
theologically and culturally specific contexts.96 Because the judicial systems of Western
countries are based on liberal secular fundamentals, their systems are challenged by the
ways different social groups continue to organize human lives given their own different
and sometimes traditional conceptions of the good life.97 It will be seen that liberal
modernity, politically and legally, takes limited account of the fact that different societies
understand and structure human interaction differently, cultivate different capacities and
virtues and assign different meanings and worth to human activities and relationships. In
the West generally, since liberal secular modernity limits its own capacity to normatively
recognize different values, or does not react fast enough to social changes, there is
therefore a forced co-existence of a variety of moral standards in their midst.
As a consequence of the last seventy years of global interconnections, it might be
argued that the latest incarnation of modernity consists of ‘multiple modernities’, or a
plurality of evolving human cultures having plural sociolegal perspectives and
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developing in significantly different ways in different contexts.98 Multiple modernities
refer to specific norm-generating enclaves that are both traditional and modern; there are
many such constellations that exist globally and in the West.99 The multiple moral and
political contexts and normative commitments of the intercultural multiplicity may lead
to peaceful coexistence or produce conflict depending on the capacities and flexibilities
of modern liberal law itself.
A. A glimpse at the development of normative political philosophy:
modernization, liberalization, and secularization since the 18th century
As stated, theoretically, if Western states are liberal modernities, they are based
on the themes of rationalism, secularism, individualism, human rights, democratic
governance and most recently, globalization, all of which play a foundational role in any
discussion of Western modernity and its cognates, such as modernization.100 The
conceptions of liberality that are combined to legally define the good life go back to the
classical era of the Greek Stoics who influenced Western moral liberal thought.101
However, it was in the 18th century Whig tradition of liberty under the law when classical
liberalism began to grow that prominent Whigs such as John Locke, Adam Smith, David
Hume, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison illustrated a fusion of economic and
political liberalism in their writings.102 These thinkers and their followers such as J. S.
Mill, Locke, Montesquieu and Alexis de Tocqueville drew on Greek rationalism and
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Christian universalism, both of which stressed monism and a form of centrality of reason
that arrived at a vision of the good life based on such values as critical rationality, choice
and personal autonomy.103
Classical liberalism accepted four principles of liberty: personal freedom; limited
government; equality of right; and consent of the governed. In this context, personal
freedom refers to no coercion in the way of life of the individual, limited government
means the state is only an instrument of society, equality of right means that everyone
abides by the same rules that the state enforces with impartiality, and consent of the
governed comes from the people to create a certain form of popular democracy. Free
choice became the foundation of the self-worth of the individual. Concern for the
freedom of the individual gave rise to the demand that government be bound by law—the
modern constitution began to take root but religion began to lose the value of its common
public goods.
The process of secularization initially occurred as a response to fierce religious
wars between Protestants and Catholics and which could not be controlled.104 A part of
the Western World’s ideals for social order that is supposedly based on absolute truths
and rational planning was that liberal law also separate from religious interest.
Secularization would be the mechanism that curtailed the power of all transcendent
religions to morally order formal society. Religious freedoms are now special guarantees
by the Western state. American colonies further developed this Western political theory
of modernization based on the concept of secularism. This moral monism as combined
103
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with classical liberalism and secularism when further combined with the Anglo-American
idea of modernization, fortified the belief that a single set of values is the most high and
other values are merely a means to the only one rational and true way to a collectively
accepted and centralized structure of political and legal authority.105 Because this
secularized form of liberal modernization holds on to the assumptions that it produces
predictable patterns of uniformity and standardization of knowledge production, there is
now a continuous commitment of Western liberal and secular law of “equating unity with
homogeneity, and equality with uniformity.”106 Are the bearers of collective rights of
particular communities therefore unfettered from following their customs and practices in
Western liberal modern secular states?
Because the claims of freedoms of numerous communities are complex and
difficult to evaluate, particularly in terms of the weight given to differing empirical
evidence; the internal rationality that has developed differently and is differently
expressed in societies can often be missed by outsiders. In particular, attempts at
interpretation of ancient religious texts by human rationale are often not extensive
enough. The formal interpretation of religious texts by human rationale also brings into
question the motivation and the qualifications of the interpreter. How important is the
concept of religion in claims of freedom of religion? The politics of recognition
associated with judicial constraints in freedom of religion jurisprudence, I maintain, are
apparent within the limiting measures of the institutions of liberal secular modernity:
weak judicial review processes, failed political actions and insufficient philosophical
reflection.
105
106

Wittrock, Supra note 8.
Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism supra note 17 at 9.

34

If the monistic liberal law is instrumentally manipulative in an undemocratic
manner, as Tie thinks, and if liberal claims of justice tend to be homogeneous, then the
results have to be confusing.107 And for Menski, different ideologies, politics, economics,
sociocultural factors and religions play a critical role in shaping legal systems
everywhere.108 The law cannot be a closed system as legal doctrines and practices have
to be interlinked with other aspects of life.109 Law everywhere is plural, inherently
dynamic, takes many different forms, is flexible and has different sources. 110 In an age of
globalization, with rapid convergence of a plurality of cultures in Western societies,
whether a particular knowledge instrument is adequate to provide ordering for the good
life is in doubt. In the relationship of the rule of liberal law and a multiplicity of norms,
can ways of life be hierarchically graded by the modern liberal and secular constitution
that presides?
1.

Liberal secular modernity: rising from classical roots to current
modern globalized societies and plural sociolegal interconnections
The institutions of the classical modern state in the West arose gradually from

absolutistic monarchy as did economic organization from the mercantilist economy.
Absolute monarchy had the power and authority to enforce rules of conduct and to create,
amend or repeal law and the power to raise revenue via taxation. In Europe, up until the
16th century this absolute and perpetual power was accountable ‘only to God.’ In 1688
England, the Stuart Kings’ claims to this absolute monarchy were defeated in the
Glorious Revolution and parliamentary sovereignty, defined as the Commons, Lords and
the Crown, all held to act together under certain procedures. Supreme authority now
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resided in the people but could be delegated in a modern democratic form. Classical
modernization and secularity called for explicitly structured patterns of persistent
integration so that steady progress of the liberal secular modernity would develop through
defined stages and without variation on this course.111
From the 16th century to the latter part of the 20th century—and Ermarth’s dates
go even as far back as 600 years ago, to the time of the European Renaissance and
Reformation—the classical theory of modernity sought to understand the institutional and
cultural transformations in the processes of ‘modernization’.112 These were times of
empire-building and modernization was essential to Western colonialism for exploitative
purposes. In Europe trade flourished after merchants and traders were able to unify rules
and customs that were common to them. Classical trading principles evolved as a selfstanding system of usages, customs, and practices enforceable by merchant courts. This
law of commerce administered by merchants themselves functioned in deciding cases
without interference from local authorities.113 In 1648, the European Treaty of
Westphalia authenticated national boundaries; the nation state developed further territory
for transformation and modernization.114
Also in the 17th century, American colonies further developed modern Western
political history by shunning traditional monarchies with new systems of legal authority
based on the separation of church and state. Together, the Anglo-American philosophers
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politicized that they had fully developed human rationality to the point that it was
possible to judge different religions, societies and historical epochs, and that only they
possessed the true ‘religion.’115 Other ways of life such as those that were communitycentered and other non-Christian religions were ruled out. Classical modernism and law
began to emerge from Christian law.
Because classical liberalism drew on a rationalism that accorded with Eurocentric
Christian universalism, it broadly rationalized a harmony between reason and Christian
morals. Christian thinkers arguing for modernization and liberalization felt that their
vision of the good life was within the moral reach of all human beings.116 Religious
normativity was removed from political rule to curb the ongoing political conflicts within
Christian religious groups. Church and state were separated for the purposes of freedom
of religion. The purpose of this process of secularization was to set the morality of the
Christian faith as a stand-alone and an important force within society. The acceptance of
the truth of religion and religious freedom occurred at a time when virtually whole
societies practiced some form of Christianity. Although the original harmonized
rationalization favoured Christianity, it too was eventually relegated to the realm of the
private. It was when Eurocentric political debates concerning modernization and
liberalization through public reason and individualistic construction of autonomy began
that the communal, social and moral dimensions of religion began to be reduced to a
private and an arbitrary choice; religion therefore began to be ignored in the public.117
The processes of secularization gave rise to the ever-expanding political, scientific and
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legal revolutions within modern societies.
2.

The development of liberal secular democracy and the chanelling of
liberal legalism
As the liberal secular democracy developed, the requirement of a judicial system

to interpret and apply the secular aspect of law also developed within the same frame.118
Towards the 18th century, courts generally began to be more concerned with enforcing a
rigid separation of church and state than with protecting the free exercise of religion. In
the development of liberal thought, religious institutions began to be regarded as a threat
that could destroy the liberties of people. The West now regards religion as a private
matter of tradition that should not intrude into the public sphere.119 Various forms of
secularism and liberalism are now the chief features of a modern liberal democracy.
However, at the end of the 19th century, when a reformed liberalism had begun to
emerge in attempts of a more democratic liberalism, society became a means of enabling
individuals to satisfy their desires in a laissez-faire ethos concerning economic wellbeing and equality of opportunity.120 Not only was the theme of this liberal modernity
viewed as superior, uniform, predictable, and coherent, but having developed in Western
Europe, the fulfillment of individual desire for economic growth became the highest good
within both classical and reform liberalism. Different governments now tend to tilt
towards either form of liberalism.
Because liberalism resulted in a fusion of economics and politics throughout the
18th and early 19th centuries, and classical liberalism identified personal freedom with a
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free market, the laissez-faire economy has become firm.121 However, long before the
political theory of liberalism had matured into democratic liberalism, and long before
equality of political participation based on all people having an equal voice, the
equivalents of social sciences and scientists had a supposed “master theoretical frame to
organize their focus, problems, explanations, and interpretations…the idea of
modernity…around the pre-modern/modern divide.”122 As stated previously, processes
through which all societies were supposedly to have passed in order to develop and
modernize were explored by mid 20th century sociological works such as of Marx,
Tönnies, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, Parsons, and many others.123 In their quest to
transform and modernize the ‘rest of the world’, the dynamics of their theorized process
of modernization centered on systematic and universal ideas of classical modernity of
economic growth, differentiation, rationalization, individualization, urbanization and so
on. Until the 1970s, the above mentioned theorists and their economic and social
development notions for understanding Western modernity with themes from classical
modernization dominated the entire economic, social and legal development industry
globally.
Towards the latter part of the 20th century, at the end of colonialism, reform
modernism and universalistic explanations for events based on presuppositions of
theorists from classical liberalism began to be critically scrutinized; these theorists were
not necessarily “unsullied by political and cultural aspirations” of conquest.124 Liberal
legal discourses of rights, inclusion and equality coexisted with the legitimization of
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colonial policies of exclusion and discrimination by the presumption of differences
between different types of individuals.125 The historical channeling of secularized liberal
legalism by an instrumental and practical view of knowledge has had the theoretical
resources and the opportunity to establish hierarchy among different ways of life.126
Currently, monistic morals continue to be engaged in vigorously distinguishing liberal
modernity and its ideology from global opposition with a vision of sustaining itself as a
vibrant liberal moral culture.
The rule of liberal constitutionalism remains dominant as modernization’s
expansive and transient quality and has manifested in most cultures across the globe.127
However, the increasing multiplicity of modernities in the West: the plurality of religious
orders and different moral doctrines indicate that multiplicities of worldviews and
lifestyles—containing the original “DNA” of the liberalized and secularized modernity—
also have claims that respect different traditional obligations for the common good than
the duty to individual autonomy. However, liberal secular modernity and legalism, and
its individual agent, continues in a global scope with vigorous interconnections in the
now intercultural capitals of Europe, Britain, United States and Canada; capital cities
such as London, New York, and Toronto are highly populated with multiple modern
people.
3.

Multiple modernities and a hetereogeneity of legal orders
There are many ways of understanding modernity, but the fact that the definition

of ‘the modern’ is diffuse, elusive and difficult to comprehend is well illustrated by
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Berman:128
The maelstrom of modern life has been fed from many sources: great discoveries
in the physical sciences, changing our images of the universe and our place in it;
the industrialization of production, which transforms scientific knowledge into
technology, creates new human environments and destroys old ones, speeds up
the whole tempo of life, generates new forms of corporate power and class
struggle; immense demographic upheavals, severing millions of people from their
ancestral habitats, hurling them halfway across the world into new lives; rapid and
often cataclysmic urban growths; systems of mass communication, dynamic in
their development, enveloping and binding together the most diverse people and
societies; increasingly powerful national states, bureaucratically structured and
operated, constantly striving to expand their powers; mass social movements of
people, and peoples, challenging their political and economic rulers, striving to
gain some control over their lives; finally, bearing and driving all these people
and institutions along, an ever-expanding, drastically fluctuating capitalist world
market.
Complex but different historical modes, procedures and institutions make it very
difficult to define modernities in their specificity. Friedman attempts to define modernity
as a process, anywhere, a powerful current of historical condition that combines to
produce sharp ruptures from the past that range widely across various sectors of a given
society.129 The change knits together the cultural, economic, political, religious, familial,
sexual, aesthetic, and technological and so forth and can move in both utopic and
dystopic directions with “shattering” “velocity”; the changes are “across a wide spectrum
of societal institutions...”130 Modernity everywhere is also relational; it is not a past
versus the present, or science versus wisdom. The major rupture—from what came
before—opens up the possibility for polycentric modernities and modernisms at different
points of time and in different locations. In the history of civilization, eruptions of
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different modernities often occurred in the context of empires and conquest such as the
Tang Dynasty in China, the Abbasid Dynasty of the Muslim Empire and the Mongol
Empire, all of which predate Western modernity.131 For Said:
… such movement into a new environment is never unimpeded. It necessarily
involves processes of representation and institutionalization different from those
at the point of origin. This complicates any account of the transplantation,
transference, circulation, and commerce of theories and ideas.132
The transformation of ideas—interpretation for instance—into new positions in
time and space, partially or fully, is gradual. “Hostile soil does not allow transplantation;
conversely, the practices that take hold in their new location are changed in the
process.”133 Although liberal modernity is characterized as a break from tradition, a tearoff from its own continuous time, it in effect invents tradition as part of its own rupture
from its past. The process of modernization and traditionalisation can never end. For
instance, to declare the end of colonialism as synonymous with the end of modernism is,
as Friedman states, “like cutting off the modernisms of emergent modernities.”134
Modernisms as the creative forces within other modernities, such as the writers, the
artists, the musicians, the dancers, the philosophers, the critics, and so forth, are engaged
in producing their own modernisms that accompany their own particular modernities.135
So, multiple modernities create multiple modernisms. And, as Goankar states in
Friedman:136
to announce the general end of modernity even as an epoch, much less as an
attitude or ethos, seems premature, if not patently ethnocentric, at a time when
131
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non-Western people everywhere begin to engage critically in their own hybrid
modernities.
Modernism did not come to a close. Indeed, it cannot come to a close as alluded
to in the idea of post-modernism. As did the creative agencies in the colonies, newly
emergent nations are now exhibiting differentiated modernizations. The nationalist
movements and liberations from political dimensions of colonial rule are central to the
story of their modernities. In that modernity invents tradition, suppresses its own
continuities with the past, and longs for what has been seemingly lost, multiple
modernisms need “respatializing” and therefore “reperiodizing.”137
As noted, liberalism broke with monarchy and also with religion. Some want to
promote the modern and others want to restore an imagined and often idealized past; the
secular liberal democracy tends to live in an idealized imagined past. The struggle
between the modernizing and traditionalizing forces, particularly of religious values
within Canada, are indicative of a defining characteristic of the current liberal modernity.
Both, the past-orientated traditionalism and liberal democracy are as much a feature of
modernity as modernization. I agree with Friedman: “hidden continuities” “buried within
the radical ruptures from the past,” refuse to change or cannot change and often have to
do with the uneven distributions of power and violence in the past, present and
particularly in the future.138
But institutional changes depend not only upon a transformation in how we view
modernity and individual rights, that is, the relationship between democracy and human
rights, but also upon an agent that can effect such a transformation. For social change,
what is required is a deeper understanding of democracy and a different agency of social
137
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transformation in order to institutionalize respect for human rights. The agency of
modernity is not autonomy and freedom to act unimpeded by others; it is a drive to be
able to name one’s collective and individual identity and to negotiate the conditions of
history at the zones of encounters of interculturality.139 It is this incarnation of
modernism that supports the unfolding universe where the unfolding happens within a
specific civilizational context; it is this avatar of modernity, this pluralization of
modernity, these alternate modernities, these polycentric modernities, these contemporary
multiple modernities, that have, collectively, gone beyond liberal modernity’s narrow
mindedness into a dimension of modernity that suggests imaginative, creative and moral
meaning-making forms and cultural practices that engage in substantial and different
ways with the historical conditions of a particular modernity.
The essence of multiplicity of modernity is creativity. But the creative agency of
modernity is in the West; the West perpetuates itself as innovative and the rest of the
world as traditional, as raw for creative appropriation and transmutation into ‘modern’:
modern art, for instance, or culinary cuisine. The creative agency of plural law has been
largely ignored. This exclusion of the juridical agency of multiple modernities deeply
affects the definitional projects of modernism. In effect, multiple modernities also
produce polycentric law, or a multiplicity of legal orders in which providers of legal
systems compete or overlap in a given jurisdiction.
In the West, liberal law is the sole provider of homogeneous law. However, law
is instituted by a heterogeneity of normative claims that are consistently formed in
specific contexts, independent of the state. Political conflicts are inherent in social
interactions as cultures are internally heterogeneous entities. Law is constantly
139
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constructed through the contest of various norm-generating communities that prescribe or
adjudicate normative commitments.140 Norm-generation is part of jurisgeneration;
“pluralism observes [that] various actors pursue norms and it studies the interplay
[without proposing] a hierarchy of…norms and values.”141 In a situation of legal
pluralism, the interrelations between different laws are of special importance. “Law and
the social context in which it operates must be inspected together.”142 In a world of
hybrid legal spaces, a wide variety of transnational and international regulatory problems
can be conceptualized in managing hybridity. How do we balance complexity and
essence, particularity and overlap and hybridity?
A closer look at the new geography of modernism will reveal many centres of
modernity across the globe that throw light on intercultural traffic and their multiple
interpretations that are linked to the circuits of reciprocal influence and transformation
that take place within highly unequal states relations.143 Multiple modernities are already
exhibiting pluralities of space and time based on global linkages with contemporary
societies. Each new manifestation of modernity is distinctive and yet, affiliated thorough
global linkages to other modernities or societal formations. Each such manifestation of
‘modernity’ is located in a series of historical processes that brought relatively isolated
societies into contact with others.144 However, a central facet of liberal modernity is that
people ought to be governed by the rule of law and citizens are under the law that is
rationally standardized.
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B. Constitutional democracy: modern liberal secular law as state political,
economic and social order
The ethics of law, politics and religion were initially separated as a Eurocentric
instrumentalist means toward the larger end of protecting true religious freedom based on
the liberal notions of equality and neutrality.145 Natural law principles and religious
principles were to exist independently of any human law-making agency and therefore
the liberal state may not alter them. Although historically, law was not a major aspect of
Western society and was shaped by customs, classical modernists began to perceive that
purposive rules and public state institutions of social control and authority were
necessary. The rule of liberal law started as a slow and historically prolonged
sociopolitical aspect of modernity but since the 19th century modernity and liberal
legalism have been rapidly swallowing up the globe. According to Thompson, human
law became an instrument of imperialism and found its way around the globe.146
Globally, democracy has now come to imply certain freedoms: political, economic and
social rights and the rule of the many. The idea of a modern liberal democracy—
constitutional democracy—that is cohesive entails legally homogenizing concepts for the
supposed stability and security of the individual and in the interrelationships and
interactions between individuals and groups within the secular democratic state.
Theoretically, constitutionalism is a set of fundamental liberal rules and principles
as shaped by the evolving but homogenized ‘manmade’ law and by which a limited state
broadly engages in the rule of, and the organization of, social life in modern liberal
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states.147 Constitutional law, as part of rule of state law, along with an independent
judiciary and respect for minorities, orders society politically.
The constitution is based on national political identity—autonomy of the
individual—but emphatically not on religious identity. The rule of liberal law is a shield
that protects citizens against the abuse of power and is unconditionally connected to
individual freedom. Generally, constitutionalism, in its association with the modern
secular state, was initially concerned with limits of power and the rule of law; democracy
and human rights are its later additions. It is the very ideals of human rights and the rule
of liberal law that logically lead to constitutionalism and the limited state. In effect,
popular democracy, where the will of the majority is accepted, becomes a legitimate form
of government only when it is united with the traditional Western ideals of
constitutionalism, rule of law, liberty under the law and limited state.148 Because the
characteristics of modern liberal constitutional law are that it is: a system of rules; a form
of purposive human action; and concurrently autonomous from and a part of the modern
liberal state, the rule of constitutional law is subject to the limits of state goals of
stability.149
A liberal constitution may be changed but the rule of liberal law requires that
amendments be made according to recognized procedure. The well entrenched citizen
rights are extremely difficult to retract.150 According to Thompson, liberal law is part of
a “superstructure” that supplies the “necessities of an infrastructure of productive forces
and productive relations”; if we judge the “culture of constitutionalism” in terms of its
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own self-sufficient values “we are imprisoned within its own parochialism.”151
Limitations on what modern liberal constitutional law perceives as controversial
religious norms frustrates the ability of government officials to take actions on
accommodating these norms and misinterpretation sometimes leads to compromise in
democratic law-making. The singular rule of liberal constitutional legalism continues to
ground our legal definitions of personal, social and political life globally.152 According
to Hogg and Zwibel, this purposive law can be influenced by the decision-making of
courts and public officials.153 The protection of religious life is questionable.
How general, systematic, predictable and effective is this rule of constitutional
law? The rule of constitutional law is fundamental to Western liberal democracy and the
rule or convention plays a significant role in the exercise of power.154 Currently, the
definition of the rule of liberal law is not fixed; it is open ended and is extensively
debated; however, at minimum, the rule of liberal, constitutional, law “must be set forth
in advance, be made public, be general, be clear, be stable and certain, and be applied to
everyone according to its terms.”155 The rulers and the ruled are to obey predictable and
supposedly impartial rules of conduct. The rule of liberal law functions as a restraint on
government by requiring officials to comply with the existing law and by curbing their
law-making power. Restraining law-making power is a restraint on the law itself so that
even a legitimate law-making authority is limited. Government actions therefore must be
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positive legal actions and no government action may contravene a legal prohibition or
restriction.156 However, the government is not the controlling or coercive force of society
but an instrument within it; the norms that take precedence in public life are those that are
grounded in abstract philosophical principles that lie behind historical liberal reflections
that are secularized. In that the liberal theory of law is reduced to a rigid structure of a
rational force, encumbered with homogenized values, it is not value-free.
1.

Secularity : a central value in the protection of freedom of religion
It is now taken for granted that the political and the secular are a standard liberal

correlation because they are central features of modernity, and within liberal law,
secularity is restricted to a particular constitutional value.157 Since the 19th century, ideas
about the rights of individuals in liberal democracies, that have been abstracted into
constitutional values, explicitly assume that equal rights have now been ingrained as
automatic methodology.158 A form of voluntary choice-making in the structure of the
guarantee of freedom of conscience and therefore of the practice of religion, is now
treated as an intentional act wherein the liberal individual is free to make moral
considerations in their everyday social interactions.159 Moral considerations that are
recognized by the law are intentions, actions and decisions that fit the public moral code
on proper behaviour and good character. Liberal law now protects the rights of the
abstracted individual believers and their particular moral codes as a constitutionally
protected identity that is supposedly free to practice his or her faith. This blanket
guarantee of a positive right is in keeping with the purpose of all modern secular liberal
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constitutional governmental structures and institutions including courts to secure social
order for the autonomy, happiness, dignity and the benefit of all citizens. But in an age of
globalization, the guarantees of negative rights are challenged by multiple modernities
that refer to different concepts on what they feel constitutes good behaviour to be good
citizens. For many, secularity is not a central feature of the good life. In Canada, there
are examples of misrecognition by courts of group identity in freedom of religion
jurisprudence despite the claimed virtues of the entrenched Charter.160 The most basic
problem for liberal law, and the most difficult, is to balance equality and difference given
the multiplicity of difference within the modern.
2.

Equality and difference: the politics of subordination within an
absolutizing legal system
Although restraints are imposed by the constitution on democratic institutions, the

rule of liberal constitutional law is not a protection against bad laws. The ability of the
majority to take away the formal expression of language, religion, and laws of a minority,
has continued from 18th century Europe when whole societies were homogeneous.161 The
will of the majority cannot be legitimate unless the majority is restrained by an expansive
constitution. Difference needs to be protected against the dominance of liberal
modernity. The imposition on difference to have ‘blind faith’ in liberal modernity is
risking loss of essential values. Studies of various diaspora in Britain conclude that
communities have not abandoned their cultures, or their religions, but have reconstructed
their own cultures to develop informal mechanisms.162 For Bhamra, the sociopolitical
reality of the immigrant experience does not accord with the idea of assimilation into
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mainstream society; it is “analogous to the choice to take a vow of perpetual poverty and
enter a [cultish] religious order.”163 Some can make explicit choices and leave their own
culture or religion; however, it does not follow that it is desirable or legitimate to require
individuals to abandon their own cultures by tacit assumptions given the seriousness of
the consequences of the choice: permanent subordination.
The point of theorizing differences, Razack states, “is not for the sake of inclusion
but for the sake of antisubordination.164” Consensus based on the principles of justice is
difficult. In the relationship between judicially enforced rights and democracy, any
misrecognition by courts implies social subordination of group identity. In Canada, the
individual has freedom of conscience and religion as guaranteed in s. 2(a) of the Charter.
Case law that will be discussed in Chapter III will show that because religion is
individual as well as communitarian, there is state interference with minority religious
practice; individuated rights are protected and valued ahead of the need for social
cohesion of whole religious communities with different rationales. The limitation of
religion is justified within the legal bounds of toleration and explained as a commitment
to a single democracy, liberal democracy.165 Chapter III will also show that courts can be
authoritarian and legal discourse has the power to colonize others. We live in an age of
confused democracy that provides citizens the freedom to make choices among various
options that are supposed to be legitimate and meaningful and, at the same time, require
many citizens to create makeshift meanings out of their own cultures, beliefs and
practices. A democratic state that imposes equal obligations yet denies equal rights
163
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forfeits its legitimacy.166
For Mouffe, an infallible test for political freedom is the legitimacy of opposition;
freedom only to agree is no freedom.167 In a liberal democracy, opposition must operate
within ‘the rule of law.’ But freedom is meaningful only if it constantly renews its
rationale of a moral vision of a good legal system and extends to those whose opinions
differ from the opinions of those in authority. As Keating states, “the real intellectual
problem arises from the doctrine of the unitary or uniform or mechanical state in which
every deviation from uniformity has to be justified by reference to a general and
universalizable rule.”168 Because the liberal democratic tradition treats the cultural
differences of multiple modernities as particularist trends or deviations, and because just
dialogue is precluded by the conventions of modern Western constitutionalism, the
current liberal state is gradually losing control over rights and the construction of new
spaces of democratic discourse.
Vargish stresses that the ultimate agenda of the absolute system of liberal
democracy is self-perpetuation. I agree with Vargish and in particular, the functional
bottom line of the absolutizing legal system of liberal democracy is, in the first instance,
not the perpetuation of the values it appears to embody and uphold—for example, liberty,
equality, fraternity, God’s will, Jesus, history as a determining force—but “order and
power to impose it.169” Shah eloquently sums up: “liberalism as a practical attitude,
rather than as a focus of sophisticated philosophical debate, has become deeply
166
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impoverished…socially ignorant and ethically barren.”170 As a consequence, liberalism,
and its broad legal approach with its many merits, has gradually been challenged by the
multiplicity of the modern to reexamine its, liberal legalism’s, very fundamentals.
Liberal legalism is the main force of liberal modernity and a force that is unable to
accommodate modernism’s incarnation/avatar; the multiplicity of the modern.
Berman confirms that “a pluralist perspective on…law provides a powerful
critique to the latest incarnation of realism—rational choice theory.”171 The confinement
of religious diversity within the liberal form of individual legal agency entails conflict.172
The questions of social justice in modern liberal states go beyond liberal debates about
whether abstract rights should take precedence over a collective conception of the social
good. Social justice cannot be reduced to an abstract legal form; the danger is that, as
equality slides into sameness, difference becomes weak in standing up for inequality or
injustice–the strength within difference will weaken if we continue to advocate for
inequality. 173 An essential part of legitimate authority is considerations of fairness; this
entails equal distribution of political power particularly in a democracy where the law is
supreme.
In the sociolegal context, Shah states that diasporic minorities are not taken
seriously and are perceived as if they are demanding special treatment.174 Also, the
presence of numerous groups, both within, and external to Western states is perceived by
the proponents of liberalism to be threatening to its fundamental ideals of authority.
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Religious difference is particularly feared. Because liberal democracy is identified with
“a reality that is universal, inviolable, complete, supreme, and, above all, single and
monological”, mainstream legal analysts in the fields of—feminism, critical race theory,
gay/lesbian legal studies to name a few—have heralded, what Cotterrell calls, a new
‘jurisprudence of difference”, which asserts that the social environment of law can no
longer be thought of as made up merely of individuals addressed equally by law.175
3.

The post-20th century emblem of the modern Western state
We have seen that although the idea of modernization is commonly associated

with the West, modernization in its multiplicity has been occurring in all societies at
different points of time and in different locations, and, since the 16th century, it has
created the context of globalization. For more than four centuries, modern liberal
constitutionalism has been developing with two forms of recognition: the equality of
independent, self-governing nation states and the equality of individual citizens.176 It has
developed with imperialism wherein European nations constructed their own imperial
systems over the non-European world. In most of the post-colonial world, modern
constitutionalism is now fashionable among the so called equal and independent
constitutional nation states. State institutions of modernization and liberalization have
become emblematic of the modern world at large. However, the argument is that if
modernism and liberal legalism is defined in terms of the prevalence of a few key societal
institutions of the political and economic Western order than modernism is reduced to the
West only and that too as is applicable to the early part of the 20th century. Everywhere,
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there is a spectrum of reinterpretation and reconstruction of the constitutional program of
liberal modernity and of the construction of multiple modernities and its diverse
interpretations. Many multicultural and multiethnic movements are attempting therefore
to redefine the discourse of particularistic modernity in their own terms. Although
modernization is not now Westernization, it was considered essential to Western
nationalism for social control and for colonialism for exploitative purposes and as a
development strategy applied to the Third World.
4.

Relativized knowledge: ongoing modernization and globalization are
not westernization
Every diasporic community globally has been exposed to some form of Western

modernization either pre-migration or post-migration to the West. If, as Eisendadt
suggests, “modernity and Westernization are not identical,” even though modernities
continue to refer to the Western historical precedence.177 The changed cultural condition
and human interconnections suggests that the bases upon which liberal-modernities are
lodged needs to be redefined in the context of the role of law in its various social
contexts. For peaceful co-existence, a dialogue of difference has to be a normative effort
in order to appreciate the relevance of the historical and civilizational interpretation and
commitment of the other. Legal analyses could be pluralist in nature. Again, in the
analysis of legal pluralist, Robert Cover, the rules and principles of justice as instituted in
formal law and conventions of social order, though important, are only a small part of the
normative universe that ought to claim our attention. “We inhabit a nomos – a normative
universe. We constantly create and maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and
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unlawful, of valid and void.”178 Those citizens (for instance, Aboriginal peoples, women,
linguistic and ethnic minorities, intercultural groups, religious organizations and other
multiplicities) whose customs and traditions have been excluded or suppressed by the
politics of recognition of modern constitutionalism of the modern nation state are
struggling for equal recognition.
For Tully, the politics of the recognition of cultural identities continue in a postimperial age of modern liberal constitutionalism.179 The modern constitution ought to be
removed “from its imperial [Western] throne,” because “constitutions are not fixed and
unchangeable agreements reached at some foundational moment, but chains of continual
intercultural negotiations and agreements in accord with, and violation of the conventions
of mutual recognition, continuity and consent.”180 For Tully, in the interest of justice,
Western constitutional theory is amendable.181
For Said, there is no culture, civilization, or nation that can truly separate itself
into a pure and an impure or hybrid culture; there are no insulated cultures or
civilizations, nor in fact have there ever been.182 Any attempt to separate them into
“water-tight compartments” does damage to their variety, to their diversity, their sheer
complexity of elements and their radical hybridity.183 And, as Kymlicka wrote in 1989,
culture is more accurately understood as a continual process of “renegotiation, reevaluation and reconstruction;” it is never finished, and it is not possible to finish it.184
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All modernisms develop as forms of cultural translation or transplantation
produced through intercultural encounters and the constant making and remaking of
boundaries, and their practical implications for law exist in all societies. Intermixing
cultures are not unidirectional; they are multidirectional. They are not linear influences
but reciprocal ones. They are not passive assimilations, and, depending on the
adaptability or resistance, they transform actively. Although the scientific, industrial and
political revolutions succeeded in emerging in the West, others, such as China, India and
the Muslim world, have been influential on the world stage in global thoughts in many
areas such as physical and natural sciences to architecture, art, commerce, and social and
political thought. Western accomplishments are inextricably linked to those of others.
The economic, techno-scientific and civic modernity occurred in the West. But there
cannot be a new epoch in human experience that is universal. If all knowledge and
public institutions were relativized, would citizenship be tenable? On the flip side, what
if there was a return of religion to the public sphere often with singular truth-claims? But
in a democracy, law is supposedly an aspect of the socio-cultural diversity it administers.
The interpenetration of civilizations and cultures is the hallmark of democracy in
the 21st century. A world civilization would not be worthy of its name if it could not do
justice to the individuality of different spheres of culture and civilization. The larger
problem is the failure of the democratic institution to recognize its relationship with the
current critique of modernity. There is a clear indication that modern liberal democracies
in the 21st century are in trouble.
Although liberal modernity has multiple interfaces, it fails to converse fully with
modernities that are firmly attached to religious values as part of life. The failure of
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liberal modernity to recognize multiple modernities and to deal only superficially with
new developments has led to a head-on collision of what I call ‘a clash of modernities.’
The singular liberal modernity that appears to be most conspicuous is the hegemony of
the United States, followed by Western Europe and Canada. In their quest to follow and
emulate the powerful, all other modernities, liberal or not, secularized or not, are
complicit in the clash.
C. A space of opportunity: an enhanced model of liberalism
Parekh advocates freedom to research and to explore the elements of liberalism
with a combination of elements drawn from other sources. Due to the complexity of
multicultural populations everywhere, the West needs to break away from its obsession
with the Western culture of liberal essentialism, finality, and intellectual rigidity. 185
Mohanty’s statement, as quoted in Razak, about the liberal form of ‘inclusion’ as a
“harmonious, empty pluralism echoes the lament of some critical pluralists previously
mentioned, some are listed here;186” Tully, the diverse ways citizens in the West are
culturally constituted by legal and political institutions to adhere to the norms of
uniformity remain unexamined;187 Sen, the privileging of legal regulation and
adjudication in political liberalism raises what he refers to as a question of capabilities
and chances, and this is a challenge to liberal conceptions of legal equality; 188 and
Parekh, liberalism, with its essentialism, closure, system building and intellectual rigidity,
marginalizes values such as human solidarity, equal life chances, selflessness, self-
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effacing humility, and contentment.189 Liberalism creates skepticism about the pleasures
and achievements of human life as “it is not sufficiently sensitive to and cannot give
coherent accounts of culture, tradition, community, a sense of rootedness and
belonging.190” I am convinced that the larger framework of liberal constitutionalism in
Canada therefore has limited legal capacity to balance individual freedoms against the
maintenance of different authentic cultures, religions or races. The limits are due to
reluctance, according to Lee, to confront uncertainty and he adds that it is not fatal to
accept uncertainty because it can be pragmatically managed as “part of self-monitoring
activities…[so that] theories as applied to social change… attempt to bring to realization
a sustainable economic and political environment under the aegis of modernity”191
The liberal traditional values such as human dignity, equality, critical rationality,
respect for others and toleration can only be enhanced with the intercultural multiplicity
and diverse intellect that obviously has no determining centre. And, according to Kaya,
no centre of society is capable of shaping the entirely of social relations.192 He argues
that modernity is open-ended enough to allow spaces for multiple interpretations.193
Multiple modernities are therefore not based on a centre that determines any activity and
sphere in the social world. A concealment of the immense variety of cultures, of peoples,
of religions, historical traditions and historically formed attitudes remains open to
disputes over the common good or the good life.194 Benhabib defends constitutional and
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legal universalism at the level of polity but within a “deliberative democracy” of legal
pluralism and institutional power-sharing.195 And the space of culture, or religion, or
language or history, whose importance is no less than that of the power of rationality,
provides opportunities to interpret imaginary significations of modernism in multiple
ways.
Studies of the plurality of civilizations confirm that many of the cultural, legal,
political, and scientific forces in people’s lives move in competing and often inconsistent
directions. Multiplicity is inherent in modernity. The plurality of the cultural worlds is
irreducible. Intercultural multiplicity and diverse intellect are therefore inevitable. The
intense multiplicity of the current complex epoch reflects a modernity in which tensions,
contradictions and dualities are much more evident and openly expressed. There is no
coherence in the current world and the conflicts within the diversity of myriad
interpretations indicate the radical pluralism of the cultural and theological worlds.196
To continue to call Canada a liberal society is to homogenize and oversimplify
contemporary society; it also gives liberal Western societies a moral and cultural
monopoly that treats non-Western societies as illegitimate and troublesome intruders.
For Parekh, paradoxically, it is the glory of liberal society—tolerant, open, and free—that
it is not, and does not need or even seek to become, exclusively or entirely liberal, that is,
committed to a strong sense of autonomy, individualism, self-creation et cetera.197 This
permanent inner logic and strength in liberalism has been misunderstood by philosophers
of all stripes until recently.198 This logic stems from his argument that liberalism views
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human beings as wholly constituted by their culture where culture is a sort of
superstructure, resting on, and interacting with, an unchanging and identical human
nature. The fact that this human nature shapes human beings and defines the nature and
content of the good life is not appreciated as a source of significance of religious
diversity. When religion serves to keep the divisions between the modern and the
traditionalist intact, an extremely important aspect of a modern society is sidetracked.
D. Conclusion
In the last 50 years, many, many millions of refugees, movements of peoples by
choice from country to country, immigrants, displaced peoples and others have
crisscrossed over to different cultures. In Canada, its Eurocentric value system with its
universal code of liberal modernity, however, clashes with the practical and legal needs
of the multiplicity of modernities. If the challenge of human rights and social justice is
not confronted, struggles could potentially erupt into violence. In particular, there is a
persistent non-acknowledgement of religious differences and historical and legal frames
of all available systems of values, beliefs and practices, giving rise to conflicts.
The ideology of liberal legalism developed from Locke’s classical liberalism to
Mill’s more reformed liberalism, and its amplification, modification and sometimes even
reduction, has struggled through parliament with Stuart Kings, the Glorious Revolution
of 1688, the establishment of supremacy over monarchy, to where the people now have a
moral right to establish the rule of law.199 From a sociohistorical vantage point,
ideologies are not static, timeless systems of ideas. As a general rule, the quality of the
outputs of any system reflects the quality of its inputs; a system of constitutional
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supremacy has to be based on the value choices of the multiplicity. Agreement on
political matters and social justice need not exclude recognition of difference. This is
most crucial in recognition of religious scriptures. And law may not be the only system
available for social justice. The treatment of “equality” is a societal value as an essential
part of the constitutional framework. Normative refinements of the liberal democratic
theory would view pluralism as a value worth protecting and not simply as a fact to be
tolerated.
The term ‘multiple-modernities’ acknowledges the relevance of many versions of
modernity and lived experiences that are culturally and historically contingent.
Currently, the world at large is rooted in liberal politics and integrating people into
changing markets with a dangerous abandonment of the democratic commitment to
equality. “There is no universally valid mediating frame: no common denominator, no
constant, especially not time and space to act as the common basis of resolution in a
universally valid discourse.”200
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CHAPTER II - The Secular Legal Order: Misconceptions within
Liberal Law of the Relationship between Politics and Religion
In the contemporary West, due to a steady influx of immigration and a growing
base of standards of morality, the relationship between religion and law reflects a
plurality of rationales, all of which are simultaneously looking for answers to questions of
authority, justification of universal rights, and rational answers to questions of code of
conduct in everyday life. However, the theory of secularization also reflects the
relationship between current law, politics and religion that exposes the now—given a
multiplicity of legal regimes—weakened foundations on which modern secular
constitutional democracies are based. The secularized relationship between plural
religions, constitutional law and politics may be illogical and legal resolution on religious
issues is difficult.
This chapter will explore what the possibilities are of expanding the boundaries of
liberal secular modernism and whether law is able to recognize and accommodate a
further multiplicity of authentic normative orders. Is liberal law: neutral towards religion,
anti-religion, or non-religious? Is the scope of the authority of each, the public and the
private spheres, religion and law, distinct and unfettered? Can the state itself be allowed
to continue to have a specific conception of the good, in this case, rational secular
morality? Given the plurality of moralities, how can a liberal secular state and society
encourage religious diversity, pluralism and the common good? If morality is an
important characteristic within multicultural societies, what is the role of religion in
guiding public morality in such societies? According to Parekh, reason can “suffer from
limitations” leading to widespread differences of views and sometimes clouded by
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emotion.201 What are the possibilities of faith and reason to interact in these modern
societies for a moral and judicious political life? Is it possible to have a universal value
system that is applicable to the beliefs and practices of a multiplicity of modernities in a
liberal democracy?
A. Regulating religion: Eurocentric tensions between religious rights and
secular politics
In the West, as part of the force of Eurocentric modernity, the theory of liberal
secularization was conceptualized to transform and completely differentiate the spheres
of the religious and the secular. It originated to liberalize and to remove religion from
legal and political rule. The freeing of religion from Christian politics and civil unrest,
religious wars and revolutions was to legally solidify Christianity’s moral force within
civil society.202 As a single process of differentiation of the various institutional
spheres—from early modern to contemporary societies—secularization is understood as a
defining characteristic of processes of modernization and liberalization that guarantee the
individual citizen freedom of religion.203 For Casanova, this process has remained
uncontested; what needs to be opened up is an exploration of Christian historicity of
Western Europe along with a multiple other different historical patterns of secularization
in other civilizations and world religions.
In the discourse between state law and religion—religious legislation attached to
constitutional values—there is often disadvantage or exclusion of some religions and
faith practices and in particular those which are not of the established, official or
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recognized religions.204 It is argued that the moral fibre and the good within civil society
are inspired by religious traditions and doctrines.205 It is further argued that all citizens
have multiple and distinct identities that they choose at will, much like chameleons and
they ought to be allowed to participate in the public sphere with their key aspects intact if
the modern liberal state itself is to remain comparatively free of moral chaos manifesting
in multifaceted conflicts.
For instance, in a 2009 freedom of religion case involving A.C, a mature but
minor Jehovah’s Witness, refused to accept blood transfusion as her religious tenet.206
The criteria that the majority at the SCC used, in the process of reasoning, and choosing
and explaining this particular religious tenet, was what constitutes a liberal legal category
and classification. But the court was also required to deliberate upon the capacity of the
adolescent to understand her personal normative subjectivity to a religious tenet. It was
an ingrained, sincere, belief of A.C. that if she accepted blood transfusion, she would be
damned for eternity. But the analysis of the case was synthesized into a body of
previously derived secular legal principles and constitutional limitations. The court was
in effect required to manage religious tenets within a specific new realm, the realm of
private values in a public forum; a constraint that is self-imposed on the secularized
system. The moral, deeply held religious beliefs, and the political contexts are most
times confused with the claims of justice.
1.

Secularism as a definitive characteristic in the progress of modern
liberation
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Liberation and separation of religion from the state were to benefit politics, law
and morality.207 The secular referred to state law, policy, and economy and the religious
included mostly various Christian churches. The definition of secularism was first coined
in 1851 by Holyoake; it was formally published in the Oxford English Dictionary in
1911.208 The rationale then was focused on neutrality: secularism “neither affirms nor
denies the theistic premises of religion” but it does replace the “uncertainties of theology”
and it is “founded on considerations purely human.”209
The process of secularization progressed in the human and societal development
to what is perceived as from the primitive ‘sacred’ to the modern ‘secular.210 The social
and political order shifted gradually from the “hand of God, to the hands of men of God,
to the hands of many, many, ordinary men” who would undertake a secular order that is
supposedly virtuous.211 In other words, Western societies and social order evolved from
a theological reference to God and blind faith, to a metaphysical stage wherein human
reason questions and investigates the religious authority.212 This is an abstract stage. The
final abstraction from religion is where the process of secularization is the AngloAmerican scientific process that supposedly has answers to moral questions everywhere
generally, and in particular in the rule of law.
The process of secularization has been structured as parallel to the political
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process of Western modernization and liberalization. In the continuing evolution of
processes from pre-Enlightenment theological roots where man and society deferred to
unquestioned natural principles of law, morality, religion, myths and traditions, to a
metaphysical stage of the justification of universal rights so that the authority of religion
became questionable, to a further stage where scientific reason and generalization of
these principles of law became paramount for the achievement of material and political
progress for self-fulfilment, liberal legislators and courts generally began to be more
concerned with enforcing a rigid separation of church and state than with protecting the
free exercise of religion.213 Today, the claim of liberal neutrality defines the process of
secularization as the process in which religious consciousness is not essential in the
operations of social systems. Although there are many variations of secularism, the term
“secular” has become synonymous with the construction, codification, grasp and
experience of a realm of reality that is differentiated from “the religious.”214 It is simply
a statement that: this is different from religion. Globally, faith-based practices are now
often considered to be hostile to political secular liberty.
In contemporary legal reality, the secular non-religion liberal order is now
understood as a normal human condition, as if God does not exist, in the public sphere.215
And it is the application of the contemporary category of the secular, godlessness, that
defines the legal and political identity of the liberal secular state and its society and that
lends liberal legalism both its legitimacy and autonomy. This monistic liberal ideology
of rights has remained steadfast in Western sociology and social sciences despite
thorough contestations by legal, feminist, race and other critics. More importantly, the
213
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complex relationship of religion and modernity may leave spaces for contestation such
that radical ideologies may gain legitimacy within societies where governance fails.
With increasing plurality, the territory which lies in-between religion and politics is
difficult to regulate. In Canada, the legal foundation for the private-public divide is not
always clear.
2.

Secularization, Christendom, and Religious Identity: in the separation
of church and state or religion and state, where is (a) freedom of
conscience, (b) equality, and (c) neutrality?
The 2008 Bouchard-Taylor Report commissioned by the Government of Quebec

in 2007 found that secularism is generally regarded as a “straightforward, unequivocal
principle that prescribes the separation of church and state, state neutrality and, by
extension, the confinement of religious practice to the private sphere.”216 However, for
Bouchard and Taylor, the “declaration of independence” by the state from the church is
not clearly distinguished.217 There is confusion in the total separation of church and
state, from that of religion and state, the latter being a political arrangement.
The Report defines current understanding of secularism in Canada as:
A system based on four constituent principles: two profound purposes (freedom
of conscience, and the equality of deep-seated convictions); and two structuring
principles the separation of Church and State, and State neutrality).218
The Report concludes that within this perspective, current accommodation for
religious reasons is perceived as being incompatible with secularism. The Report
determined that secular systems should achieve a balance between four principles: the
moral equality of persons; freedom of conscience and religion; separation of church and
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state; and state neutrality in matters of religious and deeply-held convictions.219
However, the idea that reason can fulfil its emancipating function solely if it is
free of any religious faith is also debatable; a person can certainly use his/her reason in
the conduct of their life while maintaining a place of faith.220 The faith adherent’s
identity is tied not only to his/her religious community; it is also tied to his/her social,
psychological and economic self in significant ways. If identity is non-existent,
meaningful relationships would not exist. Virtually every aspect of good human conduct
is capable of being the subject of religious belief, and moral considerations would require
the state be neutral in the public sphere in accommodating all authentic religious
groups.221 Is absolute state neutrality even a practical possibility?
The hard anti-religious sentiments within the modern state are difficult to
disentangle. For Taylor, “nothing this hard and fast exists in any other human culture in
history” rather, the distinction between a higher being and ordinary beings exists
universally.222 Again, when combined with the political understanding of the secular
self, it is argued that liberal law requires that all citizens ignore at least part of their
identities in order to be citizens but at the same time recognize that complete separation
will be impossible.
Also, Christian morals have remained integral as a code of conduct of civic life
despite secularist processes. But generally, “law and religion are each obsessed with
questions of right and wrong, sin and crime…and both set that inquiry into a larger,
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structural, often hierarchical frame.”223 Both are acquired and held by a collectivity on
the basis of a certain morality. In particular, religious beliefs and practices have been
acquired and held by a collectivity on the basis of religious scriptures and faith. Because
in reality the secular always overlaps with the religious, and it is becoming progressively
very difficult to access the realm of the religious by minority religions in the public
domain in the West, “any genuine freedom-of-religion law must protect not only
individual belief, but the institutions and practices that permit the collective development
and expression of that belief.”224 The preservation of the choices and therefore the rights
of each individual will preserve the individual as a ‘holistic’ entity. The challenge to
rational liberal secularized constitutions is that often, decision-makers universalize
different interests of society as if they are acceptable to a specific individual.
Generally, the presence of numerous different moralities, both within, and
external to Western states is perceived by the proponents of liberalism to be anti-law and
threatening to its fundamental ideals. This may lead to a misunderstanding as to the
reality of the hard fusion of the religious and the secular in different supposedly nonliberal spheres. Religious communities in Western secularized states are required to
either adapt to Western modernity or reject traditional values. Empirical linkages
between modernity and secularity may not be prominent but the removal of religion from
public life and the creation of a space for the toleration and freedom of religion from
discrimination are now expressed in secular terms and as a political guarantee.225
Given this contemporary, more political, understanding of the separation of
church and state and given the guarantee of freedom of religion in liberal law, can newer
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moralities that overlap be generalized and incorporated into universal principles of liberal
legalism and by way of consensus? Or is liberal law theorized as primarily a political
design for governance on principles that consider only the secular rights of individuals
and not other principles that the same individual may need to adhere to, such as, the
needs of faith organizations that the individual belongs to? In the rapid advancement of
modernity and secularization globally, religious influence seems to be weakening. Who
then controls all aspects of social needs of the individual?
B. The role of religion in society
The importance of religion in society is its role.226 Although religion—a
discourse with diverse and contested meanings—cannot be an adequate analytical
category for public normativity, it is a source of self-dignity and self-identity. Different
faiths consider religion as a way of life and binding religious principles are an integral
part of the governance and conduct of the self and in the improvement of the quality of
their lives. Believers are not exempt from existentiality: family, community, and
commercial life. Although different civic realities are experiences and expressed
differently in various modern contexts, religion continues to feed the moral and
permissible mindfulness that consistently formulates these expressions of the believer
civil citizen.227
Parallel and correlated to these realities are transformations of numerous religious
and secular lives in an age of rapid cross-cultural exchange of human relations and
norms.228 There is a risk of totally erasing peoples’ roots. However the role and function
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of religion in society, and the degree to which religion is valued and protected is
persistently invoked by the rule of liberal secular law in the consideration of national
identity. Freedom of conscience and therefore of choice of religious belief is supposedly
protected by liberal constitutional law. But, again, constitutional law continues to build
on the weak foundations of the public-private divide. The protection of religious interests
is sometimes confused with the protection of cultural interests, particularly of the
majority; the guarantee of freedom of religion is confused with other rights such as
cultural equality and respect.229 The progressive sophistication of the politics of modern
liberalism includes a form of non-religious morality that is oblivious to the inner aspects
of humanity and, at the same time, is very concerned with worldly interests of the
individual.230
In Canada, because liberal constitutional law considers religion to be a private
matter that cannot be allowed to infringe upon the public sphere, we need to consider
this: the interpretation of both, religion and liberal secular rationalism, rest on human
reason, an important, necessary, and the only available faculty to human disciplined and
moral thinking.231 Can what a multiplicity of practitioners of different faiths believe to
be the supremacy of God be given constitutional meaning or would this in effect be a
threat to the values of a free and democratic society as understood within liberalism? The
rationalist liberal makes the finite, and fallible, human reason, the basis of the rule of law.
However, human reason, for the religious person, relies on the “infinitely superior and
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infallible divine reason.”232 Rational constitutionalism is, for the believer, procedural,
methodological and guided by evidence but religion or faith is committed to a substantive
body of beliefs that involve the place of “emotions, spontaneity, intuitions and gut
feelings.”233 A dynamic modernism, I maintain, goes into an expanded horizon of
rationality that includes the construction of quality social consciousness. However, this
quality is subject to interpretation; the acceptance of fallibility can only lead to an
energetic search for truth as no single position exhausts truth.234
Although interpretation of religion is key, in the rapidly pluralizing state, the
public right to freedom of religion in Canada’s Charter therefore remains one of the most
controversial of rights. It is the liberal moral foundation of freedom of religion—the fact
of the value of faith understood as a mode of belief distinct from reason—that supposedly
has the capacity to contribute to human well-being.235 Secularism regards faith as
valuable only in the recognition of the fact that a secular society has guaranteed freedom
of religion. The guarantee of freedom of religion is the most prominent and yet the most
vulnerable site for the pursuit of faith.236 In Canada, current democratic rights and
protections afforded to the practice of religion may not be within reach for the believer
for certain frames of moral and ethical behavior.
Religious beliefs and practices are consistently at the centre of freedom of religion
jurisprudence. Canadian cases concerning the carrying of religious objects such as the
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kirpan,237 a religious symbol for many centuries in India for Orthodox Sikhs, is compared
to a commission of a crime of possession of a dangerous weapon; or the covering of the
body or face for religious discipline is debated against the identity of the individual for
security of others, or that a Sikh male’s turban is a legal contravention of uniformity or a
safety hazard against the individual himself.
Accommodation of religious practices is reluctantly directed to individual
adherents as and when they require exemption. Generally, courts almost always uphold
restrictions on religious practice. The existence of a large diversity of possible meanings
for the concept of religion in the contemporary West is always considered in the context
of its supposed opposite; the secular. However, the lived experiences of immigrants
continue to reproduce the diversity of deeply-held legal or normative systems as multiple
populations grow.238 All normative systems revolve around liberal rules to make claims
to authority. Because the bewildering multiplicities of religious beliefs that are rooted in
plural claims to authority are required to cohabit within the supreme state law that
pervades all aspects of life, the overlap between law and religious practice of individuals
is potentially conflictual.239
Historically, religion has always been the cause of conflict, but it has also always
been a source of good public values for society. The liberal state may lose some benefits
from, for example, faith-based institutions and organizations such as schools, hospitals,
social service agencies, charitable and other organizations, all of which may contribute
financial and other resources to societies. As stated, to start with, church and state in the
West were not separate. For centuries, religion and religious activity have been both a
237
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divisive and a cohesive force in society. Spiritual belief has inspired us for immense
good but it has also been responsible for mass persecution, intolerance of difference and
abuse of the rights of others.240 Although 4th century Christianity kick-started the concept
of secularism, it was a series of events during the Reformation in England in the 1530s,
during the reign of Henry the Eight, that is responsible for modern secularism.241
C. The modern state: its emergence and developing theory of liberal
secular law
In the 16th century, King Henry broke away from the authority of the Pope by
separating the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England. He not only
established himself as the head of the Church of England, but also as the ultimate
arbitrator of doctrinal and legal disputes.242 Because England was predominantly
Protestant, Catholics were discriminated against and Protestantism became intertwined
with national identity. There was a long and bloody period of religious and political
persecutions.243 Diverse religious groups were subjected to laws that were contrary to
their beliefs and practices. Tolerance of religious minorities such as Catholics and Jews
was rare in England. Religious minorities had to hide their religious identities and which
restricted their ability to seek new converts or to seek political power.244 In the 16th and
17th centuries, European fear and hostility to religious plurality was at its worst. It was
not until after the “Glorious Revolution” in 1688 that religion first became separated
from law. A church polity was established but Catholics in England continued to be
discriminated against; their civil liberties were severely curbed. The liberation of the
240
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Christian religion from the politics of civil strife, political rule, wars and revolutions
followed in the 17th century.245 In effect, Catholic Church organizations were considered
illegal until the 19th century.
As the modern secular state was emerging and disputes finally began to be
resolved starting in the 17th century, religion began to be removed from law and politics
in Europe generally. In 1689, the English parliament enacted the Toleration Act granting
some religious freedoms, particularly to Protestants.246 In 1789, the French declared the
Rights of Man that involved religious freedoms.247 In the struggle for political
supremacy, many functions, properties and institutions of church control were transferred
out to non-church laymen: “a rearrangement of the furniture in a civilization whose basic
features remain unchanged.”248
Although secularization refers to the actual historical patterns of transformation
and differentiation of the institutional spheres of the ‘religious’ from early modern to
contemporary societies, the general theory of secularization is still developing within
Western sociology.249 Secularization that was conceptualized within the European
historical transformations later became increasingly globalized as part and parcel of a
general teleology of conquest by the West, globally. By 1791, two guarantees, freedom
of religion, and the prohibition of establishing of religion, were entrenched in the
Constitution of the United States as fundamental rights, now within its Bill of Rights.250
Courts in all liberal democracies were also undergoing changes in empirical sciences
245
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towards more rational and progressive legal systems. Currently, in the separation of the
traditional role of religion and faith-based values as vital protectors of public morality
from politics, liberal legalism has become unable to fully understand religion.251
1.

The position of privilege of secular law and potential conflict
It is now understood that the political and practical, epistemological privilege

granted by Western liberals to the Anglo-American jurisprudence of secular modernity,
or liberal secular legalism, suppresses multiple forms of knowledge and other, what are
perceived to be ‘non-scientific’ moral codes.252 Because the principles, including moral
codes for any liberal modern political system are agreed upon, and religion is defined as
individual conscience, and because these consensus-based principles are detailed and
have to be timeless, they tend to be rigid. Again, inividuals are deemed to be
autonomous moral agents, free to adopt their own conception of what a successful life is;
the communal and social dimensions of religion are reduced to an arbitrary choice. In
this Western-historical connection between liberal law based on Christian morals, other
established religions and the value of their faiths are deprived of a voice in the ordering
of a multicultural public.
Secularism's view that religion is merely a private and arbitrary choice makes it
easier to suppress religion, whether by limiting religious freedom or by defining it
in exclusively secular terms. This form of secularization undermines perhaps the
most basic freedom upon which liberal democracy lies.253
Truths that are external to secularity and liberal rights do not matter in deliberation. This
defies the sentiment that generally, religion offers the citizen a sense of well-being, and
therefore any support for values of faith is in effect supporting the original agenda of
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secularism itself; the protection of all religions.254
No European society or political system is truly secular.255 For Parekh, this is
“Western moral engineering.”256 If, as Heyking states, the process of liberal
secularization is “a by-product of an untenable account of Western political discourse
grounded in Christendom and an Enlightenment account of the autonomy of reason”257,
and, if the Christian heritage continues to shape the vocabulary, self-understanding,
institutions, ideas and practices of liberal modernity and law, are the ideas of human
dignity, equal human worth and unity of humankind to draw their moral energy from this
heritage that always reappears in the secularized liberal form?
Many of its current laws and practices and even such things as treating Sundays,
Christmas Day, New Year’s Day, and Easter, as public holidays, are all further examples
of the continuing influence of Christianity. In effect, legislation providing Sunday as a
universal day of rest, has survived. It is considered a universal secular principle (not
everyone accepts this).258 The historical roots could be forgotten, but even if Christianity
survives only as Western culture and thought, its religious basis or overtones do not go
unnoticed by non-Christians. If the state holds a particular view of religion, or it views
the morals of a particular religion as paramount, it is deemed to have entered the realm
of ideology. Not only does there seem to be privilege granted to well-recognized
religions despite the rule against the establishment of any religion,259 but as will be
discovered in case law in Chapter III, the privilege is in effect legally justified in some
254
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cases. In an age of mass migration, legal resolution of conflict between particular
normative frames of religion and state law will be increasingly difficult if the provision of
freedom of religion in most liberal constitutions is not neutral.
Again, the tendency to dismiss the ‘non-liberal’ as atypical, unimportant and
transitory, often results in arguments and considerations of the socio-legal realities of
minority groups as making claims for special treatment. That modern liberal law tends to
marginalize religion altogether makes it a form of political law.260 Throughout the West,
discrimination against many other religious groups continues in a variety of ways.
Minority religions are considerably weakened by secularized powers.261 In Canada, for
instance, practitioners of faith are finding that the law determines truths for whole groups
of believers; the law decides which religious practices are acceptable and what sources of
normative order are to be respected. Conflict may be inevitable.
If the purpose of the concept of liberal secularism and law is really of servitude to
the greater goal of religious liberty that would be achieved through accommodation and
neutrality of religious belief, then this purpose of the separation of private and public law,
having acquired a position of privilege, is misleading.262 In terms of the protection of the
interests of the religious adherent by the guarantees of freedom of religion in liberal
constitutions, there is confusion on whether the process of secularization is a political
process that lies within the framework of law or whether it is a sociological phenomenon
that is embodied in individual conceptions of the world and different lifestyles.263 It is
understood that the state, and not society, is called upon to serve and to enhance the
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promotion of genuine religious observance; it is also understood that the state is a
political and not a religious institution and it cannot coercively enforce any religion.
2.

Canada: Misconceptions and discrimination within liberal rational
secularity
In Canada, upon application by the Muslim population to the Government of

Ontario for faith-based arbitration in 2005, the government in effect permanently
excluded all faith-based arbitration long permitted in the province.264 This was based on
a misguided fear that Muslim populations will use the opportunity to introduce Shari’a
law against vulnerable Muslim women and that the stoning of women could become
legalized.265 It was feared that Muslim women may not have the ability to choose a
liberal format for their marital disputes. And in France, its “morale indépendante”
continues in contemporary politics as the concept of laïcité—freedom from a rival
religious morality—and this is evident, for example, on bans on the Muslim headscarf in
the country.266 In Canada, in the relationship between religion and liberal law, the rule is
that the state cannot establish religion so that the separation between church and state is
supposedly firm. However, there seems to be less concern for failing to understand that
rejection of deeply-held beliefs of others is a form of discrimination and that this is
related to imbalances in social equality.267
For Razack, the responses to Shari'a law by threatened Canadian feminists (both
Muslim and non-Muslim) reinstalled the modernity/pre-modernity divide and the secular
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over the religions distinctions without hesitation.268 Canadian feminists utilized the
power of the state to stigmatize and police Muslims and to reproduce the citizen as
unconnected to community. The power of fundamental Islam does oppress women but,
in Canada, it would have been possible to get safeguards within the Arbtration Act for the
protection of Muslim women. However, the Boyd Report concluded that tolerance and
accommodation of minority groups who seek to engage in alternative dispute resolution
must be balanced against a firm commitment to individual autonomy; it also found that
secular state laws do not treat everyone equally because people’s individual backgrounds
lead to differences in the impact of these laws.269 Formal equality and liberal
essentialism therefore decontextualize subjective interpretation or particular
interpretations of religious ideology. Again, the next chapter will confirm Casanova’s
observation that the liberal constitution itself decontextualizes, interpenetrates and
mutually constitutes law in decision-making processes concerning freedom of religion.270
For Casanova, there seems to be a misunderstanding in the connection between
the political objectives of a liberal modernity and the historical concept of secularism: is
secularism a principle of modern statecraft or is secularism an ideology? 271 To maintain
liberal democracy and order, the legitimacy of a norm on religious freedom cannot rely
on the internal truths, revelations or beliefs of any one system of faith such as it does of
Christianity. However, the ethical and moral standards of liberal law purport to operate
without reference to any specific religion. Religion is now perceived solely as a certain
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ideology connected to faith. The misconception within liberal law of the relationship
between politics and secularity has incapacitated state law to recognize religious norms as
significant social norms of multiple modernities.
In Canada, that the modern liberal state tends to interpret secularity as nonreligious is represented in the 1980 case: Big M Drug Mart challenged the
constitutionality of the Lord’s Day Act in terms of the guarantee of freedom of religion in
s. 2 (a) of the Charter. The Act made it an offence punishable on summary conviction to
carry out business on Sunday, a day specifically enacted for the Christian Sabbath. In R.
v. Big M. Drug Mart,272 the SCC set a precedent strangely interweaving individual rights
and religious guarantees; individuals are free to engage in religious practice and the state
cannot impose engagement in religious conscience and practice. However, Dickson, C.J.
also held that freedom of religion and conscience prohibits state coercion in matters of
faith.273 He also stated that “the Charter has become the right of every Canadian to work
out for themselves what his or her religious obligation, if any, should be and it is not for
the state to dictate otherwise.”274 The purpose of the legislation has to be secular. The
impugned legislation, the Lord’s Day Act, infringed on the Charter rights of not only a
plurality of deeply-held convictions and norms of multiple other individuals, but also on
the freedom to refuse to participate in a religious practice—Sunday as a Lord’s Day. The
legislation was seen as coercive to others who were not religious and it was struck down.
A corporate entity was able to claim rights under the Charter to overturn the non-secular
spirit of the law. In that religion is in effect being bundled up with many different beliefs
and convictions, perhaps even with simple and fleeting figments of individual
272
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imagination, freedom of religion loses its “God-given” importance.275
3.

A critique of the secularized legislative purpose as applied to
individual moral values
The ultimate purpose of secularism, along with freedom of conscience and

religion is the “recognition of the equivalent moral value of each individual.”276
However, an ethic that demands human solidarity has to acknowledge that human life is
not only essentially moral but inherently purposeful. It underpins the development of all
human cultures. Purposefulness and morality are corollaries; authentic religions draw our
attention to this fact. And many would argue that every civilization has been created by
religion. The nation-state—secular, democratic, theocratic or even atheist—has some
semblance of a religious heritage. There has to be respect for the common fundamental
truths of human existence. However, religious obligations conflict with state interest
realized through legislative purpose. The purpose is that government may not coerce
individuals to affirm a specific religious belief; neither can the government endorse a
specific religious belief.
If religion is now expressly part of freedom of conformity to religious dogma, and
it seems to be bound up with a multiplicity of other non-religious consciences and
convictions, Macklem questions the relevancy of the guarantee of freedom of religion
and whether it has been rendered empty by the recognition of other rights and freedoms;
the content of freedom of religion is not independent.277 Macklem therefore asks:
If the guarantee retains independent content what is the proper justification for the
freedom which that independent content confers? Does that justification, if
available, warrant the extension of the distinctive protection of freedom of
religion to institutions and practices that are not animated by ideas of the divine,
A secular objective was not initially contemplated by the legislators in the Lord’s Day Act.
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given that the moral outlook that must justify that freedom is necessarily secular,
that is to say, is not drawn from the tenets of any particular religion or religions,
and thus is detached from religious doctrine? Or are there secular reasons to
restrict the guarantee of freedom of religion to activities that are shaped and
informed by contact with the divine?278
A theological critique of the dominance of secularity is missing.
4.

Secularized courts: ambiguities and confusion in safeguarding
freedom of religion guarantees
Can the observance of traditional, organized and firmly fixed religions that

millions adhere to be reduced to a liberal choice? In 2002, the Canadian society was still
confused on issues of non-religion and secular in the public sphere as shown in the case
of Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36.279 This case originated when the
disapproval of the school board trustees, of three school books showing same-sex parents,
became the subject of a petition by various groups that included gay advocacy. The B.C.
trial court held that the trustees had breached the statutory requirement of strict adherence
to secular and non-sectarian principles when applied to educational concerns. The B.C.
Court of Appeal found the trial judge’s “secular principles” placed the beliefs of religious
citizens at a disadvantage in terms of the beliefs of non-religious citizens.280 The SCC
unanimously overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal in favour of the lower court
judgment. Although the SCC dismissed the board’s concerns that children would be
misled by classroom information about same-sex parents, the court left untouched the
finding of the lower court that secularity means non-religious. The SCC also made no
attempt to define “secularism.”281 However, the SCC determined that using the term
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“secular” to mean “non-religious” is erroneous in law, and that religious believers have
the right to function in society according to their beliefs and that religious institutions
have equal rights as do non-religious institutions.
…the Court [of Appeal] interpreted the concept of secularism not to preclude at
all that a public institute, like a school board, passes resolutions “motivated in
whole or in part by religious considerations,” while it requires that “no single
conception of morality can be allowed to deny or exclude opposed points of
view.” The obligation of secularism placed on the school board is “aimed at
fostering tolerance and diversity of views, not at shutting religion out of the
arena.” …It does not limit in any way…the freedom of Board members to adhere
to a religious doctrine that condemns homosexuality but it does prohibit the
translation of such doctrine into policy decisions by the Board, to the extent that
they reflect a denial of the validity of other points of view.282
However, the confusion in the interpretation of “secularism” persists. In that the
modern secular state and society tend to interpret secular as non-religious as opposed to
being neutral, the attempts to neutralize religion in the public sphere, as in the
Chamberlain case in Canada, may have failed. In this case, limits on religious freedoms
by secular principles indicate legal and political tensions due to resistance to differing
norms.283 There is no expansive “baseline against which religious restriction, compulsion
and inequality are measured.”284 Ambiguities and uncertainties are ever present in liberal
courts dealing with freedom of religion guarantees.285
Since the Chamberlain case, the secular principles of Canada legally relegate both
religious and non-religious moral consciences to the realm of the private in keeping with
the claim of modern and secular liberal law generally. However, any consideration of
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secularism has to take into account the intention of the historical ideology of secularism:
“to exclude religion from all public aspects of society.”286
Increasingly, migrants, particularly staunch believers who refer to religion as a
way of life, may feel considerable social isolation and exclusion by restrictions on their
civil liberties. In Canada, courts are constrained by the non-neutrality of the process of
public secularization itself.287 In the relationship between religion and citizenship, where
religion, law and politics intersect, there is uncertainty, fragmentation, and disorder. The
misunderstanding of the intended process of secularization in relations between religion
and politics in liberal democracies is even greater given the pluralization of society. In
Berger’s view, the dilutions of transcendence have resulted from misguided attempts at
liberal modernization; this is particularly so in the transformations of religions in modern
societies.288 The process of secularization was to realign religious affiliations and
identities.289 Not a redefinition of identity. The tendency is to understand secular as nonreligious when the correct understanding of it ought to mean no preference is given to
any one religion.290 However, the tension as to the concept of religious nationality in
Canada and numerous views on the code of human conduct has historical roots.
In that there is confusion between the historic and monistic presuppositions of
classical liberalism of anti-religious secularism and the more recent and progressive
classification of the secular as occurred in the Chamberlain, and Big M. decisions, the
phantom individual remains paramount. The individual has moral, civil and
constitutional rights. All religions are without political authority and are therefore
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‘fundamentalist.’ Courts in Canada may have inadequately handled the relationship
between not only the Charter and religion but also aggravated the relationship between
religion and politics.291
The scientific or rational sense in which secularism is closely identified with
progressive modernity accommodates religion, but there is also another non-Western
meaning of secularism where it seeks dialogue among religious traditions and between
the religious and the secular.292 According to Taylor, the “formulae for living together
have evolved in many different religious traditions, and are not the monopoly of those
whose outlook has been formed by the modern, [West], in which the secular lays claims
to exclusive reality”293 Taylor therefore advocates that the distance between the religious
and the secular has to be not only neutral but in a plural society, it has to be a “principled
distance.”294 However, although Canada has a written constitution that takes precedence
over other laws, the goals of democratic governance: social justice, multiculturalism,
prohibition of the state from favouring any one religious community and allowing
maximum religious freedom for all, are not safeguarded because there is no strict or
formal separation between church and state in the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982. The
introduction in 1982 of various constitutional guarantees concerning freedom of religion
also complicated this relationship and generated discord in Canada's constitutional order.
D. Conclusion
In Canada, despite the institution of the Charter which specifically guarantees

291

Heyking, supra note 117 at 1.
Taylor, “The Polysemy” supra note 41.
293
Taylor, “The Polysemy” ibid at 1150.
294
Ibid. Also see Rajeev Bhargava, “What is Secularism for?” in Rajeev Bhargava ed, Secularism
and its Critics (Delhi: Oxford Univ Press, 1998) at 493-4 and 520.
292

87

individual rights for all Canadians to the full extent of its diverse populations since 1982,
it will be evident in case law outlined in Chapter III of this thesis, that Canadian courts, in
their judicial interpretations of different ways of life of myriad ‘culture-based’ normative
communities, appear to be ineffective in handling plural moralities that are integrally
significant in the lives of multiple modernities. The presence of multiple modernities in
society reflects legal pluralism, diverse knowledge, and most importantly, multiple
dimensions of individual liberty that are not limited to the single Western form of law
based on the Eurocentric concepts of liberalism and secularism.
In the question of neutrality, a judge is admittedly constrained by the enforcement
of constitutional norms. Again, it is understood that historically misrepresented tenets of
particular faiths, tenets that are naturally abhorrent to humanity, can not only infringe on
the rights of other more authentic tenets but can complicate the task of the judge. Albeit,
Canada is now confronted with a growing multicultural social base and a majority of
which has always considered religion as central to their ways of life. This citizen base is
rapidly increasing in a manner similar to many European countries. For instance,
Germany, France and England now have the religion of Islam as the fastest growing
religion; a large percent of the population of Germany now adheres to and practices
Islam. Germany has more Muslims than Lebanon and there is an indication that the
increasing distribution of Islam could have a profound influence on public policy in
attempts by Western governments to reach out to Muslims.295 The increasing distribution
of Islam in the West is having a profound influence on public policy in attempts by
Western governments to reach out to Muslims. In Canada, the fast-growing and altering
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sociolegal perspectives that contribute to a dynamic diversity of ethnoreligious norms
cannot be ignored by the pre-existing legal edifice in Canada.
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CHAPTER III - The Juncture of Freedom of Religion and
Secularization: A Review of Canadian Jurisprudence and Policy
Before and After the Charter
As stated in previous chapters, the relationship between liberal law and society—
the ideal of liberal modernism and secularism—is now specifically explained as a
relationship that contains the democratically proclaimed values of freedom, equality
before the law, participation, and shared rationality. In particular, secularity—the
separation of religion and politics—legitimizes this modern liberal ideal. Legislation and
particularly its application in courts of judicial proposals and principles are considered as
crucial in achieving and maintaining this Western liberal ideal for a free, secular and
democratic society. Canada’s legislation is structured on a majority rule system wherein
individual conscience and judgment lie at the heart of this democratic political and
judicial tradition. The 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was produced by
this positive law and sets out its political and legislative principles that also have to defer
to universal principles of equality before the law.296
In effect, the Canadian Charter was instituted for the very purpose of further
enhancing recognition and accommodation of diverse cultures, particularly of religions,
in a multicultural society. Freedom to practice religious belief is fundamental to secular
liberal politics and gives rise to the very purpose of the universalized legislation on
freedom of religion and conscience. But constitutional rights and freedoms are subject to
legal limitations that can be justified if the law is shown to have compelling
governmental interest. Although the law is required to accommodate minority religions,
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this dominant legal construction in the form of accommodation is not able to address
historical disadvantage, inequality and completeness of other forms of institutions.
Section 2(a) of the Charter states that “Everyone has the following fundamental
freedoms: (a) freedom of conscience and religion.” The purpose of s. 2 (a) of the Charter
therefore implies that central to a good life is the right to practice one’s faith in the
absence of coercion. But are freedom of religion and other rights of minorities
constitutionally protected? Canada has—and is now—along with the rest of the West,
been confronted with unprecedented levels of conflicting religious movements that are
expressing mixed perspectives on life. These different perspectives are being consistently
renegotiated socially and culturally. If the purpose of liberal law is justice for all, and if
freedom of religion is firmly guaranteed within the liberal constitution on its own
fundamentals, how can a secular state encourage rather than interfere with the increasing
religious diversity, pluralism and a changing notion of the common good? How are
judges, by way of judicial assessment, able to keep abreast of the rapidly transforming
social changes and conditions that are different and at the same time be able to vary the
intent and the effect of enacted legislation? In the modern liberal ideal of political
legitimacy, including secularity, can a progressive politics of religious philosophy be
accommodated without undue stress on the practice of religion?297 Is the practice of
religion in Canada in effect free of both direct and indirect coercion in the right to
manifest religious beliefs and practices? Are certain groups who order their lives by
traditional values, particularly those values stemming from minority religion, forced to
act in a way that is contrary to their beliefs and conscience? Does s. 2(a) withstand its
297
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true test in a consistently changing society? Are religious freedoms progressively
ineffective?
A. Universalized liberal law, religion and secular politics
The evolution of the key themes associated with the Western liberal philosophy:
rationalization, secularism, individualism, human rights, and democratic governance have
advanced gradually and continue in measured steps. Coupled with the overarching theme
of globalization and the current rapid and increasing interaction of the traditional and the
modern within the West, a reconstructed understanding of these key themes of liberal
secular modernity confirms a multiplicity of the modern exhibiting multiple normativities
which include different views also of the sciences, human rights, and democratic
governance. Modern normativities, other than liberal normativities—norms of
individuals, citizens and religious communities—too have a sense of a civic order and
obedience based on different moralities.
In Canada, the fact that legal citizenship is based on the dominant and
philosophically abstract reasons that are grounded within the political concepts of liberal
modernity and secularism wherein the individual is defined as the central bearer of rights
generally was confirmed by Dickson, C.J. in a leading SCC freedom of religion case, Big
M, that will be briefly discussed further in this chapter:298
… an emphasis on individual conscience and individual judgment also lies at the
heart of our democratic political tradition. The ability of each citizen to make free
and informed decisions is the absolute prerequisite for the legitimacy,
acceptability, and efficacy of our system of self-government.
Judges in Canada rely on this well-entrenched paramountancy of the liberal secular
individual for achieving equal political citizenship. Liberal democracy interprets
298
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different religious norms by reliance on the liberal political theory or what Dworkin calls
“political morality.”299 By liberal law, religious believers are not fully members of the
political community and therefore for courts, any form of state support for a particular
religious practice constitutes coercion as the modern liberal state cannot coerce the
conscience.300 The common good of religious minorities or organizations within
particular social fields is thus limited to the realm of the private.301
Again, because Canada has embraced Anglo-American liberalism, historical
religious values rooted within the Christian faith have translated into positive law and
subsequently have become binding on Christians and non-Christians.302 It was seen in
Chapter II above, that the presence of historically dominant forms of Christianity in
positive law blur the ideal of secularism. Conceptually, Canadian secular law may have
legitimate public purposes but in terms of practical authoritative outcomes of the purpose
of s. 2(a)—political freedom to follow one’s conscience—state law seems to continue to
support some religious values and practices and interfere with others.303
Freedom of religion jurisprudence that will be discussed in this chapter will reveal
that due to the contradiction between the secular legal order and the liberal democratic
ideal, the evolution of the themes concerning human rights are at an impasse. For
example, in Amselem, another freedom of religion case, Iacobucci J. confirmed that:
… respect for religious minorities is not a stand-alone absolute right; like other
rights, freedom of religion exists in a matrix of other correspondingly important
rights that attach to individuals. Respect for minority rights must also coexist
alongside societal values that are central to the make-up and functioning of a free
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and democratic society.304
Because constitutional rights and freedoms are not absolute, they can be justifiably
limited.
B. Section 1 of the Charter and constitutional limits on freedom of
religion
Generally Charter rights are also subject to the s. 1 limitation clause that states
that:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
Constitutional rights and freedoms are not absolute. Under s.1, the legislature is free to
enact a law that justifies infringement on any of the guaranteed Charter rights provided
the law is a “reasonable limit” on the right. Section 1 limitation is calculated to increase
the net welfare; not all people will benefit as the costs are outweighed by the benefits to
others.305 In the 1986 SCC case, R. v. Oakes, Dickson, C. J. pointed out, for a unanimous
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court, that only the values of a free and democratic society would suffice to limit the
guaranteed rights. The court suggested values such as:306
Respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social
justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for
cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions which
enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society.
In assessing law and legislative purpose, courts scrutinize the aims and objectives
of the legislature to ensure synergy with the guarantees enshrined in the Charter.
However, jurisprudence to date indicates that the objective of the law most often
overrides the limit to the rules as set by the Oakes justification test.307 Berger confirms
that the assessment of the impact of legal limits obviously has to be in terms of Charter
values: liberty, human dignity, equality, autonomy, and enhancement of democracy.308 In
a free and democratic society, therefore, some rights can be justifiably limited. However,
these terms are an intrusion and sometimes a burden on religious freedoms of both
individuals and whole groups. If limits on freedom of religion can be justified as solid
commitments of the rule of liberal law to public interest, what therefore is the place of the
lived religion? What is the legal status of values and symbols that are publicly limited
under s.1 analyses? Importantly, does the tradition of judicial review bypass individuals’
religious liberties along with their choice of the lived internal social field as guaranteed
by s. 2(a)? 309 Is it possible that s.1 of the Charter can overtly contravene guaranteed

objective it is trying to achieve (a cost/benefit analysis). But in the process and sequence of the
test, if the majority of the court dissents, the test ends and the legislation is declared invalid. If
not, the legislation continues to stand or is saved despite the fact that it violates a Charter right.
306
R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 at para 136.
307
CCL supra note 2 at 844.
308
Benjamin Berger, “Section 1, Constitutional Reasoning and Cultural Difference: Assessing the
Impacts of Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2010) 51 SCLR 25 at 36 [hereafter
Berger, “Constitutional Reasoning and Cultural Difference”].
309
Moore, supra note 22 at 719 & 874.

95

rights under its s.2? And is this therefore a violation of s. 2(a) of the Charter? But for
practical purposes, certain degrees of the burden on religious practice are not treated as a
violation of s. 2(a) as justified under s.1 particularly under a cost benefit analysis. Do
religions have a different role that the law recognizes in an era of rapidly changing
ethnoreligious diversity? If the state legislative objective is justified under s. 1 to
override an infringement on a s. 2(a) right guaranteed in the Charter, are then religious
persons forced to choose between the tenets of their faith and full participation in the
Canadian society? Does the Charter protect religious rights of minorities from majority
rule? Currently, is the Canadian state sufficiently prohibited from favouring any one
religious community and allowing maximum religious freedom for all?
C. Competing moralities: politically constituted conscience and religious
beliefs
Although all belief systems of minorities, including those based on so-called
divine and ancient scriptures, are characterized as non-religious, jurisprudence will show
that the modern state has projected itself into the realm of the private by imposing the
abstract political identity in the practice of religion and its social interaction.310 However,
highly educated judges constricted by commitment to constitutional values, are not
always able to take into account the meaning of practices that subscribe to a lived religion
of certain communities; these communities have their own internal social worldview and
do not fit the liberal-legislated and secular understanding of life. Canadian courts
therefore have to engage in the politically necessary analyses in each case of the
relationship between the theological and the Euro-philosophical. In the contemporary
juristic reality—conceptions of democracy and the rule of liberal constitutional law—
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concerning the relationship between law and religion, majoritarian ‘legalized’ individuals
assert their claims as against the claims of believers. For Shah, the problem is at the very
heart of the conceptualization of the liberal constitutional law.311 Grave
misunderstandings and injustices have resulted from the imposition of an abstract and
historic concept of identity in the separation of church and state. The constitutional
assumption on and the application of the concept of secularism may be miscalculated in
Canada.312 Again, this nationalist moral identity, observed as a secular identity, is
steeped in Christianity despite the fact that numerous Christians are not practicing
Christians. The Christian Church also has the right to speak on important public
matters.313
There seems to be a conflict between equal rights of citizens and the right of the
individual to be normatively different from legislated norms. However, no legislation
can be universally valid for a dynamic multiplicity of social needs stemming from
different and changing principles.314
Individual citizens are now coming forward with their own identity characteristics
that “nourish human interaction” and the abstract legal identity may become less
relevant.315 How do courts respond to the challenges of the liberal concept of the secular
individual, including equality of rights, and competing moral and political agendas of the
multiplicity of modernities?
In the relationship between liberal law and religion in Canada and in
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religion, what is normal and typical tends to depend on the legislator’s or the court’s
vision despite stated Charter values. The principles that recognize which government
objectives are important and that warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right has
not been clearly identified for sustainable change. There is a growing burden on
Canadian judges in assessing the constantly changing and complex social, cultural, and
theological realities and their set liberal tools could be losing their relevance.316 In
Berger’s eloquency, the perspective of law on the true nature and constitutional value of
religion is always “rendered through the lens of the culture of the constitutional rule of
law.” 317 The subjugation of others is justified as is this ideological posture. Reiterating
Razack, it would seem that: “[theorizing difference] is not for the sake of inclusion but
for the sake of antisubordination.318”
This chapter will survey and attempt to analyze briefly some freedom of religion
jurisprudence in Canada pre and post-Charter. In that state political power and civic
authority are legitimated by constitutional law, the liberty of the individual fuels political
morality; a position of neutrality between different beliefs of collectivities is absent in
judicial deliberations such as in case law that will be discussed in this chapter.
Discussion on pre-Charter case law follows.
D. Freedom of religion jurisprudence in pre-Charter Canada319
In Canada, legal protection for the practice of the Catholic faith goes back to the
1770s when Quebec was the first to be granted this liberal protection by the British
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legislation even ahead of Catholics in England.320 It was not until 1852 that equality
amongst other Christian denominations in Canada (or in the then old Province of Ontario)
was instituted. Today, this legislation is effective in Ontario as the Religious Freedom
Act; 321 this statute guarantees “the free exercise of… religious… worship without
discrimination…” At Confederation, no religion was established or given prominence
but the Roman Catholic and the Protestant denominations were guaranteed education
rights under the British North America Act, 1867 (BNA).322 This protection for freedom
of religion of minority denominational education rights was under s. 93 of the
Constitution Act. Although there was no specific provision of a bill of rights within the
BNA, or specific protection for freedom of religion, the BNA gave sufficient
constitutional standing to the minority Roman Catholic and Protestant schools in Ontario
and Quebec. That these two Christian groups have had a continuous guarantee of secure
faith-based education is a privilege.323
However, there was hostility towards other religions, including towards other
Christians. For example, during the 1930s Jehovah’s Witnesses in Quebec were in
frequent confrontation with the provincial government, within the then predominately
Catholic Quebec, for proselytizing. Evidence of collaboration between the Cardinal of
the Roman Catholic Church and the federal government to suppress Jehovah's Witnesses
is briefly stated:324 In the 1940s, the federal government passed an order-in-council
declaring the Jehovah's Witnesses to be an illegal organization under the War Measures
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Act.325 The religious activities of “other faiths” therefore were declared illegal by the
Government of Canada. Also, pre-Charter jurisprudence shows that the then Province of
Québec, under Premier Duplessis used coercion to break up Jehovah’s Witnesses’
religious services including those held in private homes.326 The SCC intervened and was
instrumental in providing powerful protections of religious freedom in Canada.327 In the
SCC case of Roncarelli v. Duplessis,328 Roncarelli an active member of Jehovah’s
Witnesses and an owner of a small restaurant in Montreal furnished bail money for other
Witnesses who had been wrongfully charged under the Criminal Code for various acts of
dissemination of religious materials relating to their religion.329 In 1946, Duplessis
ordered the Québec Liquor Commission to revoke Roncarelli’s liquor licence and which
triggered litigation in the courts. At the SCC, it was concluded that Duplessis had acted
without legal authority because Roncarelli’s religious activities were unconnected with
the statute under which his liquor licence had been granted.
Subsequent pre-Charter litigation led to a constitutional alleviation of freedom of
religion. In Saumur v. City of Quebec, Rand, J. stated in 1953330:
religious freedom…[is] a principle of fundamental character…the untrammelled
affirmations of religious belief and its propagation, personal or institutional,
remain as of the greatest constitutional significance throughout the Dominion is
unquestionable.
Freedom of religion was considered an inviolable right of the individual and a primary
condition of community norms and life; a condition that “antecedes and does not depend
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on positive law.”331 Religious freedom, for Rand, J., was a foundational component of
any political organization; in 1953, religious freedom was not a right to be conferred by
legislation.
However, in 1960, when the Canadian Bill of Rights was enacted, this human
rights charter applied only to federal law; it was difficult to obtain consensus across the
provinces.332 Many judges regarded the 1960 Bill as an interpretative tool only and the
Bill therefore had weak constitutional value. In that s. 1of the Bill included protection of
freedom of religion, for instance, in a 1963 case, the SCC upheld the validity of the
Sunday closing law thus reversing the protection of freedom of religion that was part of
the unwritten court tradition since 1953 and that Rand, J. and others upheld as a natural
right.333 This civil liberty was found to be contrary to liberal secular rationality which
“imposed limitations on absolute liberty of the individual.”334 Freedom of religion was
therefore no longer an inherent or natural right of citizens; these civil rights were now the
subject of law and limited by liberal law. In particular the law rejected the practice and
beliefs of certain religions. Equal religious citizenship was therefore not protected by
civil law. Although it was felt that in pre-Charter decisions religious freedom enjoyed
constitutional status and that all religions had equal standing, this guarantee had to be
exercised within the legal limits of the law as was enacted.335 Specific religious liberty
was limited by rational liberty of general application. And although courts were prepared
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to shield religious liberty from laws which sought to limit the “professions and
dissemination” of religious faith, case law herein will show that there is consistent
interference with religious worship.
In the 1960s, the Canadian population was still relatively more homogenous and
the laws which worked a less direct effect on religious practices were not viewed as
jeopardizing religious freedom. In 1982, upon the repatriation of the Canadian
Constitution, the Canadian Bill of Rights lost most of its importance; almost all the
guarantees of fundamental freedoms have their counterparts in the Charter.336 The SCC
now mostly does not follow its Bill of Rights decisions on similar points.
Although religious freedoms have evolved (the state is required to vigorously
inquire whether there is coercion of religious obedience and belief) simultaneously with
the evolution of liberal secular democracy, there may now not be more deference to
religion under the Charter than there was under the Constitution Act, 1867.337 And,
secularization of religion may not be the only way to realize freedom of religion.
However, freedom of religion is now an integral part of the Canadian Constitution; it is
one set of group rights that are contained in the now Charter of Rights and Freedoms
itself under its s 2 (a).338
E. Freedom of religion jurisprudence in Canada in post-Charter era
Canada is a diverse society with questionable secularity. Canadian courts are
charged with making some of the most complex, sometimes life-changing decisions for
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people and for society.339 For the protection of individual rights and religious vitality that
endures, courts are invariably required to adopt systematic strategies in interpreting the
constitution. Because claims of religious freedom are complex and difficult to evaluate,
particularly in terms of the weight given to differing empirical evidence, freedom of
religion cases representing differing normativities tend to be hard cases. The
interpretation of the moral and political concepts in freedom of religion jurisprudence
tends to be inconsistent and vague.
The Charter grants religious freedom as a private and expressly not a public
matter. Rights in the Canadian Constitution are therefore framed as highly general
principles that leave considerable scope for debate as to their particular application. Does
this imply separate and private courts for religious disputes? A survey of recent SCC
decisions will determine the particular protections religious persons are afforded
publically, in a supposedly secular Canada. It will also help in discovering the extent of
law’s capacity to recognize the importance of religion for believers both in their private
lives and as civic citizens. Although the virtues of the rule of constitutional law are
essentially functional, they are also moral-political virtues intending to enhance a range
of goods valued in a pluralistic society.340 Brief discussions of six SCC cases, ranging
from 1985 to 2009, relating to the scope of freedom of religion and equal religious
citizenship follow in: (a) Big M.341; (b) Edwards Books342; (c) Amselem343; (d)
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Multani344 ; (e) Hutterian Brethren345; and(f) A.C.346
1.

R v Big M Drug Mart [1985]1 SCR 295 [Big M].
Big M is a leading case on the Charter guarantee of freedom of religion. In this

case, the SCC struck down the Lord’s Day Act (LDA), a federal statute that bound all
Christian and non-Christian Canadians to sectarian ideals and values rooted in Christian
morality.347 For many centuries in England, Sunday closing law promoted the Christian
Sunday Sabbath as a day to abstain from work for religious participation. Sixteenth
century English law obligated attendance in Church on Sundays and no business or
labour was to be conducted.348 In later centuries, and in particular, in the 18th and 19th
centuries, settlers in North America were required by law to attend church on Sundays
and were discouraged from participating in non-religious activities such as entertainment,
travelling and sports.349 Contraventions to prohibitions meant severe penalties. The
historical translation of Christian morality into positive law still persists.
In Canada, until 1985, the LDA made it an offence punishable on summary
conviction for anyone engaging in or carrying on business on Sunday. The purpose of
the LDA was to secure public observance of the Christian Sabbath but it also seemed to
provide a uniform day of rest from labour for people of all denominations.350 Otherwise
lawful, moral and normal activities of non-Christians carried out on Sundays were
therefore illegal under the purpose of this Act. This denial or right to work on Sunday on
344
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grounds of public religious observance of the Christian Sabbath infringed upon the
religious freedom of Canadians in general. And cases challenging Sunday closing laws
were already in place when the Charter came into force in 1982.
a) Interpretation of public purpose of law in Big M
In this 1985 case, Big M, the SCC found that the LDA had a religious purpose in
forcing Sunday closing and was therefore unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
addressed, head-on, the fundamental issues raised by individual rights and freedoms
enshrined in the Charter, as well as issues concerning legislative powers. The main
challenge in issue before the SCC, for the first time, was the interpretation of the
fundamental freedoms protected by the Charter, the guarantee of "freedom of conscience
and religion" entrenched in s. 2(a). Section 2(a) in effect protects both religious belief
and religious practice or observance. The SCC laid the foundation, finally, of the judicial
interpretation of religious freedom as guaranteed by the Charter.
Although the Alberta Court of Appeal in this case dismissed the appeal of its
Attorney General, the Court was divided on the interpretation of s. 2(a). The strongly
expressed positions of the dissenting justices at the Court of Appeal are reflective of the
tensions and the difficulties of balancing liberal modernism and religious freedom in the
current sociolegal context in Canada. In dismissing the appeal from the Court of Appeal,
Dickson, C.J., in narrating portions of Belzil, J. A.’s judgment, illustrates the conflict
between minority and majority rights. For instance, Belzil, J. A. states that the day of the
week “regarded as holy by the great majority of Canadians is not inconsistent with the
basic principles of democracy. That is political reality.”351 On further assessing the
reflections of the Court of Appeal, Dickson, C. J. states:
351
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Mr. Justice Belzil said it was realistic to recognize that the Canadian nation is part
of "Western" or "European" civilization, moulded in and impressed with Christian
values and traditions, and that these remain a strong constituent element in the
basic fabric of our society. The judge quoted a passage from The Oxford
Companion to Law (1980) expatiating on the extent of the influence of
Christianity on our legal and social systems and then appears the cri du coeur
central to the judgment at pp. 663-64: 352
I do not believe that the political sponsors of the Charter intended to
confer upon the courts the task of stripping away all vestiges of those
values and traditions, and the courts should be most loath to assume that
role. With the Lord's Day Act eliminated, will not all reference in the
statutes to Christmas, Easter, or Thanksgiving be next? What of the use of
the Gregorian Calendar? Such interpretation would make of the Charter
an instrument for the repression of the majority at the instance of every
dissident and result in an amorphous, rootless and godless nation contrary
to the recognition of the Supremacy of God declared in the preamble. The
"living tree" will wither if planted in sterilized soil.
“Positive law had circumscribed freedom of religion so as to prevent the Lord's
Day Act from breaching the guarantee in the Canadian Bill of Rights,”353
In this majority decision, Dickson, C.J. also stated that “the protection of one
religion and the concomitant non-protection of others, imports a disparate impact
destructive of the religious freedom of society.”354 And in defining freedom of religion,
he offered the following:355
The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such
religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly
and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief
by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination.
For Dickson C.J., it was important that due to the “spread of new beliefs” and the
“changing religious allegiance”356 interpretation of the meaning and purpose of the
specific guarantee of freedom of religion does not “overshoot the actual purpose of the
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freedom in question and to recall that the Charter was not enacted in a vacuum and must
therefore…be placed in its proper linguistic, philosophical and historical contexts.”357 In
the post-Charter era, not only did this case lay down the foundations of religious freedom
but it also provides courts with an explicit approach in the interpretation of religious
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter.358
b) Justification of the impact of law on religious rights in Big M
One of the constitutional questions before the SCC was whether the LDA
infringed the right to freedom of conscience and religion guaranteed in s. 2(a) in the
Charter and was it also justified under s. 1 of the Charter. The Supreme Court held that
the LDA which prohibited the operation of a business and other commercial transactions
on Sunday compelled religious practice contrary to s. 2(a) and could not be justified
under s. 1. Section 2(a) of the Charter would require the law to accommodate minority
religions by according exemption for their practices only in cases where there is no
compelling governmental interest to the contrary and as justified by s. 1 of the Charter.
Restrictions on acts that are religious practices must be demonstrably justified by
the government pursuant to s.1 of the Charter or must be shown to be incapable of
accommodation without undue hardship in the statutory human rights context. The
commitment in Canadian human rights law to equal religious citizenship in a pluralistic
society includes the right to engage in religious practices without interference. For
instance, if there is no evidence that accommodating the wish of the religious observer to
take time off for religious Sabbath will not cause undue hardship on the employer, the
believer has the right to the time off. This reasoning constitutes the Canadian conception
357
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of equal religious citizenship. Without the ability to demand that neutral rules and
policies be adjusted to meet their religious needs, persons of faith cannot participate
equally in social and economic life. The believer too recognizes that religious equality
rights are not absolute; they will have to give way in the face of competing rights and
interests particularly where the employer’s ability to run a business without incurring an
undue expense in accommodating the religious needs of its employees is compromised.
In this case, the SCC held that the LDA prohibited commercial activity for some
on a Sunday and compromised the guarantee of freedom of religion in s. 2(a) of the
Charter by historical purposes which compelled adherence to the Christian Sabbath. The
purpose was found to be invalid and could not be justified under s. 1. The legislation was
therefore struck down.359 Dickson C.J. stated:
On the authorities and for the reasons outlined, the true purpose of the Lord's Day
Act is to compel the observance of the Christian Sabbath and I find the Act, and
especially s. 4 thereof, infringes upon the freedom of conscience and religion
guaranteed in s. 2(a) of the Charter. 360
His reasons included the fact that in binding all Canadians to a sectarian Christian ideal,
the legislation did not have a secular purpose. Rather, that purpose was an infringement
of the freedom of religion of non-Christians because, by virtue of the guarantee of
freedom of religion, “government may not coerce individuals to affirm a specific
religious practice for a sectarian purpose.”361 The purpose was not compatible with s.
2(a); it was religious, not secular.
The object of legislation is critical if liberal rights that are guaranteed are to be
protected. The SCC emphasized that religious freedom could be violated by either the
359
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purposes or the effects of laws or policies. However, the purpose and effect of legislation
are indivisible.362 In Big M, Dickson C.J. too opined that both purpose and effect are
relevant in determining constitutionality where either the purpose or the effect of the law
can invalidate legislation. This concept of adverse effects discrimination is evident in
Dickson C.J.’s comment in Big M that “…the equality necessary to support religious
freedom does not require identical treatment of all religions…true equality may require
differentiation in treatment.”363
In its expansive conception of religious freedom that included protection for
religious practices from direct or indirect coercive interference by the state, the court
closely allied with the Charter’s commitments to religious equality in s. 15 and to the
preservation and enhancement of Canada's multicultural heritage in s. 27.364
c) Implication on constitutional protection of religion in Big M.
Big M is a classic case of the SCC’s s.2(a) jurisprudence that describes a free
society as one in which fundamental freedoms are ‘equally’ enjoyed. The shift in
jurisprudence since Big M, since 1980, is that religion has constitutional relevance in
terms of an expression of human autonomy and choice. Liberal law recognizes religion
as personal choice. In outlining the harm of Sunday closing legislation, Dickson, C.J.
stated that the LDA creates “a climate hostile to and gives the appearance of
discrimination against non-Christian Canadians.”365 He further stated that Canadian
constitutionalism is committed to the ideal of “a truly free society…one which can
accommodate a wide variety of beliefs, diversity of tastes and pursuits, customs and
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codes of conduct.”366 An individual may be capable of reflecting upon and revising
incrementally particular aspects of her/his worldview, but it may be difficult or
impossible for her/him simply to discard and replace her/his most basic values and beliefs
or to walk away from her/his religious community. Religion can claim, within law, an
autonomous expression of important sets of preferred tastes and chosen pursuits. A
necessary outgrowth of the good of freedom and autonomy is that to protect the ideal of
religion is to protect the right of an individual to make choices about her/his spiritual life.
In this case, Dickson, C. J. defined freedom of religion as “freedom from
conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious
dogma.”367 The definition of freedom of religion offered by Dickson, C. J. does not fully
explain the rationale of this freedom. He made clear that s. 2(a) protects religious
practices as well as religious beliefs within the constitutional right to freedom of religion
of individual liberty to embrace and enjoy a chosen religious belief; the autonomous
agent is supreme. Protecting autonomy is the core element of religious liberty and
autonomy and in this case is secured by ensuring an absence of coercion or restraint.368
Religious beliefs, however, are deeply connected to other believers in faith-based
communities and the very identity of the believer is shaped by the moral framework of
her/his religious community.
In a liberal modernity, religious adherents are free to follow the norms of their
community yet, their values may clash with those of official law. The freedom in s. 2(a)
is explicitly the freedom of the individual, not, although it is connected to collective or
associational freedoms of the community, the authority of the immediate or extended
366
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family or of the faith community. However, the freedom to act in accordance with
religious beliefs is the most important means through which religious rights provide
protection that goes beyond that provided by other fundamental freedoms.
d) Freedom of religion and secularization in Big M.
Dickson, C.J. added the proviso that freedom of religion would not protect
minority religious groups in certain religious practices. The entrenchment of freedom of
religion in the Constitution promotes state secularization and the government must refrain
from adopting laws or policies that favour one religion over another. Any facilitation of
religious life by the state has to be without discrimination in its treatment of different
groups or belief systems. In Big M., the SCC read the guarantee of freedom of religion as
protecting freedom to follow one’s religious beliefs and practices, freedom from state
imposition of religious precept and action, and the equal standing of all religious faiths;
the lower court did not. The SCC and the Court of Appeal were at opposite poles in the
resolution of the conflict concerning freedom of religion.
Although as stated earlier, Christianity is an embedded component of Canadian
law, the LDA could not withstand a Charter challenge in this case. Dickson, C.J. stated
in this case that “the theological content of the legislation remains a subtle, and a
constant, reminder to religious minorities within [Canada] of their differences with, and
alienation from, the dominant religious culture.”369 However, even though the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the Charter guarantee of freedom of religion, and equal standing of all
religious faiths, it omitted the political background of the relationship of the individual
and the state. Dickson, C. J. was concerned with the place of religious minorities; but
while the court’s ruling challenged the status and authority of Christianity as the
369
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dominant faith, it could not displace its dominance in society entirely. The explanation
for this would seem to be fear of “shifting variable[s]” in future jurisprudence that could
create uncertainty in the law and the fact that no legislation would be safe from a revised
judicial assessment of the purpose of the law; it would jeopardize the doctrine of stare
decisis. This is a clear case of the power that resides within the judiciary, as ultimate
arbiters, to be able to manipulate state law by not only incorporating difference within the
law but also by further entrenching within it the dominance of Christianity. The law
remains a slave to the singular purpose of liberal secular modernity even though variables
within society point to plural indices.
2.

Edwards Books and Art Ltd. v The Queen [1986] 2 SCR 713, 35 DLR (4th)
1 (Edwards Books)
This was another landmark Sunday-closing law case before the SCC, R. v.

Edwards Books, wherein the Province of Ontario Retail Business Holidays Act was
challenged by four Ontario retailers as they wished to open their businesses on Sundays
and other holidays.370 The Ontario Act prohibited retail businesses to sell or offer to sell
retail goods on a Sunday or on a holiday.371 In 1983, three of the four businesses were
charged and convicted under s. 2 of the Ontario Retail Business Holidays Act. At their
appeal, the businesses invoked section 2(a) of the Charter. Given the success in Big M.,
they challenged the constitutional validity of the Ontario Sunday closing legislation. The
SCC, in reviewing this case, agreed with the Ontario Court of Appeal that the legislation
had a secular purpose and was therefore valid. The secular purpose was to provide
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uniform holidays or pause days for retail workers and that there was no impact on
religious practice.
a) Interpretation of public purpose of law in Edwards Books
In this case, there were at least three issues that were considered by the SCC: was
the Retail Business Holidays Act within provincial jurisdiction pursuant to the
Constitutional Act, 1867? Did the Retail Business Holidays Act violate ss. 2(a), 7 and 15
of the Charter? And if it did, was the violation justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter?
Although the purpose of the law was secular, the court’s assessment of the effect of the
law was found to limit freedom of religion, particularly as Sunday has historically been
accepted as the common pause day for religious reasons. The effect of the law actually
would impose a burden on retailers whose religious beliefs required them to abstain from
work on a day other than Sunday. Even through the Ontario Act limited the Charter
guarantee of freedom of religion, it was held to be justified under s. 1 and was therefore
exempt. The court found that the religious purpose did not render the exemption
unconstitutional as it was open to the provincial legislature “to attempt to neutralize or
minimize the adverse effects of otherwise valid provincial legislation on human rights
such as freedom of religion.”372 The rule is that the purpose of a statute is paramount in
assessing whether it does indeed violate a Charter guarantee. The SCC concluded that
“the constitution does not contemplate religion as a discrete ‘constitutional matter’ falling
exclusively within either a federal or provincial class of subjects.”373 “The Act was
within the provincial legislative competence.”374 The impact of the law on religion is not
critical. In that the intent of the Act is to provide a uniform day of rest, the Act was found
372
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to have “secular inspiration” and did not abridge freedom of religion. Any economic
harm was supposedly due to religion.
b) Justification of the impact of law on religious rights in Edwards Books
In this case, it was found that “none of the retail stores…has established that it
was open on Sunday for any purpose than to make money.”375 Dickson, C.J.C stated
that:
“The Constitution shelters individuals and groups only to the extent that religious
beliefs or conduct might reasonably or actually be threatened. …legislative or
administrative action which increases the cost of practising or otherwise
manifesting religious beliefs is not prohibited if the burden is trivial or
insubstantial. …376
The SCC also stated that part of the object of the legislation benefits retail
employees so that a common weekly holiday is available and enjoyed by most of the
community. The practicality of Sunday as a pause day was significant but the impact on
religious practice was inconsequential; the law was upheld as a reasonable limit that is
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
c) Implication on constitutional protection of religion in Edwards Books
In the question of constitutional protection of non-Christian believers to conform
to majoritarian religious dogma that requires Sunday closure for business, the court in
Edwards Books considered that although “all coercive burdens on the exercise of
religious beliefs are potentially within the ambit of s. 2(a)”377, “not every burden on
religious practices is offensive to this constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion.”378
The SCC stated that the state is “under no duty…to take affirmative action to eliminate
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the natural costs of religious practice.”379 Retailers and consumers who observe days
other than Sunday as a day to practice their religious tenets would face loss of business
on days that they actually take as a pause day. The constitutional guarantee of these
retailers and consumers is indirectly coerced.
d) Secularization and freedom of religion in Edwards Books
According to Hogg, the observance of days of religious significance is a matter
upon which attitudes will vary from one locality to another.380 Although the legislation
in both, Edwards Books and Big M, concerned Sunday closing jurisprudence, the
outcomes in each of the cases is different. In Big M, the purpose of the federal legislation
was found to be religious and therefore infringed upon the Charter guarantee of freedom
of religion; it was struck down. In Edwards, the purpose of the provincial prohibition
was secular. If there is a conflict between the federal Act and the provincial Act, an
unconstitutional statute cannot render provincial legislation inoperative under an
overriding doctrine.381 The impact of the law (intra vires the province or not) on religion
is generally not critical.382 What is critical is the clearly outlined purpose of the
legislation. The purpose of the provincial Act is to ensure state interest.
3.

Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem [2004] 2. S.C.R. 551 [Amselem]
Amselem was based on a claim alleging infringement of freedom of religion under

the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.383 In this case, Orthodox Jewish
residents installed individual succahs—outdoor structures built by Orthodox Jews during
the harvest festival of Succot—on the balconies of their apartments in an upscale part of
379
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Montreal, Quebec.384 For those connected to the Jewish faith, this nine day festival is
biblically mandated. The condominium association demanded the removal of the
succahs based on the bylaws that prohibited decorations on balconies but offered to set
up a communal or collective succah in the gardens on the ground floor for religious
observance. The explanation given by Amselem was that a communal succah would
cause extreme hardship with their religious observance, but a succah on their own
balcony was integral to their personal religious beliefs. Regulations agreed to by all
owners explicitly set out the character of the neighbourhood as a condominium building.
Mr. Amselem, however, defied the condominium, Syndicat Northcrest’s, regulations, and
insisted on building this Succot on his balcony. His neighbours raised various economic,
security, and aesthetic concerns, including concerns about the way they wished to be
perceived within the common areas by outsiders. For Amselem, this activity was
perfectly legitimate and appropriately circumscribed. The association applied for a
permanent injunction against succah construction on individual balconies. The
corporation’s application was granted by the Québec Superior Court, and this decision
was affirmed by the province’s Court of Appeal.
a) Interpretation of public purpose of law in Amselem
At the SCC, the majority in this case found Amselem’s beliefs to be sincerely
held indicating that this SCC judgment is firmly grounded in public law notions of
individual rights which include religious freedoms. Individual self-fulfillment of a
religious person with “deeply held personal convictions or beliefs385” took precedence
over the complaint of nuisance regarding the succah and this complaint was found to be
384
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unreasonable. In this SCC judgment concerning freedom of religion, the liberal
individual is central. At the same time, the majority decision did not characterize the
narrative as one of association of religious or cultural groups. In this case, Iacobucci, J.
gave the example of a previous freedom-of-religion case, R. v. Jones, wherein La Forest
J. stated that the court may not question the validity of a religious belief regardless of the
quantity of claimants that may share that belief.386 He also cited the U.S. Supreme Court,
Burger, CJ, in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division that
“courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”387 In this case, freedom of religion,
the majority asserted “revolves around the notion of personal choice and individual
autonomy and freedom.”388 In liberal democratic and secular terms, the individual
condominium owner is characteristically understood as the individual condo owner; the
law only understands religion as a product of choice, a choice connected to the liberty
and autonomy of the individual.
In the dissenting judgment of Justice Bastarache in this case, the rights of
individual neighbours were also balanced as individual rights against each other. He also
argued that the law must take cognizance not only of the claimants’ religious interests but
also of the other owners’ property rights: “…not only is there a conflict between the right
to freedom of religion and property rights, but the right to freedom of religion is also in
conflict with the right to life and personal security, and with contractual rights.”389
b) Justification of the impact of law on religious rights in Amselem
In this case the SCC stated that, “claimants seeking to invoke freedom of religion
386
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should not need to prove the objective validity of their beliefs”390; sincerity of belief is
not the same as validity of belief. The majority in this case stated, per Iacoboucci, J.391
In my view, when courts undertake the task of analysing religious doctrine in
order to determine the truth or falsity of a contentious matter of religious law, or
when courts attempt to define the very concept of religious "obligation", as has
been suggested in the courts below, they enter forbidden domain. It is not within
the expertise and purview of secular courts to adjudicate questions of religious
doctrine.
Jurisprudence is limited in its treatment of religion.
The Supreme Court in this majority decision drew up a definition of freedom of
religion under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms mindful of the
overlap with section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter.392 In so doing, the Court attempted
to define religion itself.
In order to define religious freedom, we must first ask ourselves what we mean by
"religion". While it is perhaps not possible to define religion precisely, some outer
definition is useful since only beliefs, convictions and practices rooted in religion,
as opposed to those that are secular, socially based or conscientiously held, are
protected by the guarantee of freedom of religion. Defined broadly, religion
typically involves a particular and comprehensive system of faith and worship.
Religion also tends to involve the belief in a divine, superhuman or controlling
power. In essence, religion is about freely and deeply held personal convictions
or beliefs connected to an individual's spiritual faith and integrally linked to one's
self-definition and spiritual fulfilment, the practices of which allow individuals to
foster a connection with the divine or with the subject or object of that spiritual
faith.393
Although this may seem to be an expansive definition of religion, it is important
to note that the definition of religious practices as protected under s. 2(a) is still defined
in individualist terms.
c) Implications on constitutional protection of religion in Amselem
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In Amselem, the Supreme Court somewhat weakened the symbolic boundary
between the public and the private. The test that law required the truth of the sincerity of
belief of the liberal individual in religion was satisfactory in meeting the individualist
definition of religion as explained by the principled basis for the protection of religion.
However, both, validity and sincerity of belief are central facets of the code of conduct
for a vast majority of believers. Additionally, the SCC recognizes that it has no capacity
to adjudicate questions of religious doctrine. But for now, Canadian law understands
religion as central to individual autonomy and religious commitment only as a conscious
preference. However, law can understand religion. For Berger, law is in effect asserting
something about the true nature of that which it is protecting only.394 And for Beaman,
religion is like law because the way in which it is written and the way it is lived are two
different phenomena making it very difficult to define religion for the purpose of
determining religious freedom.395
d) Secularization and of freedom of religion in Amselem
In Amselem, the finding that religion encompasses a right to religious practices if
the individual has a sincere belief does not take into consideration whether the practice
was needed according to religious practice. The court simply has to believe the individual
that his/her practice is connected to religion. In this case, the court felt that religious
beliefs are indecisive and individual “beliefs and observances evolve and change over
time.”396
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The Supreme Court’s focus on the individual pays full respect to the person
driven by internal faith and religious obligation and with respect to his private property.
However, the consequences of the judgment of the majority in the case go beyond
Amselem and reshape membership both in a religious community and in the community
of the co-owners and residents of the condominium. The residents must readjust their
understanding of what give-and-take means and the ongoing conversation among coowners of the building is thus reframed. Succah structures, for ten days of the year, are
relabelled normal or reasonable interference with condominium owners’ enjoyment of
their spaces. The Jewish holiday of Succot and its implications for celebrants and the
people who live next to them are now in a shared experience of these structures in their
neighbourhoods for ten days a year; it is possible to rezone religious space and time by
positive law in the minds of the Canadian citizenry.
Berger too confirms that the separation between religion and law is “artificial,”
where law is informed by the political culture of liberalism and lacking a fluid or
complex understanding of religion.397 Religion cannot be separated from other practices
of everyday life, culturally, legally, politically, medically and so on.
4.

Multani v Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys [Multani]
The difficulty of securing rights to equal religious citizenship is illustrated in the

SCC case of Multani, which concerned the ability of a twelve-year-old Orthodox Sikh
student to carry his kirpan (dagger with a metal blade) on school property—his religion
requires that a kirpan has to be worn at all times. In Multani, the Court found freedom of
religion should protect a non-violent Sikh student's right to wear a kirpan in school. This
case began in 2001 when the kirpan of Gurbaj Singh Multani, the Sikh student, dropped
397
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to the ground in the schoolyard of the public school he was attending. Recent events had
heightened school security in Montreal public schools and this kirpan event was
exacerbated by religious fears post 9/11. The event triggered a strong reaction from
parents, teachers, and administrators. The school board council of commissioners
decided that carrying of kirpans violated the school’s no-weapons policy. This policy
infringed upon the religious tenets of Multani’s faith.
Multani’s rights were vindicated at trial at the Quebec Superior Court, but the
Quebec Court of Appeal found that the school board, “a creature of statute [that] derives
all its powers from statute,”398 did not have to accommodate Multani’s religious practices
because the toleration of any security risks in schools would constitute “undue hardship.”
There had not been any reported incidents of school violence involving kirpans, and the
boy in question had no record of disciplinary problems. Sikh students were, after this
Quebec Court of Appeal judgment, forced to choose between the tenets of their faith and
attendance at public schools; in effect, Sikh students were to abandon their faith and in
order to become full members of Canadian society they had to alienate themselves from
their own. This would now be a precedent in other Canadian environments. The matter
was then appealed to the SCC.
a) Interpretation of public purpose in Multani
An issue that the SCC was required to consider was whether the school board's
decision, which infringed the plaintiff's s. 2(a) rights, was justified under s. 1 of the
Charter. The uneasy relationship of religious accommodation and religious freedom is
illustrated in this appeal to the SCC. The school regulation prevented the student,
Multani, from acting on a sincere religious belief and the regulation contravened s. 2(a)
398
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of the Charter. Justice Charron, for the majority, found that absolute prohibition (no
weapons policy in schools) was not justified and the minimal risk to school safety posed
by wearing the kirpan could be managed by the school. An absolute prohibition was out
of proportion to the small risk posed by the wearing of the kirpan and “would stifle the
promotion of values such as multiculturalism, diversity, and the development of an
educational culture respectful of the rights of others.”399 She held that this prohibition on
weapons was too broad to satisfy the minimum impairment branch of the Oakes test.400
But in her attempt for reasonable accommodation, Charron, J. limited the student’s
freedom of religion by ordering that the kirpan be kept in a wooden sheath and be sewn
into the student’s clothing so that it could not be easily removed. Justice Charron also
accepted and seemed to agree with the lower court decisions upholding an absolute
prohibition of the kirpan in aircrafts and even in courtrooms as these two environments
would justify “a different level of safety.”401 Although the Supreme Court in this case
was divided on the question of whether a state obligation to accommodate religious
believers is sufficiently strict an obligation to be encompassed by the justificatory
analysis of freedom of religion under s. 1402 of the Charter, it held unanimously that the
regulation infringed the student’s freedom of religion.
b) Justification of the impact of law on Multani
According to Charron, J., an individual must show that he or she sincerely
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believes that a certain belief or practice is required by his or her religion.403 In Multani,
Singh was required to show that he sincerely believes that his faith requires him at all
times to wear a kirpan made of metal. She notes, from the evidence that:
… the Sikh religion teaches pacifism and encourages respect for other religions,
that the kirpan must be worn at all times, even in bed, that it must not be used as a
weapon to hurt anyone, and that Gurbaj Singh's refusal to wear a symbolic kirpan
made of a material other than metal is based on a reasonable religiously motivated
interpretation.404
Regardless of its moral validity, as a legal principle, freedom of religion serves as an
authoritative source of political power granting powers to institutions and individuals. It
can also coerce the same institutions and individuals to refrain from violating the
principle of freedom of religion. In that the operation of freedom of religion requires
justification within the domain of political morality, the liberal theory excludes the
plausibility of political justification of religious doctrine; political justification must be
based on reasons accessible to all reasonable persons within the polity.405 “What we
need”, going back to Parekh, “is a liberal theory of multiculturalism” for a co-existence
of indifference through policies that engage, dialogue and learn, and care for each
other.406
The importance of freedom of religion by the SCC is further stated by Charron, J.
She reproduced Dickson, C. J.’s statements in Big M. in terms of the right to choice of
religious beliefs and to the ability to fully practice these ideals openly.407 She quotes
from Big M:
Freedom means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public
403
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safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others,
no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience. 408
And in reproducing from Amselem, Charron J. states that “it was explained in Amselem
that freedom of religion consists:
... of the freedom to undertake practices and harbour beliefs, having a nexus with
religion, in which an individual demonstrates he or she sincerely believes or is
sincerely undertaking in order to connect with the divine or as a function of his or
her spiritual faith, irrespective of whether a particular practice or belief is required
by official religious dogma or is in conformity with the position of religious
officials.409
Charron, J, quotes further from Big M:
... With the Charter, it has become the right of every Canadian to work out for
himself or herself what his or her religious obligations, if any, should be and it is
not for the state to dictate otherwise.410
However, in this case—as opposed to the case of Big M, legislation was found to be
unconstitutional on its face because it violated the Charter right to freedom of religion
and it could not be saved under s. 1 of the Charter. Although freedom of religion was
accommodated there was no full liberty. Freedom of religion in Canada is a principle
that asserts its own validity, as a moral principle and as a legal principle.
c) Implication on the constitutional protection of religion in Multani
Singh’s constitutional rights were broadly well-established some years earlier
pursuant to previous jurisprudence, namely, Big M and Amselem. Despite the strong
support of the SCC for equal religious citizenship, constitutional/state restriction on
fundamental freedoms under s. 1 remains dominant. The appellant had to bear a time
consuming, costly court battle to secure the rights to which he was clearly entitled.411
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Multani, at an impressionable young age, also suffered prolonged agonizing negative
attention from numerous Canadian citizens who were ignorant of his rights. Neutral rules
need to be adjusted to accommodate religious practices. The duty to accommodate—
represented as the state’s obligation to facilitate the maintenance of religious pluralism—
is an idea familiar to human rights law in the context of employment.412 This was noted
in the minority judgment in Multani. Employers are required to take into account
religious difference and to accommodate religious preferences. But accommodation in
the presence of pluralism is assimilationist.
5.

Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 [Hutterian
Brethren]
The Colony of Hutterian Brethren in the Province of Alberta sincerely believed

that their faith-based Second Commandment prohibited them from having their
photograph willingly taken as this seriously violated religious belief and would be akin to
“sinful” behaviour. However, specific regulations in each province in Canada require
that all persons who drive motor vehicles on Canadian motorways hold a driver’s licence
with a photo-identification; Alberta is no exception. In Alberta, before 1974, a Condition
Code G license, a non-photo driver’s licence, was granted at the registrar’s discretion,
under the Traffic Safety Act, to those who objected to their photographs being taken on
religious grounds.413 This Colony carries on business as a rural self-sufficient religious
commune and claimed that if their members could not obtain drivers’ licenses their
communal lifestyle and survival would be threatened.
In 2003, the Province of Alberta amended its Traffic Safety Act and adopted a new
David Schneiderman, “Associational Rights, Religion, and the Charter” in Robert Moon ed,
Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) at 67.
413
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regulation under this Act making photo requirement universal. The objective and
therefore the interest of the province lay in a new universal facial recognition data bank
that would reduce the risk of identity theft associated with photo-identification. The
photos were to be deposited in the province’s facial recognition data bank for quick
computer access for this governmental fraud control purpose. The Colony therefore
proposed what they believed to be an alternative to the functionality of the control system
by requesting that they be allowed drivers’ licences marked “Not to be used for
identification purposes.”
The Colony’s proposal was denied; they challenged the constitutionality of
Alberta’s newly enacted regulation alleging an unjustifiable breach of their religious
freedom in a free and democratic society. At this point, there were 450 Condition Code
G licences in Alberta, 56 percent of which were held by members of the Hutterian
Brethren Colony. Intra-Province of Alberta, both levels of courts held that there was
infringement of s. 2(a) and that this infringement upon freedom of religion was not
justified under s.1. On appeal by the Government of Alberta, the SCC upheld the
regulation.
a) Interpretation of public purpose in Hutterian Brethren
After a six-year court battle, the Colony was not successful in persuading the SCC
that the impugned regulation was not justified in a free and democratic society.
McLachlin C.J. C. (Binnie, Deschamps and Rothstein JJ concurring) held that the
regulation was justified under s.1 of the Charter. LeBel, Fish and Abella JJ dissented.
The limiting regulation was found to be constitutional on this narrow, four to three,
decision and the appeal was allowed. The majority decision per Mclaughlin held that the
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universal photo requirement was rationally connected to the objective of the province, it
minimally impaired s. 2(a) right and that it was justified. The SCC proceeded only on the
justification test under s. 1. Therefore the validity of the regulation becomes
questionable. The question before the courts was whether the vehicle control regulation
infringed upon freedom of religion of the Colony; did the universal photo requirement
infringe on s. 2 (a) of the Charter? If so, was the infringement justified under s. 1 of the
Charter? Within the justification is the limit prescribed by law? Is the purpose for which
the limit is imposed pressing and substantial? Is the means by which the goal is furthered
proportionate?
b) Justification of impact of law on religious rights in Hutterian Brethren
In this case, Mclaughlin C.J.C. was hesitant to use s. 2(a) to transform its
supposed neutrality based on guaranteed secular principles and the principles of
universality. She explained that freedom of religion poses specific challenges because of
the “broad scope of the Charter guarantee” and that:
Much of the regulation of a modern state could be claimed by various individuals
to have a more than trivial impact on a sincerely held religious belief. Giving
effect to each of their religious claims could seriously undermine the universality
of many regulatory programs, including the attempt to reduce abuse of driver’s
licences at issue here, to the overall detriment of the community.414
And as the legislation was challenged as unconstitutional the court had to determine
whether it falls within “a range of reasonable alternatives.”415 Per McLaughlin:
Where a complex regulatory response to a social problem is challenged, courts
will generally take a more deferential posture throughout the s.1 analysis than
they will when the impugned measure is a penal statute directly threatening the
liberty of the accused. … The bar of constitutionality must not be set so high that
responsible, creative solutions to difficult problems would be threatened.416
414
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McLaghlin C.J.C. distinguished the reasonable accommodation analysis in Multani on
which the lower courts in this case had relied on in their assessment of minimal
impairment, and in their analysis under a s.1 justification. Is it legislation that is at issue
or is it statutory discretion that is at issue? It is understood that for validity of a law of
general application, government has to show that the measure: (a) is rationally connected
to a pressing and substantial goal; (b) minimally impairs the right in s. 2(a); and (c) is
proportional in its effects.417 According to McLaughlin, C.J.C., a s.1 analysis is crucial
where the validity of a law is at stake, but a reasonable accommodation analysis simply
addresses an alleged violation by the government or its administration, of a Charter
claim.418 For McLaughlin, "reasonable accommodation is not an appropriate substitute
for a proper s.1 analysis” based on her methodology of Oakes. The SCC in this case
redefined the Oakes test. She explains that when a law which has passed through all the
rigours of the Oakes proportionality test—pressing goal, rational connection and
minimum impairment—it could fail at the final inquiry of proportionality of effects.
The answer lies in the fact that the first three stages of Oakes are anchored in an
assessment of the law’s purpose. Only the fourth branch takes full account of the
“severity of the deleterious effects of a measure on individuals or groups.”419
Whereas the rational connection test and the least harmful measure test are
essentially determined against the background of the proper objective, and
are derived from the need to realize it, the test of proportionality (stricto
sensu) examines whether the realization of this proper objective is
commensurate with the deleterious effect upon the human right. . . .It
requires placing colliding values and interests side by side and balancing
them according to their weight.
In assessing the Hutterians’ proposed alternative in the context of the minimum
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impairment test, McLaughlin C.J.C. found that it would "compromise the Province's goal
of minimizing the risk of misuse of driver's licences for identity theft."420
However, in dissenting, Abella, Fish and LeBel, JJs agreed that the impugned
regulation was not proportionate and should be struck down. Abella, J. reasoned that the
burden on the government, of demonstrating infringement of religion, was not justified
under s.1; in terms of deleterious effects, the regulation seriously harms the small
Colony’s religious rights and threatens their autonomous ability to maintain their
communal way of life. She felt that it constituted an indirect form of coercion leaving the
Colony members having to make difficult choices concerning religious tenets. Abella,
J’s reasoning is that the law does not have to fail at the minimal impairment stage
because the proportionality test does not end here; her reasoning is more consonant with
claimants’ rights in Multani and Amselem wherein government inquiry into the sincerity
of religious beliefs was restricted.
When Abella J states that in her opinion "the government has not discharged its
evidentiary burden or demonstrated that the salutary effects in these circumstances are…a
web of speculation,"421 and adds that there is no evidence “from the government to
suggest that…for 29 years…an exemption to the photo requirement [has] caused any
harm at all to the integrity of the licensing system”, the dominance of political objectives
become apparent. To Abella, J., the basis for determining the exemption is no longer
feasible. She finds the impugned regulation is a form of indirect coercion that places the
Colony “in an untenable position of having to choose between compliance with their
religious beliefs or giving up their self-sufficiency of their community…[and their]
420
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historically preserved…autonomy...”422
LeBel, J in dissenting also, states that “courts must weigh the purpose against the
extent of the infringement.”423 He also states that McLaughlin C.J.C.’s approach to
minimal impairment “would severely restrict the ambit of court review of government
action and would reduce it to an analysis of the alignment of means with purposes.”424
How much flexibility does the court have over the effect of government objective when
assessing the alternative proposed by the Colony? And are citizens with different criteria
in the conduct of life to be discouraged from formulating novel alternatives? It seems
that with the exception of Big M in freedom of religion jurisprudence, legislative
objective remains firmly installed.
c) Implications on constitutional protection of religion in Hutterian
Brethren
In the s.1 analysis of proportionality in this case—balancing between the
deleterious and salutary effects of the purpose of the impugned regulation on religious
rights—the objective of the regulations prescribed by law was given more significance.
The alternative suggested by the Colony was discarded as illegitimate. But exactly how
compromised is this particular government goal in general? In the balance, the effects on
the overall system concerned a very small isolated group without a photograph in their
driving licences; the Colony could have just been given an exemption without much
impact on the system or legislative schemes. The impact on the Colony was significant.
Are there less harmful ways of achieving government or legislative goal?
Interaction that is based on principles of secularization and democratization when
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legitimated by authority that is anchored in the politics of legalism, tend to delegitimize
evidence of community practice, historical precepts and observance, and practice of
religion, all of which are significant to the lifeworld of a plurality of citizens. Is the
objective important enough to limit the Charter guarantee? In the balance, the mal effects
of the infringement of the regulation by a very small, vulnerable group of people on
society are significantly less than the mal effects on the colony itself in the infringement
of their Charter right to freedom of religion under s. 2(a).
6.

A.C. v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), 2009 SCC 30
[A.C.]425
The focus of this case is on a devout minor-mature Jehovah’s Witness’—A.C.’s—

right to refuse blood transfusion to which she herself objects. A.C., a girl aged fourteen
years and ten months, was hospitalized for lower gastrointestinal inflammation and
bleeding caused by Crohn’s disease.426 It was medically determined that her hemoglobin
count was dangerously low and that she urgently needed blood transfusion. Jehovah’s
Witnesses interpret the bible to prohibit any form of ingestion of blood. A.C. had signed
written instructions forbidding transfusion of blood to her under any circumstances. She
particularly refused receipt of blood after the advice of her doctor that internal bleeding
had created an imminent, serious risk to her health and perhaps her life.
Despite the fact that a psychiatric assessment at the hospital deemed A.C. to have
the capacity to make medical decisions relating to herself, the Director of Child and
Family Services of Manitoba apprehended her as a child in need of protection, and sought
a treatment order from the court under s. 25(8) of the Manitoba Child and Family
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Services Act (CFSA),427 by which the court may authorize treatment that it considers to be
in the child’s “best interests” if the child is under the age of 16 and when a life is at risk.
And s. 25(9) of the same Act presumes that the “best interests” of a child 16 or over will
be most effectively promoted by allowing the child’s views to be determinative, unless it
can be shown that the child does not understand the decision or appreciate its
consequences; no such presumption existed here. However, the applications judge
ordered that A.C. receive blood transfusions, after concluding that when a child is under
16, there are no legislated restrictions of authority on the court’s ability to order medical
treatment in the child’s “best interests.” A treatment involving blood transfusion was
administered to A.C. A.C. and her parents appealed the order arguing that the legislation
(Manitoba CFSA) was unconstitutional because it unjustifiably infringed a variety of
A.C.’s rights under ss. 2(a), 7, and 15 of the Charter.
a) Interpretation of public purpose of law in A.C.
The question before the courts was: What is the legitimacy of Charter guarantees
under freedom of religion, security of person and equality? Section 7 concerned the
Charter rights of liberty and security of person and fundamental justice wherein
provincial family services apprehended and authorized medical treatment under the
legislative power of s. 25(8) and contrary to the child’s wishes and consent and personal
moral conviction, and voluntary compliance. Section 2(a) concerned Charter rights of
freedom to practice religion in Canada and in this case the faith-based practice of a minor
Jehovah’s Witness under the age of 16 having a right to reject blood transfusion despite
dire consequences and the fact that coercion had already occurred in the forced
427
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administration of blood and her ability to understand relevant information or
consequences of treatment decision under the impugned law. Section 15 of the Charter
concerned equality rights, in this case, of discrimination on the basis of being under the
age of 16 years and whose maturity status on the capacity—in effect her level of
understanding—to refuse blood transfusions was questioned. The Manitoba Court of
Appeal unanimously upheld the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions and
the treatment order of the applications judge. A further appeal of the imposed transfusion
to the SCC was dismissed.
At the SCC, the appeal was dismissed and ss. 25(8) and 25(9) of the Manitoba
CFSA were upheld as constitutional in a six to one decision; Binnie J dissented. Four
SCC judges—Abella, LeBel, Deschamps and Charron JJ—found that there was no
violation of her freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter, two judges—McLachlin
C.J and Rothstein J—found that a violation of s. 2(a) did occur but was justified under s.1
of the Charter, and in dissenting, Binnie J found that the violation of A.C.’s s. 2(a) rights
was unjustified and that s.25 of the CFSA was unconstitutional.
In assessing whether A.C. was acting without restraint and with a mature
understanding of the consequences of refusing blood transfusion, the majority judgment
delivered by Abella J did consider the child’s religious heritage and the ‘truth’ and depth
of her core values and beliefs. However, the paramount aim of the SCC was to determine
the statutory “best interests” of the child under s. 25(8) of the Manitoba CFSA. After a
comprehensive evaluation by the SCC of “the maturity of the adolescent...to determine
whether … her decision is a genuinely independent one” that reflects understanding and
the serious consequences of her decision, the SCC felt that a young person’s religious
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wishes could be respected only “as his or her maturity increases in a proportionate
response both to the young person’s religious rights and the protective goals of s. 25(8).”
428

The three sets of reasoning at the SCC are summarized here:
b) Justification of the impact of law on religion
I. Four out of Seven SCC Judges found no Violation of s. 2(a).
In this case, the majority at the SCC found that the constitutional balance was

“appropriate” between achieving the protective legislative goal while at the same time
respecting the right of mature adolescents to participate meaningfully in decisions
relating to their medical treatment.429 A.C. in effect became a child claimant without
legislative capacity to exert her autonomous rights, in this case freedom of religion. In its
“careful” application of the “best interests” standard, the majority found that although the
legislative scheme created by ss. 25(8) and 25(9) of the CFSA did impose differential
treatment on the basis of age, it did not infringe ss. 7, 15 or 2(a) of the Charter because it
is neither arbitrary, discriminatory, nor violative of religious freedom. Per Abella J:430
The question is whether the statutory scheme strikes a constitutional balance
between what the law has consistently seen as an individual’s fundamental right
to autonomous decision-making in connection with his or her body and the law’s
equally persistent attempts to protect vulnerable children from harm. This
requires examining the legislative scheme, the common law of medical decisionmaking both for adults and minors, a comparative review of international
jurisprudence, and relevant and social scientific and legal literature. The
observations that emerge from this review will inform the considered analysis.
Global modern liberal secular rationale prevailed. In Canada, State goals tend to be
paramount.
II. Two SCC judges concurred with the majority decision but found there was
violation of s. 2(a) that was justified under s. 1 of the Charter.
428
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In concurring with the majority decision, McLachlin C.J, and Rothstein, J
concluded that the legislative authorization to override A.C.’s sincere religious belief and
objection to transfusion constituted an infringement of her right to religious freedom
guaranteed by s. 2(a) of the Charter but they also found that the authorization of
treatment by the applications judge was justified under s.1 of the Charter. They did not
dispute “that A.C. possessed a sincere religious belief as a Jehovah’s Witness against
receiving blood products and transfusions.”431 McLachlin, C.J. referenced Amselem
wherein Bastarache J. stated that:
…religion is a system of beliefs and practices based on certain religious precepts.
A nexus between personal beliefs and the religion's precepts must therefore be
established…. Connecting freedom of religion to precepts provides a basis for
establishing objectively whether the fundamental right…has been violated….a
practice must be connected with the religion…the connection must be objectively
identifiable.432
Mclaughlin further states that this is clearly more than a trivial interference with her
“right to manifest beliefs and practices.”433 She also referenced Dickson C.J. in R. v. Big
M:
Freedom can primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion or constraint.
If a person is compelled by the state or the will of another to a course of action or
inaction which he would not otherwise have chosen, he is not acting of his own
volition and he cannot be said to be truly free. One of the major purposes of the
Charter is to protect, within reason, from compulsion or restraint. Coercion
includes not only such blatant forms of compulsion as direct commands to act or
refrain from acting on pain of sanction, coercion includes indirect forms of
control which determine or limit alternative courses of conduct available to
others. Freedom in a broad sense embraces both the absence of coercion and
constraint, and the right to manifest beliefs and practices. Freedom means that,
subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health,
or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, no one is to be forced
to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience.434
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The majority in this case found infringement to be justified under s.1 of the Charter and
religious belief could not alter the essential nature of the claim for absolute personal
autonomy and of the medical intervention for the preservation of life.
Again, according to McLachlin, C.J., when s. 25(8) is considered in light of s.
2(a) of the Charter, the limit on religious practice imposed by this legislation is justified
under s.1 as a proportionate limit on the right; the life of the minor has to be ensured and
courts have the discretion to order treatment after consideration of all relevant
circumstances.435 In this case the impugned provisions of the Manitoba CFSA deprived
A.C. of full decision-making authority as to her firm religious beliefs. McLachlin stated
that “in this case, the s. 7 and s. 2(a) claims merge…”436 She also rejected the assumption
that s. 7 is absolute and trumps all other values; she argued that the treatment order also
violated s.7.437 McLachlin C. J. and Rothstein, J. affirmed the constitutionality of ss.
25(8) and 25(9) of the CFSA but awarded costs to A.C. throughout. State action,
coercion, was at the direction of the judiciary.
But although the court acknowledged that there was infringement of A.C.’s s. 2(a)
rights at the justification stage, the principles of fundamental justice were found to be a
reasonable limit on A.C.’s rights and were allowed to override the sanctity of religious
values and free participation in deeply held beliefs.
III. Binnie J.’s dissenting judgment that s. 2(a) was violated by the legislative
scheme
In dissenting, Binnie J. stated that:
…the Charter enshrines in our highest law the liberty and independence of a
mature individual to make life’s most important choices free of government
435
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intervention, provided there is no countervailing social interest of overriding
importance.438
Binnie J. reiterates that although judges would instinctively give priority to the sanctity of
life, for Jehovah’s Witnesses, refusing blood transfusions despite life threatening
situations is fundamental to their religious convictions.439 However, the state, for Binnie
J., is not justified in taking away the autonomy of individuals, even those under 16 years
old; given the equality rights under ss. 2(a) and 7 of the Charter if a mature minor does in
fact understand the nature and seriousness of her medical condition and is mature enough
to appreciate the consequences of refusing consent to treatment, the young person has the
capacity to make the treatment decision, “not just to have “input” into a judge’s
consideration of what the judge believes to be the young person’s best interests.”440
Binnie J. also references Dickson, J. in the Big M case to emphasize that s. 2(a) covers
religious practices as well as religious beliefs.441 He finds that A.C.’s belief was “sincere
as must be established by an s. 2(a) claimant.
In stressing the sincerity and the importance of freedom of religion, he refers to
Amselem and Multani, the latter quoted here per Charron, J:
What an individual must do is show that he or she sincerely believes that a certain
belief or practice is required by his or her religion. The religious belief must be
asserted in good faith and must not be fictitious, capricious or an artifice
(Amselem, at para. 52). In assessing the sincerity of the belief, a court must take
into account, inter alia, the credibility of the testimony of the person asserting the
particular belief and the consistency of the belief with his or her other current
religious practices (Amselem, at para. 53).442
To deny the truth of capacity to consent to or refuse medical treatment violates A.C.’s
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“freedom of religion and her right not to be deprived of her liberty or security of person
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”443 Binnie J. further
states that the “interference with A.C.’s religious conscience far exceeded the “nontrivial” threshold established in Amselem, and it was rightly conceded that s. 25…violated
s. 2(a), subject to s. 1 defence advanced by the government.444 According to Binnie, J.,
the legislative objective could not justify the limiting of freedom of religion under s. 1
indicating that the purpose of the law contradicts the Charter right.
a) Implication on the constitutional protection of religion in A.C.
In the question of refusing blood transfusion in the face of a threat to life of a
minor as part of sincere religious observation (or be plagued with feelings of being
damned for eternity), how strong is the claim for accommodation of s. 2(a) rights? The
justification of the limiting law lies in the purpose of the freedom itself; the law has to
fulfil its legislated function in guiding human conduct. Also an integral purpose of
fundamental freedoms is the preservation of life and courts are empowered to protect life.
Section 1 requires that the policy of the legislation be balanced against the policy of the
Charter.445 However, courts can uphold legislation only under s.1 of the Charter and
they will therefore strive to find that s.1 is satisfied.446 Limits are justifiable where the
freedom is being engaged to restrict the circumstances in which one may be convinced to
change one’s belief and to protect certain public spaces as neutral zones in moral contests
particularly those involving the preservation of life. In this moral debate, the will of the
majority prevailed. But proportionality is at the discretion of the reviewing judge/body.
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In weighing proportionality in this case between the deleterious and the salutary effects,
the deleterious effects are dominant. Hogg states that:
…the scope of the judicial review depends upon: a stringent standard of
justification coupled with a purposive interpretation of rights against a relaxed
standard of justification coupled with a broad interpretation of rights.”447
And he further states that to be able to maintain a meaningful balancing process, “judicial
review will become even more unpredictable than it is now [and]…the purposive
approach will usually have the effect of narrowing the right…[and]…generous approach
is subordinate to purpose.”448 The impact of legislated limitations on the democratic
process is already vague. How do growing normative bases that are plural continue to
survive or at least co-exist?
Again, in this case, there is a difference in the characterization of the purpose of
the law in the three groups of decisions. In each instance, although the objectives of the
law are in concert with the values of a free and democratic society, these objectives are
related to the infringement of a plurality of Charter rights that go well beyond a
determination of the maturity of a mature minor which in turn is directly related to
freedom of religion and illiberal ideals.
b) Secularization and freedom of religion in A.C.
In the majority decision, although the conscience or religious expression was not
significantly interfered with, the democratic process was not allowed to expand to include
an ‘other’ set of beliefs with openness. The legislative integrity is directly at odds with
the value of pluralism and the commitment of a liberal state to respect reasonable
pluralism. Again, the outcomes of jurisprudence concerning freedom of conscience and
447
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religion almost never change sincerely held religious beliefs and values. In that it is by
an independent jurisdictional sphere arising from the concept of the separation of church
and state—the process of secularization—that freedom of religion is tied up with state
law accommodation, state law does not recognize religion. Religious believers however,
see themselves not in terms of individual rights claimants, but in terms of community
rights. Faith is a collective activity and the key right is self-government. The believer
“categorically disregards elementary self-interest and accepts martyrdom” rather than
transgress religious tenets.449 Limit to religious accommodation has to account also for
respect for different perspectives as part of legislated freedom of religion. Different
social situations may warrant changes in the purpose of the law. In a pluralistic society
the law has to be able to meet diverse moralities. Hogg points out that significant
variations in individual beliefs do exist within a particular religion be it Christianity,
Islam, Judaism, Hinduism and many others. And change is costly morally, politically
and economically. The democratic process, the judiciary and subsequent Charter rights
need to be emancipated from the politics of secularization.
F. Conclusion: interpretative challenges within jurisprudence of
modernity
As can be seen in the above cases, a pattern has emerged: where there is
disagreement on some acute moral, political and legal conflicts, and there is no clear
distinction between the normatively right and the institutionally feasible positions on
individual rights with religious freedoms, priority is given to the state interests in
autonomy and modern secular politics over religious freedoms in most cases.450
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Although many disputes may be resolved within religious communities, or in various
levels of courts, the means to administer a diversity of moral perspectives in courts is
missing. Legislative integrity is only a political ideal and legislators should try to make
the total set of laws they enact as morally coherent as possible.451 Limits on the claims of
faith believers should leave them, at a minimum, meaningful choice rather than a
complete deprivation. There is no one stable core that can be attributed to ethnic
experience and difference in Canada is viewed as unchanging essence to the exclusion of
all others. The SCC has not been able to find middle ground between compelling state
interest and religious liberties and tensions have aggravated between the two sides.452
When it comes to determining religiosity for legal purposes and with substantive
constitutional concepts, there is an indication that courts do not seem to have flexibility.
In weighing state objectives against individual and collective rights under the s. 2(a)
guarantee, it would seem that courts are more deferential towards state objectives. For
“equal religious citizenship”, according to Ryder, there is a requirement that accepted
neutral rules be adjusted to accommodate religious practices if there is to be equal
participation for persons of faith in social and economic life.453
According to Schneiderman, religion and law continually interact, yet always
insist on boundaries of their own space and the modalities of their use of that space.454
There are many instances wherein a court will be asked to define the outer boundaries of
a religious faith, and this may require inquiry into the external boundaries, for example
when an individual seeks accommodation from mainstream practices. Although, all
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human communities have enforceable rules of conduct, they may or may not be written
down. Whether they are articulated or not, they exist and are enforced. Such laws
embody the experience a community has gained in its struggle to survive. In time, the
actors discover methods of cooperation with rules that promote internal order and
external strength.455 However, challenges to the liberal political and normative
philosophy are bracketed as comprehensive worldviews that are disagreeable,
unmanageable or costly. The constitution does not deal effectively with the religious
challenge.
Freedom of religion jurisprudence in Canada illustrates that the interests of the
person of religion or a religious group are pitted against the political and economic
interests of the modern state as an entity bound by and acting through liberal or
constitutional law and judiciary. Individuated religion is favoured ahead of the collective
rituals of whole societies; the abstract individual has primacy but his/her religious
development is reflected in numerous different ways of living alongside numerous
religions in Canada. It is argued that the freedom of religion jurisprudence outlined
above illustrates that in a democracy such as Canada, guaranteed freedom of religion is
formally infringed upon when its theoretical vision of justice may no longer be able to
meet the empirical reality of the adjudicatory needs of a now different, changing and
pluralizing society.
The practice of faith is based on sincere beliefs that have historical significance
and cannot be confined to a general authoritative law. A plurality of faith-based religious
values is being trumped by the constitutional freedom based on freedom of individual
conscience. The relationship between public reason and religion is a fundamental
455
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problem for present political philosophy and constitutional theory based on secularity.
While Canadian law examines and responds to random slices of specific religions, it does
not go far enough in answering these questions to address the normative issues that are
raised by an increasingly pluralist society. Conflict is therefore inevitable. To resolve
conflict, inclusionary alternatives to the existing legal-political model rest on examining
plural communities and their plural moral orders that are embedded in different social
and economic practices. The next chapter examines the possibilities of peaceful
coexistence of state law or liberal legalism, religious law, and the customs of the
multiplicity in Canada.
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CHAPTER IV - Is Peaceful Coexistence of Liberal Law and Religious Pluralism
possible?: Canada’s Multiple Modernities and Multifaceted Legal Orders in the
21st Century and beyond.
In an age of rapid globalization, mass migration, swift transportation systems
including instant electronic data exchange, intense social communications, significant
economic interconnections between far-flung countries and other agencies, one of the
main features of the modern world is that different laws increasingly come to share fields.
Although mass migration is having the effect of blurring boundaries between the legal
and the non-legal, and between Western and non-Western conceptions of law, in Canada,
in the 21st Century, it would seem that peoples of diverse backgrounds and interests are
inevitably coming together in organisations of varying types and goals, for different kinds
and forms of creative expression, which are mostly valuable and deserving of support by
government and society as a whole. However, I have argued in this thesis that, although
Canada is a nominally pluralist society, the legitimacy of religious pluralism has not been
fully established in its public domain. Liberal law can be said to be slow in changing as
it interacts with other norms. As was evident in Chapter III, in the liberal conception of
jurisprudence concerning equal religious citizenship, alternative forms of law such as
religious tenets—that are historically complex and already contextually varied—cannot
avoid falling prey to the limitations of liberal law.
Sociocultural life is extraordinarily diverse as is the plurality of norms within
society. Where do the other normative sets of meaning and regulation, particularly of
religious tenets, belong in the conceptual status of the law? In this chapter, I will discuss
the works of several different legal pluralists exploring shared normative expectations
and aspirations. On the basis of the perspectives of some legal pluralists and on the basis
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of my review of the jurisprudence as outlined in Chapter III, I would argue that the
SCC’s approach to normative pluralism is inadequate to the task of recognizing religious
difference. This is particularly so when balancing the purpose of the law as against
freedom of religion where norms are steeped in tradition. I will also look at how the
perspectives concerning law and order, generally, are developed to create basic shared
expectations in consideration of vantage points that exist for particular tasks.
Canada’s central rule-based power is contained by state institutions. As was
evident within the sampling of jurisprudence in Chapter III, this liberal state successfully,
yet selectively, legitimates particular viewpoints; there is a methodological understanding
and application of the foundations of religion in a particular context that attempts to
balance tradition and modernity. At the same time, the country’s jurisprudence and
legislation on freedom of religion indicates a continuous deconstruction of state law and a
crossfertilization of rules and standards seeming to evolve between state law and various
religious norms giving rise to a further multiplicity of normative expectations. For legal
pluralists mentioned here, the struggle for comprehension, recognition and positive
accommodation of the rights to religious practices in the liberal West must be addressed
in discussions of social inclusion, immigrant integration, multiculturalism,
interculturalism, democratic participation and justice.
This chapter will therefore address legal pluralist viewpoints. It will address
questions such as whether the Canadian state is sufficiently prohibited from favouring
any one religious community such that it can allow maximum religious freedom for all.
To this extent, legal pluralist perspectives shed light on the non-neutrality of liberal
legalism. How can a secular state encourage religious diversity, pluralism and the
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common good? The aim eventually, is to understand the relationship between different
normative systems and the impact of state law on religious diversity in Canada. Is law
responsible for society or vice-versa?
According to Berman, a legal pluralist, although the concept of law is signified by
empirical reality, that is, political weight or substantive content of legal forms, these legal
forms and meanings can be built upon by subsequent iterations.456 However, the factual
power of the state that lends empiricity for the existence of its law is in its rule of
recognition: as discussed previously, the political and legal philosophy of the nation state
provides its descriptive conceptions.457 However, religious norms are central to people’s
political identity. Because religion, most times, is at the core of people’s identity rather
than a consequence of chosen or formalized projects, the search is for a balance between
state law with the weight of historically recognized interpretive traditions and the
emergence of an urgent appeal to confront challenges of distinctiveness in the here and
now or within the empirical reality. In Canada, a crucial question therefore is whether
and under what conditions the law could be usefully fashioned into a cross-cultural
comparative concept, state or not.
A. The normative, philosophical and theological in the quest to manage
religious diversity in Canada
In Canada, multiplicities of social norms have continued to surface and grow in
importance in their own right. Each social field is full of normative material originating
from within itself or from external social fields.458 And in general, every legal system
claims to have authority over a particular field of its area of jurisdiction. This authority
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also claims to have priority over any other law within the field. Although there are many
forms of law, religious laws in particular have historically provided guidance for social
behaviour in the form of interconnected norms explicitly stated in religious doctrines.
Religious law and its claim as the final authority in the code of human conduct is a major
component of legal pluralism (whether for salvation or for liberty); the socio-religious
diversity itself produces a multiplicity of legal systems.
That law means different things to different people with different consequences
for individuals is not necessarily a problem. Legal pluralists understand law as a “chaotic
tangle of ongoing social arrangements in which there are complex and binding
obligations” that exist and that are based on cultural and religious overlaps and collective
experiences.459 However, for pluralists, collective social life also entails institutions,
networks, and so on, that result from coexistence. Cotterrel, for example, states that life
is a realm:
…of solidarity, identity and cooperation, but also of power, conflict, alienation,
and isolation; of stable expectations, systems, custom, trust and confidence, but
also of unpredictable action, unforeseen change, violence, disruption and
discontinuity.460
Pluralism is a key value within society. Ryder points out the importance of the
collective aspect of religion and the close relationship of religious and conscientious
belief systems and community formation and people’s sense of membership in their
communities and states: “these communities are sources of strength, support, and
normative authority that provide a counterpoint to the role of the state in people’s
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lives.”461 However, a condition of openness to the viewpoints of others does not come
about through “a calculated inhabitation of an ethical intersubjectivity” 462
Legal pluralists are acutely aware of the existence of tension and of the
impossibility of its resolution within orthodox legal theory and practice. For Tie, there
are no indications that religious perceptions are fundamentally altering the shape of
formal legality; instead, there is a recolonization of citizens that practice religion through
the assimilation of their views via the language of legal pluralism.463 The quest has to be
purely a moral pursuit that reflects on the damage being by formal presumptious legacy.
Is it possible to identify the victimization of others for the sake of reparations?
We have seen that morality which is associated with openness to otherness occurs
most acutely through resistance and conflict.464 Openness to otherness is born in
negativity. The concept of legal pluralism therefore begins with this embarrassing,
unpredictable and precarious phenomenon.465 However, this obvious tension between
identity and morality seems to compromise the personal integrity and human dignity of
some individual citizens and groups against excessive or harsh punishment. More
importantly, there is a danger of cultural imperialism, political subjugation, or simply a
product of extreme ethnoreligious centricity before the law. As was evident in Chapter
III, the judge in Canadian courts dealing with freedom of religion, is torn between:
creating certainty, “closure”, about law, in ordering the current complex society and at
the same time “critiquing” the position taken by the assumptions of liberal law or “to be
self-reflexive about the assumption through which they have come to know and judge
Ryder, “The Canadian Conception” Supra note 27 at 87 & 94.
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law.”466 For Tie, the space between “closure” and “critique” are impossible to inhabit; it
is this space which has occupied discourse on the recognition of socio-cultural difference
to create bases for shared social life.467
Peaceful coexistence—of normative orders sharing the same field—that is openended in the midst of rigid dominance is therefore difficult unless the constitution which
oversees the social plurality is compatible with its social organization and other faith
norms are able to acquiesce to its power. In altogether ignoring or missing an ethical
position towards the ‘other’ and their conceptions of law, the liberal theory of law can be
construed as politically charged. Legal pluralists have given us a conceptual framework
within which one can convincingly argue that liberal legalism in Canada is, emphatically,
not neutral. For instance Tully, for whom diversity produces a ‘multiplicity of demands’
for self-rule that “conflict violently” in practice, reiterates that the goal has to be to
construct an approach that does not subjugate other perspectives to itself and in the
process, disassemble its own cultural imperatives under an aura of neutrality.468 For civil
and peaceful interaction of diverse cultural and faith norms of a multiplicity of
modernities in Canada, rethinking liberal legalism is urgent. Of great importance, is the
fact that the tension through which historical ethics are reshaped are escalating. Within
the growing degree of legal pluralism, legal fragmentation, violence, and societal
weakness, there is urgency to making democracy work in Canada.
Although all liberal constitutions adhere to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the implementation of these rights is almost impossible precisely due to
irreconcilable conflicts between the established concept of human rights and the
466
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conceptions based mainly on non-Western culture.469 And although the standards for
permissible action and validity of transactions and procedures are provided in liberal
constitutions to deal with problematic situations such as the management of conflict so
that disputes are given meaning and are further regulated, discussions that began with
sensitivity to frequent parallel or duplicatory legal regulations within one political
organization have now become increasingly dominated by the exchange of many
conceptual à priori and of stereotypes.
According to Chiba, a non-Western pluralist, Western people tend to take
differences for granted and non-Western people are threatened that their human identity,
based on their specific traditional/ethnic law, are infringed upon, particularly when
licenced interpretation may distort meaning.470 Again, where maintenance of identity by
different peoples becomes an issue and a social conflict arises, there is a need for mutual
recognition, accommodation and co-habitation by the parties. And, if the power of state
legislation fails in this task, conflicts will escalate. Differences in legal conceptions and
differing meanings may incite mortal harm to human life.471
B. Co-existence of different legal systems: The politics of identity versus
the location of meaningful and hetereogenous faith-based values
For many pluralists, the tendency to categorize and misidentify a vast number of
independent heterogeneous claims despite the latter’s meaningful cultural values, raises
dilemmas such as how are we connected and how do we want to co-exist in all aspects of
our social realities and existence, economically, politically and even morally in the 21st
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century and beyond?
Sack argues that legal pluralism is about the co-existence of different politically
distinct legal systems of law and he feels that it is not possible to relativize the different
forms of law.472 Cover corroborates, that in ancient societies, political myths and
religious myths coincided in content and function.473 Myths are mapping devices through
which we look at the multifaceted character of the world. The space between a simple,
empirical meaning and the ultimate meaning of life or of death is the complex, sociocultural space within which myths operate. For Cover, because prescription is located in
discourses of “history and destiny”, “beginning and end”; “explanation and purpose” not
only are history and literature obviously located within a normative universe, but
prescription that is embedded in legal text also has its origin and end in experience.474
Incidentally, Tamanaha also places legal pluralism within a historical context “for the
only way to grasp where we are and where we are headed is to have a sense of how we
arrived at the present.”475
Again, for legal pluralists, homogeneity of any type is not a natural condition or a
starting point; we need to understand, empirically, law and its place in a universe of a
multiplicity of historical and current social enclaves and lives. For most pluralists, more
empirical research is needed in order to further our understandings of the many
variations within empirical constellations of legal pluralism and the various ways in
which social, political and economic conditions of life are influenced in the context of a
472
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multiplicity of modernities. In particular, the concepts of difference and sameness are not
empiricized because they reflect a particular juridical value such as “differences in
humans ought not to be taken account of” and the sameness lies in the categorization of
particular normative order of social facts.476 The facts themselves remain irrelevant.
Different rules for identical situations cannot be applied to a common circumstance as the
functional possibilities vary. Because justice for a majority is an empirical question, it is
only empiricity that must distinguish between normative attributes and the variable
empirical functionality concerning moral considerations and standards of ethics or
justice. However, monism seems to be leading to an ideology aimed at legal unification
on a global scale and freedom of religion processes continue to be redefined in liberal
terms in adjudication and legislation.477
The extent to which conventional centralized conceptions of law can be relied
upon to recognize socio-cultural identities in a just manner and adjudicate fairly within
conflicts between differently-positioned communities such as faith groups and
associations is questionable. In the 21st century, the conflicts at the interface of diverse
sources of legal normativity in Western liberal polities are particularly important and
urgent to address.
In Canada, how should a religiously diverse society distribute rights and
responsibilities? Do different aspects of law have to be integrated in a systematic
fashion? It is understood that liberal law, by its nature, has to fulfil different functions
and be cognizant of different values. Despite a variety of forms of self rule available in
the dominant language of Canadian constitutionalism, and despite the attempts of the
476
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proportionality method under s. 1 of the Charter to refine responses to freedom of
religion, alternative norms are still denied by liberal constitutional law. As we noticed in
Chapter III, religious identity is recognized through highly formal norms of equality and
non-discrimination with decidedly negotiated sets of norms about tolerance or
accommodation. For Tully, the ranges of demands for identity are extremely broad:
various nationalistic, linguistic, ethnic, inter-cultural, feminist, religious and indigenous
voices call for the right to self-determination, not misrecognition.478 For Tully, any
constitutional suppression of difference signals authoritative justification of
uniformity.479 Cover confirms, that the exclusion of diversity of some and the inclusion
of others is doctrinally narrow.480 Charles Taylor agrees that the monistic Eurocentric
systems of legality are propelled by a newfound emphasis on identity based on universal
forms of constitution and which have dominated sociolegal theories of liberalism,
socialism and feminism.481 Arthurs and Arnold suggest that globalization as an ideology
should involve a change in Canadian and other Western social values and in liberal
fundamental understandings about what role law does play and should play in society.482
Because law transcends any type of relativity, there can be no superior law except
individual preferences based on measured individual values that hold strong personal
convictions concerning characteristics of law.483 This individualized and personally
relativized law eliminates the question of objective superiority and promotes unity in
society. Legal pluralism is concerned with basic legal alternatives related to rules and
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adjudication. Legal pluralism is not interested in the makeup of rules relating to the same
subject matter or in the differences in the ways in which adjudicative bodies are
arranged.484 Again, legal pluralists will take account of normative orders in so far as they
are aspects of social behavior; there is no investigation of the truth of ideologies. Further,
the pluralist does not engage in debate over the correctness of propositions about
doctrines of law generally. Legitimacy, on the other hand, depends on meeting normative
expectations—based on heartfelt bonds—of the multiplicity of modernities.
The works of several legal pluralist scholars are discussed below as they are vital
to the argument in this thesis that there are other functional sources of normative
authority in a liberal constitutional democracy than uniform state law.
C. The works of some legal pluralists
Cover, a foremost supporter of legal pluralism states that although the rules and
principles of justice as instituted in formal law and conventions of social order are
important, they are only a small part of the normative universe that ought to claim our
attention.485 “We inhabit a nomos–a normative universe.”486 Law does not reside
exclusively in the coercive commands of a sovereign power conferred by the Westphalian
writ of sovereignty.487 Great legal civilizations and texts are much more than just their
technical or practical sophistication, rhetorical power or inventive genius. The nomos is
“constituted by a system of tension between reality and vision” and which cannot be
utopia.488 Cover’s nomos constitutes and establishes paradigms for “dedication,
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acquiescence, contradiction and resistance” and does not require a state.489 The creation
of the legal process of a state has a collective social meaning and the state does not
necessarily create legal meaning; law comes from society, which itself is now comprised
of, as I have argued earlier, a multiplicity of modernities. For Cover, because universal
values of modern secular liberal law are broad principles of law, they weaken the
stronger jurisgenesis or creation of normative meaning based on, for instance, religious
worship.490
Legal pluralists maintain that within modern liberal democratic and secularized
constitutions, there is scope for the right to difference to be affirmed. The relationship
between a given narrative and the way it comes to address the political conditions of a
particular group needs to be understood. Narratives are created by imposing a normative
force upon a state of affairs, real or imagined.491 Narratives become interrelated sets of
beliefs and attitudes held by a society or cultural group. Although sovereign assertions of
law—prescriptive or adjudicatory—count as law, normative commitments also arise
through the constant construction of law through various norm-generating
communities.492 Again, because the narrative in material reality was sourced by our
imaginations, law is not merely a system of rules to be observed but a world in which we
live. Because the creation of legal meaning, jurisgenesis, Cover explains, occurs through
a cultural medium where real law grows, normative behavior is most intelligible and
bonds are stronger within communal narratives as they provide the context of that
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behavior.493 These communal rules of conduct stemming from experience that a
community has gained in its struggle to survive are the strong bonds of common meaning
found in shared ritual or prayer and of a common corpus that are recognized as the
moving normative force of the community. Cover maintains that societies function better
on these strong interpersonal bonds, subjective discourse and trust. “We constantly
create and maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and
void.”494 However, strong interpersonal bonds are absent within state law. A
sociocultural space without meaningful values and norms can potentially create divisions
in terms of rights and obligations giving rise to a society of hierarchies leaving the “civil
community…spiritually blind and ignorant [with] no faith, no creed and no gospel and its
members are not brothers and sisters (prayer is not part of life).”495 “To inhabit a nomos
is to know how to live in it.”496
To restate Cover, all legal traditions and institutions are part and parcel of a
complex normative world, the “corpus juris” or prescriptions, including morality
because, as he stated, “narratives…locate [and give] meaning.”497 The methods to
develop cooperation between narrative and rules and the promotion of internal order and
external strength, may or may not be written down.498 As rules establish normative
behavior and legal doctrine between the normative and the material universe, between the
demands of an ethic and constraints of reality, whether they are articulated or not, they
exist and are enforced. The normative meaning therefore inheres in legal doctrines such
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as in messianic messages of liberation promising peace, truth and happiness and also in
“apologies of power and privilege and in the critiques that may be leveled as the
justificatory enterprises of law.”499
Moore, another pluralist, agrees that complex physical situations involving the coexistence of religious and non-religious conceptions antedate the establishment of a
modern state in many contemporary socio-geographical spaces of the world.500 She
emphasizes that the legal organization of society is congruent with its social organization
and that normative heterogeneity as linked with social action takes place in a “context of
multiple, overlapping semi-autonomous social fields which…is in practice a dynamic
condition.”501 Moore’s current socio-geographical spaces are social fields within nation
states; national states; or even transnational spaces. According to Moore, each field
within a particular heterogeneity is self-regulated but it is also vulnerable to the larger
complex world by which it is surrounded. For Moore, because the nation state is now the
fundamental unit of political organization, particularly in democracies and the rule of
liberal law is its central instrument, and because law is present in every “semiautonomous social field” as whole societies are structured and seen as a pattern and
network of “areas of autonomy and modes of self-regulation”, she points out the dynamic
aspect of partial autonomy: the tendency of self-regulating social fields is “to fight any
encroachment on autonomy previously enjoyed.”502 For Moore, legal pluralism is a
complex social situation in which law finds its working, free from hierarchical, centralist,
whole society preconceptions, with an emphasis on a continuously variable autonomy of
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social fields.
Griffiths agrees with Moore’s descriptive theory of legal pluralism, that the
sociolegal structure is manifest in the actual pattern of interaction of the various semiautonomous fields which can be observed.503 But he adds that if the recognition,
incorporation or validation of normative heterogeneity stem from the perspective of a
nation-state’s concept of legal pluralism, the latter not only contributes to the theory of
legal centralism but it obscures this descriptive theory of law. For Griffiths, the
normative heterogeneity requires that the “social space is normatively full rather than
empty.”504
For Tamanaha, what makes legal pluralism noteworthy is not merely the fact that
there are multiple uncoordinated, coexisting or overlapping bodies of law, but that there
is diversity amongst them making competing claims of authority; imposing conflicting
demands or norms; and having different styles and orientations. He refers to a
multiplicity of legal orders ranging from village laws to sophisticated legal systems that
exist nationally, supranationally, transnationally and internationally. Globally or locally,
these laws can be customary law, indigenous law, religious law, or law connected to
distinct ethnic or cultural groups within a society. There is also an evident increase in
quasi-legal activities, from private policing and judging, to privately run prisons, to the
ongoing creation of the new lex mercatoria, a body of transnational commercial law that
is almost entirely the product of private lawmaking activities.505
For Berman, the complexity is in law in a world of hybrid legal spaces where a

Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism?” supra note 4 at 36-37.
Ibid. Griffiths at 34.
505
Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism”, Supra note 469 at 1.
503
504

158

single act or actor continues to be regulated by multiple legal or quasi-legal regimes.506
Hybrid norms are heterogeneous in origin, composition, and style, and have different
types of independencies. Although they are descriptive in nature, they may perform the
same function as the rule of law, rule, regulation, precept, statute, ordinance, and cannon,
all of which are primary sources of ethical standards of decision-making prescribed by a
single sovereign authority requiring obedience on those subjected to this authority.507
For De Sousa Santos, there is an incompleteness of each culture and a crossculture conception of human rights is called for in a process of “diatopical hermeneutics”
or on the idea that the topoi of an individual culture, no matter how strong they may be,
are as incomplete as the culture itself.508 It has to be assessed from another culture’s
topoi. He raises the consciousness of reciprocal incompleteness to its maximum possible
by engaging in the dialogue with one foot in one culture and the other in another. This
cannot occur in a social void as it shares a political bias in favour of emancipation with a
different process of knowledge creation. It requires a production of knowledge that must
be collective, interactive, intersubjective, networked and perhaps prescriptive.
However, for Griffiths, the descriptive conception of legal pluralism should break
the stranglehold of “a single, unified and exclusive hierarchical normative ordering.”509
For him, the analysis of an empirical state of affairs points to legal orders which do not
belong to a single system. For Griffiths also, the term ‘legal pluralism’ is not an attribute
of a legal system such as a: doctrine, theory, or an ideology. The concept of legal
pluralism can never be complete, orderly, and institutionalizable. And Sack laments, that
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in the interrelation of legal rules with state law, that unless other forms of law are
translated into rights and rules, and informal mechanisms are institutionalized, the
challenges of legal pluralism are unwelcome and therefore a threat to liberal legalism. 510
For Berman, Cover’s definition of law as that being constantly constructed
through the contest of various norm-generating communities is not only unavoidable but
desirable, both as a source of alternative ideas and as a site for discourse among multiple
community affiliations including the official prescriptive or adjudicatory jurisdiction.511
And Sack feels that law cannot escape its responsibility within changing societies,
politics and culturally-specific formations; what is crucial is not analytical clarity and
consistency achieved through logic and advanced theories of forms of law but the
performance of practical social tasks.512 For pluralists, to be effective, law has to remain
flexible.
Globally, the legal system is now an interlocking web of jurisdictional assertions
by state, international, and non-state normative communities. Each type of overlapping
jurisdictional assertion (state versus state; state versus international body; state versus
non-state entity) creates a potentially mixed legal space that is not easily eliminated. It
can be argued that with state versus state conflicts, growth of global communications
technologies, the rise of multinational corporate entities with no significant territorial
center of gravity, and the mobility of capital and people across borders mean that many
jurisdictions “will feel effects of activities around the globe, leading inevitably to
multiple assertions of legal authority over the same act, without regard to territorial
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location.”513 And again, in the ever-increasing global flows and frictions, people feel ties
to—and act based on affiliations with—multiple communities in addition to their
territorial ones. These ties may be ethnic, religious, or epistemic, transnational,
subnational, or international, and the norms asserted by such communities frequently
challenge territorially-based authority. Canon law and other religious community norms
have continued to operate in significant overlap with liberal state laws.
In Canada, Muslim and Jewish citizens, among others, experience conflict
between their personal law tied to religion and Canadian law tied to their nation-state and
this continues to pose constitutional and other challenges. As stated, because ethnicities
bond and can also create significant normative communities, some normative systems
therefore will deny even a limited mutual dialogue creating further challenges. A
pluralist approach cannot provide a decision-making authority about which norms prevail
within a messy hybrid world. “Pluralism fundamentally challenges both positivist and
natural rights-based assumptions that there can ever be a single answer.”514
Paradoxically, universal harmonization is not only unlikely to satisfy everyone
but neither will it be fully achievable. Hybridity is therefore a messy reality and it not
only preserves spaces for contestation, creative adaptation, and innovation, but also
inculcates ideals of tolerance, dialogue, and mutual accommodation in our adjudicatory
and regulatory institutions.515 The ideal of the legal reality of the modern state is not, and
as Griffiths affirms, “tidy, consistent, organized … nicely captured in the common
identification of ‘law’ and ‘legal system.”516 In effect, the ideological heritage of the
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bourgeois revolutions and liberal hegemony of the last few centuries is also a complex of
ideas concerning the nature of law and its place in social life.517
D. Hegemonic state law and justification by courts: are complex and
divergent interpretations accounting for mythical origins of norms?
As a pluralist, for Griffiths, despite the fact that law and narrative are inseparable,
the hegemony of legal centralism stemming from Western theoretical approaches of law,
continues to dictate that “law is and should be the law of the state, uniform for all
persons, exclusive of all other law and administered by a single set of state
institutions.”518 The intricate union of central law commands a systematic normative
ordering: how things ought to be with terms of rules, principles, categories, standards,
notions, and schemes of meaning. Within this teleological vision, in other words, a
commitment of official judges to the constitution, the origin of law in myth and history
does not exist in the justification by a court. The liberal secular world disclaims control
over the interpretation of narrative and it particularly disclaims the thick contextuality to
all moral situations so that all other normative orderings such as of church, family,
associations and organizations, both voluntary and economic, are subordinate to liberal
institutional state law. State law can therefore permanently separate reality from vision.
Again, the propositions of state law and general layers of norms lend validity
from the bottom up until some ultimate norm is reached.519 In Canada, as outlined in
Chapter III, the court may consider a break from its own homogeneity in the interest of
being tolerable, for instance, in determining and formulating rules regarding conflict of
identity such as sect, religious group, marriage laws, rites and rituals, etc. This may
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strain the court’s own legal ethics in recognizing a particular religious content and norms
as valid. When parts of the vision are given depth and are highlighted and other parts are
cast aside—and associations even reinterpret the terms of their own being—the law takes
on the role of adjudicating between many different substantive normative orders.
Both, state constitutions and widespread narrative traditions, that are not
universally accepted as a basis for interpretation, are competing with ‘natural law’ for
primacy. Cover points out that insulated communities have established their own
meanings for constitutional principles in their struggle to maintain independence and
authority of their own nomos. The norm-generating aspects of the free exercise of
religion, corporation law, and contract are all instances of associational liberty protected
by insular constitutions. Again, insularity, particularly of ancient scriptural religious
tenets, is maintained by communities and groups at whatever cost. However, the insular
movements that generate their own constitutional law have to this point been considered
almost as if they operated in a world in which there is no meaning and have been
subjected to force and violence.
According to Cover, no religious churches, however small and dedicated, or
utopian communities, however isolated, or cadres of judges, however independent, can
ever manage a total break from other groups with other understandings of law.520 For
Cover, just as constitutionalism is part of what may legitimize the state, so
constitutionalism may legitimize within a different framework, communities and
movements. State law may be mistakenly overreaching itself with only a partial insight
into the operation of law where multiplicities of modernities exist. Because Canadian
law and its foundational beliefs are based on political ideology of liberalism, it will
520
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require a substantial adaptation and reformulation of both existing legislation and judicial
precedent to make provision for substantive recognition of the normative claims of
religious freedom. Even though official values are ultimately grounded in rational ethical
arguments, we need ethical raw data as inputs for critical reflection and agreement.
These initial ethical inputs come from cultures.
And Griffiths insists that the plurality of laws in a liberal modernity are “private
as well as public, and the national legal system is … a secondary rather than a primary
locus of regulation.”521 In the current normative world, there is no obvious central text
that exhaustively supplies both narrative and precept. The complicated reality and
tension between the ideology of legal centralism and the actual empiricism of a liberal
state is further problematized by the idealized depiction of law in liberal modernity and
its use to unjustly compare it to and to belittle other ormative orders.522 Yet, statedeclared constitutions and some theological tenets continue to act as supreme law in the
place of foundational beginnings emanating jurisgeneration.
This is evident within the jurisprudence wherein strong traditions of common
visions and obligations continue to be at the heart of religious institutions. In that
interdependence of legal meanings makes it possible to say that all communities,
including the judge, are engaged in the task of constitutional understanding, the distinct
starting points, stories, commitments to legal meaning and identifications make us realize
that we cannot pretend to a unitary law.
This high regard for religious liberty and type of meaning of law can therefore
destabilize power; there are sometimes tremendous stresses that law abiding citizens,
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believers for instance, face, when there is conflict between secular principles and deeply
held religious aspects.523 In the majority of the cases of this nature, when there is a
collision, allegiance is towards “God.” Therse forms of consciousness have stemmed
from tortuous histories of hardship and ‘martyrs’ have arisen to ‘suffer’ for tenets that are
upheld.
In the law-state link, von Benda-Beckmann argues that dubbing normative
orders—other than state law that are not recognized—as ethnocentric, obscures the
fundamental differences in form, structure and effective sanctioning between state law
and other normative orders.524 As far as von Benda-Beckmann is concerned, whether law
functions as social control or that it resolves conflicts or creates conflicts (it does both) in
different empirical situations, is not as important as to how effective is it in terms of
people conforming to the normative boundaries set by their law. The existence of a rule
of conduct within an association, such as a religious organization, is a matter of actual
behavior and recognition by the association of a standard within. Again, the concept of a
social group and the concept of rules of conduct are inseparable. Does the law conform
to the behaviour of the member in terms of the individual’s place within the specific
association?
Pluralists maintain that because interpersonal faith and reason are both
constitutive of the normative worlds, people cannot be satisfied with rules that disallow
them to live the law. Legal meaning is a challenging enrichment of social life, a potential
restraint on arbitrary power and violence. Legal pluralism is omnipresent in any human
society and law remains open and dynamic, not requiring entire legal systems so that the
523
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social state of affairs may have multiple legal mechanisms comprising of rules or clusters
of rules or institutions.
As we saw in Chapter III, in broad arguments, even at the Supreme Court of
Canada, there is a range of opinion, but it does choose, as per Cover, a single justification
of a specific court or “in the last resort a uniform rule of civil justice.”525 Cover suggests
that although normative behaviour can be located within a “common script” it is when
law is used as social control to justify and ensure the co-existence of many normative
worlds, that the social basis for jurisgenesis destroys legal meaning—jurispathy.526 Even
the most perfectly designed statutes need to be interpreted by the courts and ambiguities
in language are inevitable. Consistently fresh events are adapted to new situations
(continual legislative amendment is not always practical). Meaning is deliberately
constructed in the normative world by jurisprudence. Jurisprudence reveals that the
capacity to turn the customs of a specific religious group into law can only be done in
specified circumstances when it is allowed to replace its uniform general law. As new
law continues to be created through the sectarian separation of communities the “too
fertile forces of jurisgenesis” create a multiplicity of meanings.527 Jurisgeneration by
which legal meaning proliferates in cultures including interpretation of history, are strong
forces but the resultant diversity is subject to violence constrained by monistic norms; the
jurisgenerative world of multiple incoherent and violent interactions now requires to be
maintained.
On the capacity to express a privileged hermeneutic on unresolvable differences
of opinion by higher courts, Cover quotes US Justice Jackson’s famous aphorism “We
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are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”528
If it is the state that creates law only to “confuse the status of interpretation with the
status of political domination” and if it is the state that elevates the court’s interpretative
privilege within its political hierarchy, legal codes provided by conscious legislation deny
the jurisgenerative community its legal meaning and integrity of a law of its own.529 This
exercise of superior brute force by agencies of state law stamps out the creative
hermeneutic of principle found across a multiplicity of legal meaning. For Cover, state
courts can be coercive as they have supreme jurispathic capacity.
Cover suggests that there is an “undisciplined” yet “visionary jurisgenerative
impulse” that is indifferent to the state.530 Powerful movements can create their own
nomian worlds. That legal pluralists are widely divergent in the conceptualization of law
and legal pluralism and that the relation of law’s content to its meaning is complicated
was already well enunciated by Geertz, that “man is an animal suspended in webs of
significance he himself has spun”531
Complexities also arise when precedents multiply over decades leading to more
uncertainty in law. Although common law is valuable, it does not always produce
desirable results and judges taking numerous such undesirable decisions, including
conflicting precedents on unsettled points, may have to come to a predicament with no
obvious escape. This impasse—a radical dichotomy between the social organization of
law as power and the organization of law as meaning—would take very long to resolve.
For Cover, a significant resource that enables us to “submit, rejoice, struggle,
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pervert, mock, disgrace, humiliate, or dignify,” is manifest in patterns of intricate
competition, interaction, negotiation, isolationism and the like.532 The very existence of
the normative universe is due to the force of commitment to interpretation and the
determination of the meaning of law.533 Depending on which side a narrative is placed,
the degree of norm-generating autonomy on the part of any association is not liberty to be
but liberty and capacity to create and interpret law.534 Law therefore is meaningful when
an interpretation is acceptable with a personal commitment to act, an affirmation, on the
transformed position taken. An affirmation projects a commitment to understand the
norm at work in reality – an ultimate vision in relation to its utility of all possible worlds.
Again, any transformed views requiring affirmations must be with the understanding that
the group, religious or otherwise, is being projected into the realm of the unknown. “The
distance between the universality of the law and the concrete legal situation in a
particular case is … indissoluble.”535 For Sack, the presiding “positive law [should
have]…no difficulties in incorporating even the most exotic forms of substantive foreign
law.”536 For Cover, we ought to stop “circumscribing the nomos; we ought to invite new
worlds [in].”537
Matter of fact statements about law as social control, as culture, as power and as
process are useful only to the extent of the qualities and function of law in actual life and
should not to be confused with identifying law with any of these specific manifestations.
Neither is the scope of moral life designed from an overarching religious domain. For
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Griffiths, uniformed and administered by a single set of institutions, state law is blatantly
illegitimate as, although it is vast and sophisticated, it is a myopic and stifling umbrella of
liberal jurisprudence.538 In other words, legal centralism has been the major obstacle to
the development of a descriptive theory of law.
E. Conclusion: powerful plural epistemological normativities of multiple
modernities as ‘agents’ of social transformation
According to Shah, generally, the export via colonialism or by voluntary adoption
of the monistic conception of law that has penetrated legal theory as the only form of law
which is made and recognized by the state is now fiction.539 In referencing Menski, Shah
insists that to the contrary, the core thesis is that the search for a uniform set of rules for a
global order is bound to be futile because laws embody and reflect the socio-cultural
particulars and experiences of functioning societies, and which, although transmitted
longitudinally within the society, are nonetheless complex, fluid and dynamic. If conflict
is predictable due to non-inclusive governance, and it is understood that rejection of
pluralism may be the spark for this condition, the value of pluralism is essential in preempting the risk of conflict in today’s ever-globalizing world.
However, a pluralist disposition is also a learned value and a continuous
investment by government in harnessing the power of diversity. Allowing communities
to aspire to self-rule in accord with their own customs and traditions will eradicate the
injustice of an alien form of rule.540 Any adequate theory of law and of a legal order
therefore must, among other considerations, take account of the particularized sociopolitical institutions of the society, that society’s belief systems, its politics and its
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history. The one universal characteristic of all legal systems, Shah claims, is thus the
inherent tendency towards “plurality-consciousness.”541 Plurality is human rights,
successful democracy, and institutional strength in quality service of humanity all rolled
into one.542
Shah also brings to our attention that although the West may have been home to
legal modernism, both, Menski and Chiba, who he also references, would combine
modern natural law theories with legal liberalism and socio-legal traditions to form an
interactive, triangular, concept of legal pluralism; in other words, their approaches to
legal pluralism would include analyses of historical and conceptual development of nonWestern as well as Western jurisprudence.543 However, the thinking that reproduction of
state law by ordinary citizens is not considered legal is deeply ingrained in the
methodology of social scholars, including some lawyers and judges.544 The construction
of alternative approaches which emphasize morality and maneuvering through conflicting
political interests, has to resonate with the rule of law.
However, in the alignment of the rule of constitutional law and liberalism for the
management of religious diversity, the focus is on practical accomodation, rather than a
sophisticated normative and philosophical debate.545 The liberal attitude of subordination
of difference, particularly of religion, to an abstract individualism of liberal modernity—
despite the fact that the human identity needs particular anchors—succeeds in invoking
the constitutional rule of law to resist legislation and democracy. Democracy and human
rights suffer even with the lofty achievements of the rule of law.
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Although Canadians show a high degree of allegiance to or identification with the
Charter, Blattberg asserts that many Canadian citizens feel somewhat alienated from the
constitution itself and many can’t seem to reconcile themselves to it at all.546 According
to Blatberg, many Canadians are confused about what exactly it would mean to have
achieved any kind of constitutional home.547 There is a growing recognition of cultural
diversity within Canada but the same cannot be said about the recognition of its
epistemological diversity, that is, the diversity of knowledge systems underlying the
practices of a plurality of different social groups. The philosophical argument relies on
the uncertainties of a rationalized and objective epistemology. If there are uncertainties
and limits to popular participation in the political and therefore constitutional openness to
change, the goal of democracy and liberal justice cannot be realized.
A more robust notion of religious freedom would explore equality of
opportunities to be granted to the different kinds of knowledge engaged in ever
broadening epistemological disputes aimed both at maximizing their respective
contributions to build a more democratic and just society and the decolonizing of
knowledge and power. There is no social justice without cognitive justice. Berger too
states that the encounter between law and religion runs into conflict with an ambitious
culture of the rule of law that is not as ready to delve into deep religious diversity.548
However, the task of jurisprudence is to offer us a means by which we can understand
and relate to the complex phenomenon of law and society.549
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CONCLUSION
The Failure of Canadian Secular Liberal Law to Transcend Difference
in Globalization: Religious Rights Remain Accomodational Political
Claims of a Multiplicity of Modernities
Canada is ruled by a modern, liberal secular rights-protecting polity with an
entrenched Charter of Rights and Freedoms making its liberal constitution the supreme
law of the country.550 Its legislatures have a constitutional role in accommodating
difference and the judicial review function for this role is vested in its courts. It is in
courts that rights are actively pursued and the judge is the final arbiter that shapes the
claims of the constitutional rule of liberal law. Indeed, it is the commitment to the rule of
liberal constitutional law that judicial review is legitimated and which forces all
institutions in society to abide by Charter guarantees.551 The 1982 Charter is, in effect, a
response to diversity in Canada and the post-Charter era is the latest incarnation of
modernity in Canada, otherwise defined as a multiplicity of modernities. In the ever
increasing global flows, different people feel ties to and act based on affiliations to their
own group in addition to the affiliation to the state. Yet, the profoundly entrenched 17th
century European ideology of the isolated and abstracted individual endures within the
Charter.
In terms of the differences between individual rights and group rights and the
norms asserted by these communities, the European ideology continues to shape the postCharter Canadian approach to diversity. In the 30 plus years since the institution of the
Charter, each instance of the difference in current normative systems continues to
undergo a process of accommodation from within liberal legalism and often adjudicated
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upon as an expression of something temporary. In the post-Charter era, religion and the
associated norms seem to have become inconsequential.
A. Revisiting the historical and theoretical perspectives within liberal law
As stated, historically, liberal law and jurisprudence have moved from supporting
a state religion and considering as heathens those who did not conform to that particular
religion, to a position where some religions are more clearly recognized, yet, many are
not. In Canada, because the majority religion stems from Christendom, there is still a
persistence of Christian privilege in Western institutional practices and structures.
Although, the relationship between the religious believer and liberal law is specifically
guaranteed by s. 2 (a) of the Canadian Charter, and basic equality guarantees to specific
isolated groups, including religious organizations, are also provided in Section 15(1) of
the Charter, the liberal legal system accommodates the needs, traditions and cultures of
the majority packaged in the language of neutral rules that conceal their religious,
sociological and cultural underpinnings. And although a neutral form of secularism in
society seems to be entrenched in the Canadian constitution, and religion is a choice that
is constructed under the dogmatic and individualistic doctrine of the autonomy of the
individual, or the guarantee of freedom of individual conscience and religion,552 the postCharter era continues to be based on historical theoretical presuppositions and ideals of
Eurocentric liberal modernism and in keeping with the Eurocentric concept of secularism
wherein religious claims are perceived as political claims. Liberal legalism conflicts with
multiple modern identities and their plural sociolegal perspectives.
Again, in Canadian liberal politics and law, because the supreme natural right to
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pursue happiness has come to mean that each person is the chief bearer of rights as
against the state, and has equal rights before the law, and because these guaranteed rights
to life, liberty and security are negative in nature, the Charter does not protect positive
rights such as economic or social entitlements in the form of employment, shelter, social
services, et cetera.553 Ideas about freedom, equality and justice will always remain
central to liberalism but they have to be endorsed by all citizens that are loyal to
competing definitions about these values. Individual choices that are self-centered are
liberating, but at the same time, individual choices associated with religious institutions
and beliefs need more support at the intersection of liberal legal authority and what it
considers to be illiberal ways of life. For instance, the constitution emphasizes that
people might be equal or unequal and may or may not be treated equally, or unequally,
however the ideal of equality exerts a great moral force.
Yet, perpetuating historical presuppositions of liberal modernity as central to
contemporary social theory in Western democracies, and perpetuating the autonomous
and self-sustaining positive law by power politics and essentialism, context is replicated
in modern constitutional law as a bearer of traditions. The consistent imposition of this
particular approach in a plural society is unjust and may result in violent conflicts.
B. Recapping on current socio-normative and socio-political contexts in
Canada
As outlined herein, generally, the sociology of law indicates that law: springs
forth from sociopolitical contexts—contexts that exist in differrent historical eras; is
biased in serving some interests rather than others; is differently orientated in different
societies giving rise to different legal systems; and continues to dominate through a
553
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combination of coercive and ideological legal systems, structures and processes. It was
also seen that modern Western liberal constitutional law limits state interference in
individual freedoms of conscience and religion, and the state is in effect the primary
agent of social control and change. Law remains its purposive instrument to transform
society. In modernity, liberal constitutional law changes and redirects social relations in
the pursuit of positive social ends and goals by extensively regulating a range of activities
from employment practices to financial services to human rights with a bias towards
informal legal systems, customary law, and religious tenets. It is precisely when law is
viewed as an expression of social relations that the complex connections and tensions
between positive laws of modern societies and the spontaneous relations that have been
interfered with that the latter become apparent.
A crucial lesson that is emerging from the social reality in Canada is that state
ethics cannot be built by only public and elite-driven institutions based on outgrown
philosophy or by constitutional engineering. The citizenry has to be fully engaged with
all aspects of life, including the practice of religion, which is what maintains and
produces good civic morals in the majority of society. The religious identity covers a
large and important area of human life and shapes the way a believer is defined and
regulated. Religion is, for believers, the source of their worldview and values, it is the
very ground of their being and thus their frame of reference in the governance of all areas
of their lives. For believers, this is what gives religion its political significance; its
importance extends well beyond the narrow confines of the liberal constitutional order.
Philosophically, religion claims to shape public reason rather than be shaped by it.
Religion in effect assumes that liberal rationalism is not sufficient for principles
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of conduct and social meaning. “Scriptural literalists” go even further with their finality
on the scripture as they argue that rationalism rests on faith; they may be logically
incoherent.554 The secular world, on the other hand, rejects the essence of religion and,
because state law is based on reasons that are within reach of society at large, the public
sphere is a realm of reason and rationality as opposed to religious beliefs stemming from
faith or from cultural community.
In Canada, the most important mechanism of constitutional change in
contemporary society is now the rule of constitutional law and judicial interpretation in
the governance of a multiplicity of modernities and their sincere beliefs. Since 1982, the
Charter has enhanced the political power of the courts that are the “natural” interpreters
of the constitution. In engaging in constitutional review, Canadian courts can infuse and
breathe life into the constitution but they may not stray far from the corpus of liberal
constitutional law if both are to thrive in the present system. Even the most analysed
interpretations are subject to constitutional limitations which lends a certain amount of
vagueness to constitutional outcomes.
Liberal law’s inconsistent and inelastic approach to liberalism itself denies the
relevance of the value of diversity at the expense of liberalism itself.555 There is no
feasible position between difference and sameness within modern liberal law. The
process of secularization in the liberation of the individual is misunderstood.556 The
tension between the ancient norms of minority religion and the extremely slow reshaping
of liberal law is apparent in Canadian courts. Unequal treatment of religious freedom by
legislation and by courts or misinterpretation of religious norms due to a lack of
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understanding the social significance of such norms is a form of discrimination. But
more importantly, the assertion of difference can be legitimated and sometimes violated.
C. Constitutional commitment to freedom of religion in Canada
The constitutional commitment to freedom of religion in section 2(a) of the
Charter must be taken very seriously, particularly by the enactors and enforcers of law
via legislation, administration and adjudication. As noted in Chapter III, in Canada,
when there are disagreements on some acute moral, political and legal conflicts at the
center of liberal secular values, the importance of religious liberty may be by-passed if it
is untenable to the political majority. Because within secular legalism the assumption of
equality is a uniform treatment, in the event of a challenge of unconstitutionality, courts
have to determine whether the limit under s. 1 of the Charter is “reasonable” and
“demonstrably justified.” Justification of the limit on Charter freedoms such as freedom
of religion in s. 2 (a) varies in each case. Some such cases are difficult to solve reflecting
limitation in the capacities afforded to the judge. However, as was evident in the case of
A.C., constitutional constraints on democratic legislation enforced by judicial review or
judicial restraint are morally problematic and can even be illegitimate.557 And those that
insist on a homogeneous form of liberal legalism may be limiting the capacity to
adjudicate fairly within conflicts between differently positioned real communities. Does
this constitute a violation of human rights? The overtly narrow treatment of equality
issues by the courts pulls the judiciary and the law directly into a political debate. In the
tendency to politically simplify different religious norms, there is misinterpretation of
complex social issues; liberal law and its principles overshadow the social goods and pre-
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existing capital of collectivities. Communities of believers are finding it difficult to
mobilize the Charter for their constitutional status against social disparities. It would
seem that the interest of the believer is legally protected in court and in the event of a
moral conflict, the cornerstone of religious freedom in the Charter is respect for the
perspectives of the other. However, where freedom of religion presents a dilemma,
judges do not go far enough in the exercise of this purpose of the protection of specific
claims and equal participation in society. Various national minorities, religious groups
and intercultural multiplicities in Canada desire, in their own different ways, society to
recognize, the legitimacy of their differences which constitute their normative identity
and well-being.558
D. Possibilities in liberty: a mix of identities, equal religious citizenship
and legal pluralism?
As long as secularity means non-religiosity or a contra-indication to religion, the
fear of intervention of religion into political life will remain strong and just as equally,
will the fear of foreshadowing of religion by secular interventions.559 Although a
conscience that dictates that everything legal that is religious is not acceptable, faithbased conscience also plays an important role in the well-being of the citizen.560 Again,
religious centralism, like legal centralism, is also an unrealistic analytical tool but in
terms of ethical behaviour, both individual human rationality and collective morality are
integral to humanity and a way of life. The dominance of secularism undermines
religious ritualistic claims.
In Canada, the legitimacy of the institution of the judiciary is enduring. Pluralists
Parekh, “Rethinking Multiculturalism” supra note 17.
Heyking, supra note 117 at 3.
560
Menski supra note 7 at 194.
558
559
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and anthropological analysts, however, have suggested that in historical terms, because
plurality is a product of struggle, negotiation and other interactions amongst a
multiplicity of social fields, it is a core feature of human experience.561 However, it is the
very commitment to Western modernity that has steadily atrophied the awareness of the
knowledge of a variety of conventions that humans use to order their lives and
experiences.562
Although, as per Cover, narrative in material reality was sourced by our
imaginations and the human is indeed a spin-doctor and gets caught in his/her own
trappings,563 reflection on Canada, and the culture, ethics and political reality in which
individuals and communities are making myriad different choices, reveals a widening,
transforming, hyperplural and overlapping identity that has to grapple with the
complexities of law in a world of multiple normative communities. Equality before the
law, and equal protection of the law, needs to be defined in culturally sensitive contexts,
of differential treatment of different groups, and not as one serving as a cloak for
discrimination or privilege. The problem of cultural diversity and justice, and the fate of
law in plural societies, particularly in Canada, are crucial concerns. It is evident that the
many shades of modernity in Canada have far-reaching implications for democracy in the
context of law and society. A definition of the many shades of modernity—multiple
modernities—requires a much needed understanding of not only the relationship between
the democratic institutions and the critique of liberal modernity but also of the practical
implications of liberal secular constitutional law. Only through a pluralistic, multijuridical framework can we fully respect the place of plural legal thinking.
Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism?” supra note 4 at 36.
Tie, supra note 13.
563
Cover, Supra note 20, referencing Geertz.
561
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F. The need for continued research of the law by pluralists
In that the law is seen as: primarily symbolic; focused on the implicit forms of
normativity; arising in myriad everyday relationships; and aimed at facilitating human
interaction, the goal is not just to consider technical questions of primary interest to the
legal profession, but substantive matters that bear on the lives of people who fall outside
of the legal mainstream: the socially disadvantaged and the politically marginalized. As
such, failing to recognize the significance of religious law (for instance) will result in the
impoverishment of our understanding of Canadian laws and legal processes. Consistent
interrogation by pluralists will put on notice the degree of inclusivity that represents
normative reality and why law and the state are at the center of our inquiries.
In the interim, as globalization and the cultural pluralizations of the multiple
modernities are proceeding simultaneously, so too are arguments being advanced for
legal pluralism to allow a co-existence of jurisdictional systems for different cultural and
religious traditions and acceptance of a variety of institutional design for societies with
strong ethnic, cultural and linguistic cleavages.564 But the very pluralization of lifespaces endows them with highly ideological absolutizing orientations and, at the same
time, brings them into the political arena. Western liberal law could be said to be
therefore developing without religion. It is understood that to get to the authenticity of a
religious tenet of any particular religion is an extremely difficult task.
If the precepts of religion and the constitutional rule of law are two competing
normative systems both claiming sovereignty over the religious citizen, the relationship
between religion, politics and law in Canada is not only difficult, it is illogical. 565 To
continue to refuse to acknowledge or respect the public elements of other religious
564
565

Benhabib supra note 194 at 19.
Taylor, “The Polysemy” supra note 41.
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traditions is a risk of alienation of large sectors of the dynamic multiplicity of populations
in Canada.566 Pluralized constitutional law will ensure that multiplicities of laws
continue to be constitutionalized. A robust pursuit of truth has to accept that unitary
approaches will fail as no single known position is known to have reached the truth.

566

Heyking, supra note 117.
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